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The concept of desert is familiar to everyone.

We have all heard

that wrongdoers deserve punishment, that the virtuous deserve
happiness,

that hard workers deserve success, that innocent victims deserve

compensation, that everyone deserves an adequate level of medical care,
that no one deserves to be born handicapped, and so on.

From these sayings, it is clear that desert is an evaluative
concept.

It therefore belongs to the class of concepts that includes

rightness, justice, rationality, goodness, beauty, and others.
is thus a familiar,

It is ironic,

Desert

evaluative concept.
then,

that desert has not received anything like the

amount of philosophical attention enjoyed by the other evaluative

concepts that

I

mentioned.

In this dissertation,

I

focus my attention

on desert.
I

begin,

in Chapter 1,

neglected by philosophers.

by trying to explain why desert has been
In Chapter 2

I

argue that much of the

received philosophical wisdom about desert is false.

dedicated to "institutional" theories of desert.

V

Chapter

3

is

These theories make

desert relative to institutional rules or
purposes.

Chapter

4

explores

some views about the purported connection
between desert and the

emotions.

In Chapter

5

I

argue that a well-known attempt to justify

desert-claims fails, and that this failure is the result
of mistaken
views about the connections between desert and the
concepts of moral

obligation and of value.

One aim of Chapter

6

of some prominent theories of desert of wages.

is to reveal the defects

A deeper aim is to

expose a fundamental defect in a standard way of looking at
desert in
general
In Chapter 7,

I

present my own theory of desert.

It contains,

among other things, a catalogue of bases for desert and an explanation
of "all-in desert" in terms of "prima facie desert" and "weight."

The

structure of my theory of desert is therefore similar to the structure
of W. D. Ross’s theory of moral rightness.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

We do not merely describe the world.

We evaluate it -

ineluctably, and from a variety of perspectives.

We pronounce of

various things that they are good or bad, beautiful or
ugly, right or
wrong, rational or irrational.

These are just a few of the many

concepts we employ to evaluate the people we know, the acts we
perform,
the objects we behold, the rules we make, the fates that
befall us.

Another evaluative concept is desert.

We use this concept to

evaluate the receipt or distribution of benefits and burdens

-

such as

prizes, grades, punishment, offices, apologies, compensation,

retribution, suffering, rewards, wages
liberally.

-

and we employ the concept

Most often it crops up in our evaluations of what people

receive (or could receive) from other people, as when we say that a

student deserves a certain grade, or that a waitress deserves a certain
tip.

But we also use it to evaluate what people "receive" from the

natural world, as when we express sympathy for the "undeserving victims"
of floods,

famine, and earthquakes.

We also invoke the concept of

desert to evaluate what the natural world "receives" from human beings,
as when it is argued that rabbits do not deserve to suffer the Draize

test for cosmetics, or that the Olympic Peninsula deserves preservation.

Appeals to desert extend even to inanimate objects, as when we declare

1

that Union Carbide deserves to be sued
for its role in the Bhopal

disaster, or that Oregon deserves better
publicity.

Indeed, once one

becomes sensitive to the concept of desert,
one cannot help but be
struck by the ubiquity of evaluations made in
terras of it.

As George

Sher has observed, "Desert is central to our
pre-ref lective thought."^
Thus it is surprising that desert, unlike the other
evaluative

concepts

I

mentioned, has been neglected by philosophers.

The available

philosophical literature on desert is more or less exhausted
by a few
books and a dozen articles, almost all of which appeared
in the last few
decades.

Prior to the 1960

’s,

references to desert in the

philosophical literature were confined almost exclusively to debates
in
the philosophy of punishment.

In those debates,

the concept of desert

was used to characterize a form of "retributivism" according to which

punishment is morally justifiable only if deserved.^

But even those who

endorsed this sort of retributivism offered nothing in the way of an

articulated theory of desert.^
Indeed, among the few philosophers who have written about desert,

the tendency has been as much toward ridiculing or downplaying the

concept as toward taking it seriously.

One example of the former

tendency is Barbara Goodwin’s verdict that "...the concept of desert
itself is incoherent and, philosophically speaking, unfounded."^

Another is Brian Barry’s astonishing prediction: "In examining the
concept of desert we are examining a concept which is already in decline
and may eventually disappear."®

Remarks such as these imply that even

2

if desert is central to our pre-ref
lective thought,

philosophical reflection might prompt us to
reject

a bit of
it.

The neglect of desert by contemporary
philosophers is surprising
for a reason other than desert’s centrality
to pre-ref lective thought.

The reason is that, in the twenty-five years
since the publication of
John Rawls’s enormously influential A Theory
of Justice, there has been
a tremendous outpouring of philosophical
interest in the idea of
Justice.'^

But according to a venerable view, justice obtains
to the

extent that people get what they deserve.®
so is desert.

Thus,

Since justice is important,

it is natural to suppose that the recent upsurge of

interest justice would be accompanied by a similar upsurge of
interest
in desert.

This has not happened.

What explains this tendency among contemporary philosophers,

especially those interested in justice, to ignore or reject the concept
of desert?

Part of the explanation,

I

think,

is Rawls’s work itself.

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls appeared to argue that desert,

rather than

the central concept in terms of which justice could be explained,

is

instead a concept explicable in terms of a prior notion of justice.^
Rawls, accordingly, made no use of the concept of desert in the

formulation or defence of his theory of justice.

Those (the many) who

were impressed by Rawls’s theory of justice may have felt no need to

discuss or invoke the concept of desert in their own work on justice.
This, however, cannot be the whole story behind the contemporary

neglect of desert.

This is because some of Rawls’s severest critics

make no use of desert in their own theories of justice.

3

Robert Nozick

IS an excellent example of one such
theorist.

In Anarchy, State,

Utopia, Nozick subjects Rawls’s theory of
justice

Rawls’s rejection of desert
criticisms.^®

own

to serious and,

and,

in particular,

in my opinion,

devastating

Yet when Nozick turns to formulating and defending
his

entitlement

whatsoever.

-

-

and

theory of justice, he makes no mention of desert

Another example is Michael Sandel, whose penetrating

criticisms of Rawls are second only to Nozick’s, but whose own
communitarian" theory of justice is devoid of appeals to desert.

The

existence of these critics of Rawls, whose theories of justice do
not

depend on desert, suggests that there may be a deeper explanation
of
their apparent scorn for desert.

Samuel Scheffler has recently sought such an explanation.

Scheffler’s idea is that contemporary theorists of justice have shied
away from desert because of their acceptance, perhaps tacitly, of

"naturalism."

Scheffler writes:

The widespread reluctance among political philosophers to
defend a robust notion of... desert is due in part to the
power in contemporary philosophy of the idea that human
thought and action may be wholly subsumable within a broadly
naturalistic view of the world. The reticence of these
philosophers - their disinclination to draw on any... notion
of desert in their theorizing about justice - testifies in
part to the prevalence of the often unstated conviction that
a thoroughgoing naturalism leaves no room for a conception
of individual agency substantial enough to sustain such a
notion.
This problem, the problem of the relation between
naturalism and individual agency, is of course a descendant
of the problem of determinism and free will.... Thus my
suggestion is that the reluctance of many contemporary
political philosophers to rely on a preinstitutional notion
of desert results in part from a widespread though often
implicit skepticism about individual agency, a form of
skepticism that is the contemporary descendant of skepticism
about freedom of the will.^^

4

Scheffler’s explanation, as

I

understand it, is this.

theorists of justice accept the doctrine of naturalism.

Contemporary
Naturalism is

incompatible with the doctrine that human beings have
free will.

The

denial of the doctrine of free will is incompatible
with accepting a
robust

notion of desert.

Hence, contemporary theorists of justice

reject any such notion.

There is something plausible about Scheffler’s explanation.

At

any rate, Scheffler is not the first philosopher to suppose
that

skepticism about free will or responsibility is tantamount to
skepticism
about desert.

Daniel Dennett, for example, makes the same supposition

in his engaging book.

Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth

Wanting:

It could be... that the concept of personal responsibility
enshrined in traditional (Western) morality is subtly
incoherent, and that we ought to revise or even jettison
that concept and the family of ideas surrounding it: guilt,
desert, moral praise, and punishment, to mention the most
important.

Tom Campbell makes a similar remark:

...the belief in desert - the very idea that anybody
ultimately deserves anything - seems to run counter to the
common contemporary assumption that individual behaviour is,
in the end, almost entirely the outcome of heredity and
environment, with little if any significance being
attributable to people’s individual choices. The "free
will" assumptions behind traditional ideas of desert are
certainly hard to fit into a scientific and deterministic
world view according to which human decisions are simply one
part of a continuous causal chain.

5

Thus,

if desert and naturalism are incompatible,

as some have thought,

and if recent theorists of justice accept
naturalism, then Scheffler is
correct: the retreat from desert by those
theorists should come as no

surprise.

That said, there is something implausible about
Scheffler’

diagnosis of the recent retreat from desert.

First, there is no direct

textual evidence of a denial of free will in the writings
of the

theorists of justice that Scheffler has in mind
notably.

In fact,

-

Rawls and Nozick, most

Rawls and Nozick depend heavily on notions of

freedom, autonomy, and liberty.

seems unlikely, then, that these

theorists have assumed (even tacitly) a conception of the world
incompatible with human freedom.

Second,

let us suppose with Scheffler

that those philosophers have accepted a conception of the world

incompatible with human freedom.

But then why would they jettison

desert only, and not also the "family of ideas," to borrow Dennett’s
phrase, that seem to surround it: guilt, praise, punishment, and so on?

Rawls and Nozick, at least, do not reject this family of notions.^®

If

these notions are, along with desert, out of place in a world without

human freedom, then Scheffler ’s explanation implies that contemporary

theorists of justice have internalized naturalism, but without

appreciating some of its most obvious implications.
some contemporary theorists of justice who are,

I

Third, there are

presume, no less

susceptible to the supposed "power" of naturalism, but who nevertheless
make a place in their theories for desert.

Scheffler ’s explanation

implies that these theorists are even more incapable than their anti-

6

desert colleagues of appreciating the full
significance of naturalism.

Given the implausibility of this and the
other implications of

Scheffler’s diagnosis, perhaps it would be best
to treat it as merely
part of the full explanation of recent refusals
to countenance desert.

Perhaps another piece in the full explanation of desert’s
neglect
by philosophers is this.

Perhaps some philosophers have confused desert

with some other concept, or mistakenly subsumed it under
some other
concept.

Unaware of the error, but aware of theories of whatever

concept desert may have been confused with or subsumed under,
perhaps
these philosophers concluded that there was nothing more to say
about
desert.

So,

they said nothing about it.

There is evidence that some philosophers have, if not confused

desert with some other concept, then at least subsumed it under some

other concept.

Brian Barry, for example, seems at one time to have

thought of desert as a species of goodness:

To ascribe desert to a person is to say that it would be a
good thing if he were to receive something. .. in virtue of
some action or effort of his or some result brought about by
him.

Austin Duncan-Jones

,

to take another example, seems to have confused

desert with the concept of responsibility.

This confusion is most

apparent in his description of a "utilitarian” theory of desert:

...when we say that a man is responsible, and has certain
deserts, the whole meaning of our statement can be resolved
into two clauses: (1) he has done a good or bad action; (2)
it is useful to apply certain sanctions to him.
[These]
two clauses. .. convey the whole of our meaning when we
ascribe responsibility or desert....^®
.
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.

.

As a final example, take S.

influential textbook.

1.

Benn and R. S. Peters.

In their once-

The Principles of Political Thought, these
authors

treated desert as a species of entitlement:

Desert is a normative word; its use presupposes
a rule
having two components: (i) a condition to be
satisfied; (ii)
a mode of treatment consequent upon it.
In questions of
income distribution the condition is usually the
performance
of some service (and in this respect it differs
from
entitlement," which is more general^ since one might be
"entitled" to benefits under rules which prescribed need,
or
insurance conditions, or sale of goods, as the qualifying
condition).
We cannot estimate desert, therefore, in a
vacuum; we must be able to refer to some standard or
rule
from which X deserves R" follows as a conclusion.^®
If the philosophers mentioned thought of desert as
at least subsumable

under another concept, then perhaps others have thought so
too.

If so,

this might partially explain the relative lack of interest
in desert as
a concept in its own right.
It is interesting to wonder about possible explanations for the

relative lack of philosophical interest in desert.

But it may be more

interesting, and more pertinent, to wonder whether this lack of interest
is justified.

This is where Scheffler’s diagnosis may take on a deeper

significance.

Is it true,

as Scheffler and others imply, that a broadly

'naturalistic" view of the world is incompatible with an acceptance of

desert?

If it is,

and if the naturalistic view of the world is correct,

then a philosophical study of desert (such as the one before you) is

interesting as an academic exercise only.

8

It will be a study of a

concept that, like the concept
of phlogiston, has no
application to the
actual world.
I

will not try to fully address
this vague worry here.

I

will,

however, suggest that even if
"naturalism" is true and inconsistent
with
the doctrine of human freedom,
there is still a place for desert
in the
world.
To see this, suppose we are
not free.
Suppose further that we
are occasionally victims of crime,
natural disasters, workplace
injuries, disease, and so on.

Even if we are not free agents,

it is not

obvious that we could not deserve
compensation, medical care, sympathy,
and perhaps other forms of treatment
in virtue of suffering such
things.
Indeed, as John Kleinig pointed out
twenty-five years ago:

The possibility of deserving compensation.
.. indicates that
there IS no simple relationship between
"being deserving of
and being responsible for." The man
who deserves
compensation is precisely not responsible for
those things
on the basis of which he deserves it.^^

Thus, even if widespread acceptance of
naturalism partly explains the

retreat from desert, it does not obviously
justify it.

For it to do so

the supposed connection between desert and
responsibility would, at the

very least, have to be made much clearer.

In Chapters

and

2

7,

I

take

up inter alia the supposed connection(s) between
desert and

responsibility.

With Kleinig,

I

conclude that if there is any such

connection, it is not so simple that a denial of freedom would
force us
to deny desert.
I

will also record my view that desert is distinct from the

concepts of goodness, responsibility, and entitlement.
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I

have already

noted that desert and responsibility may not be as closely
connected as
some philosophers have supposed.

As for desert’s distinctness from

goodness, this can be seen by considering a simple example.
that

I

experience some pleasure.

may not deserve that pleasure.

This is good in itself.

Suppose
However,

I

Hence, desert is distinct from goodness.

Besides, even if the getting of what’s deserved is always good in
itself, and in this way a "species" of goodness, this would not provide

any reason for a philosopher to ignore desert - any more than it would

provide a reason for a philosopher to ignore pleasure, virtue,
friendship, or any other species of goodness.

distinctness from entitlement,

I

As for desert’s

refer the reader to Chapter 3, where

make the case for this distinction in some detail.

Thus,

I

if my

suggestions here and in the chapters that follow are correct, the
neglect of desert by some contemporary philosophers cannot be justified
by their supposing that desert is (or is a species of) goodness,

responsibility, entitlement, or some other concept.

Whatever the full explanation or the supposed justification, the
fact remains: desert has been largely ignored by philosophers.

There

are only a few worked-out philosophical theories of desert available in
the literature.

Obviously,

I

In this dissertation,

would not do this if

available theories were correct.

I

I

contribute a new theory.

thought that one of the currently

Accordingly,

I

do not believe that any

of the currently available theories of desert are correct.

that all of those theories contain valuable insights.
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I

I

do believe

try to

incorporate some of those insights into my own
theory, which
and explain in Chapter

2,

3,

and

4

theories of desert.

present

7.

The chapters preceding Chapter

Chapters

I

7

can be summarized as follows.

are devoted to discussions of some prominent
Thus,

in Chapter 2,

I

attempt to clear away some

misguided views of desert that are prominent in the literature,
and that
have conveniently coalesced in a theory of desert recently
espoused by

Wojceich Sadurski.^^

Chapter

3

is dedicated to an examination of a

family of theories that have the following feature in common: each

attempts to explain desert in terms of rules or purposes^ and most

characteristically in terms of the rules or purposes of social
institutions.

(It is this sort of theory that is suggested by some

remarks in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.)

In Chapter 4,

I

discuss a

theory that attempts to explain desert in terms of a certain class of
emotions.

I

also explore there some other purported desert-emotion

connections.
As

I

see it, a pressing question for any theorist of desert is

whether our considered views about what is and what is not a "basis" for
desert can be justified.

So,

for example, how (if at all) can we

justify the considered views that hard workers deserve to succeed, that
the virtuous deserve to be happy, or that innocent sufferers deserve

sympathy?
in print,

In the only full-length study of desert currently available

George Sher attempts to justify these and a host of other

desert-claims.^'*

My view, explained and defended in Chapter

Sher’s justificatory project fails.

I

11

5,

is that

take the failure of Sher’s heroic

attempts to justify the major desert-claims as evidence
for the futility
of any such project.

Chapter

6

takes a somewhat practical turn.

the question of why,

if at all,

In it,

workers deserve wages.

I

I

try to answer

also trace out

some implications that my answer has for the "comparable worth"
debate.
An ostensible aim of this chapter is to discuss some prominent theories
of desert of wages, and to expose their defects.

reveal what

I

But a deeper aim is to

take to be a fundamental flaw with a standard theory of

desert, a theory espoused and defended by Joel Feinberg in his landmark
essay, "Justice and Personal Desert.

My hope is that Chapter 6

provides the last piece in a cumulative case for my conviction that a
new theory of desert is needed.

theory in Chapter

As noted before,

I

present such a

7.
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CHAPTER
DESERT:

2

CLEARING AWAY SOME MISCONCEPTIONS

Introduction
George Sher opens his full-length study of the concept of
desert

with the remark: "Desert is uncharted philosophical
territory.
might have said with equal justice that desert is mischarted.

Sher
The

literature on desert, meager though it is, contains some grave

misunderstandings of a concept that pervades our ethical thought.

It

would be advisable, therefore, in a study such as this, to identify and
correct those misunderstandings at the outset.
of this chapter.

In it,

I

That is the central aim

play the role of Lockean underlaborer:

I

attempt to clear away "...the Rubbish, that lies in the way to
Knowledge.

That said, the goal of this chapter is not entirely destructive.

One constructive aim is to provide (perhaps via negatival

sketch of the concept of desert as
the agenda.

I

understand it.

)

a rough

Another is to set

Many of the points merely raised in this chapter require

more careful treatment.

This they receive in several of the following

chapters.
To make the task of this chapter manageable,

Sadurski’s recent theory of desert.^
reasons.

First, Sadurski’s book.

I

I

focus on Wojciech

choose Sadurski’s theory for two

Giving Desert its Due, contains one of

the few detailed treatments of desert in the literature.
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Second,

Sadurski’s theory is the perfect target:

it contains almost all the

received philosophical views about desert that

I

reject.**

Sadurski’s theory
Desert claims seem to have (implicitly, at least) this form:

deserves x at

in virtue of E’.

t

thing deserved;

P is the deserving subject;

is the time at which P deserves x;

t

of P’s deserving x.

'P

x is the

and E is the basis

A theory of desert may therefore take the form of a

statement of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for P to

deserve x at

t

in virtue of E.

At any rate, this is how

I

will construe

Sadurski’s theory.
As

I

understand it, Sadurski’s theory of desert (or STD) contains

seven parts:

STD

P deserves x at t in virtue of E iff (i) P is
responsible for E; (ii) P is a person; (iii) E
is effort exerted by P; (iv) E is valuable to
P’s society; (v) E occurs prior to t; (vi) E is
a burden to P; and (vii) x can be distributed to
P.

In this section,

section,
(i)

I

I

will further present and explain STD.

In the next

will evaluate it.

P is responsible for

E,

A view widespread in the literature

is that there is an important connection between desert and

responsibility.

Typical assertions of such a connection include:

A person’s having been able to have done otherwise is a
necessary condition of ascribing desert.^
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People ought to be done by according to how
they deserve,
and how they deserve depends on how they
have done, which in
turn presupposes responsibility and freedom.®
The concept of desert serves to signify the ways
of treating
people that are appropriate responses to them,
given that
they are responsible for those actions or states
of affairs.
That is the role played by desert in our moral
vocabulary.’*
The assertion that a man deserves the superior character
that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his
abilities is. .. problematic; for this character depends in
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances
for which he can claim no credit.®

These passages differ in important ways, but a doctrine running
through them seems to be this:

If S is not responsible for some quality or action, then S
does not deserve anything in virtue of it.

Sadurski accepts this doctrine:

When we are pronouncing judgments of desert, we are
inevitably making judgments about persons who are
responsible for their actions.
It makes no sense to
attribute desert, positive or negative, to persons for
actions or facts over which they have no control.
(Page
117

.

)

This doctrine, which (i) is intended to express, is supported by
many examples.

Suppose a cashier is forced at gunpoint to hand over the

money.

The store suffers a loss, but the cashier does not deserve

blame.

This is because the cashier was not responsible for handing over

the money: he was coerced.
paper.

Suppose a student submits an excellent term

If she is not responsible for it (if,

for example, her roommate

wrote it), she does not deserve praise or a good grade.
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Suppose a

sprinter swallows a handful of amphetamines prior to
a race, and wins.
He does not deserve to win, and this is (at
least partly) because he is

not truly responsible for his performance: the drugs
are.

These

examples lend credence to the doctrine about desert and
responsibility,
and hence to
(ii)

(

i

)

P is a person.

Sadurski writes: "...desert considerations

are always person-oriented" (117),

always a person.
this claim.

That is, the subject of desert is

Like (i), many examples could be adduced in support of

Furthermore,

(ii)

is at least suggested by

(i),

asserts the connection between desert and responsibility.

which

For it is

plausible that only people can be (morally) responsible for anything.
(ii) might also be suggested by (iv), which states the basis of P’s

desert is valuable to P’s "society."

At any rate, the view that the

subject of desert must be a person is venerable.

It was,

for instance,

endorsed by the eighteenth-century moralist Richard Price:

The epithets right and wrong, are, with strict propriety,
applied only to actions; but good and ill desert belong
rather to the agent.
It is the agent alone, that is capable
of happiness or misery; and, therefore, it is he alone that
can properly be said to deserve these.

(iii) E is effort exerted by

P.

According to Sadurski, "...effort

is the only legitimate basis and measure of desert"

(116).^°

The notion

that effort is the only basis for desert is familiar from discussions of

desert of wages.

Thus,

in supposing that effort is the only desert

base simpliciter, Sadurski is generalizing that idea.

18

He is also

accepting what he takes to be a consequence of
(i), the thesis about
desert and responsibility:

I consider effort to be the
principle criterion of desert,
mainly because 'contribution’ or 'success’ reflect,
among
other things, factors which are beyond our control and
thus
for which we cannot claim any credit.
(Page 134.)

Here, and in the debate over desert of wages, the argument
that

effort is the basis for desert goes like this.
either effort or success.

The basis for desert is

effort one exerts is within one’s

control, the success of those efforts is not.

Desert can arise only in

virtue of what is within one’s control, or for what one is responsible.
(As Sadurski says,

control.

.

...factors which are totally beyond a person’s

.are irrelevant to desert" [3]).

Thus,

it is not success but

effort that must be the basis for desert.
(iv)

E is valuable

to P’s society.

The idea here is that the

basis for desert must be valuable to the deserving person’s society.
There are two ways to construe this.

One is Sadurski

’s:

"What counts is

a conscientious effort which has socially beneficial effects" (116).^^

On this construal, one’s effort is valuable to society, and a basis for

desert, only if it benefits others.

Another way to understand the idea that the basis for desert must
be valuable to P’s society is this:

The basis of P’s desert must be

generally "valued" by P’s society (regardless of whether it actually
benefits anyone).

This second idea is suggested by Joel Feinberg’s

claim that "If we were all perfect stoics.

19

..

then there would be no use

for the concept of desert.

It is explicitly endorsed by David

Miller:

...desert is a matter of fitting forms of treatment to the
specific qualities and actions of individuals, and in
particular good desert... is a matter of fitting desired
forms of treatment to qualities and actions which are
generally held in high regard.

Like the other portions of STD considered thus far,
air of plausibility.

(iv) has an

People who contribute to society, or who perform

actions that are generally admired, are said to be deserving.

Philanthropists are said to deserve admiration or public recognition;
virtuous behavior is said to deserve praise and emulation.

Thus it may

appear, as (iv) asserts, that desert bases must be "valuable" to society
in some way or another.
(v)

E occurs prior to

t.

standard thesis about desert.

throughout the literature.

Like other parts of STD, this is a
It

(or a similar thesis)

is endorsed

Typical statements of the thesis include:

...the basis of all desert is a person’s own past actions.
If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment he must,
necessarily, be so in virtue of some characteristic or prior
activity.

Desert can be ascribed to something or someone only on the
basis of characteristics possessed or things done by that
thing or person.
That is, desert is never simply forwardlooking.

The idea in each passage is that desert bases are always located
in the past.

This idea can be more precisely expressed:
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If S deserves x at t in virtue of E,
performed E prior to t.

then S acquired or

This idea is accepted by Sadurski: "...desert considerations
are always

past-oriented.

When talking about desert, we are evaluating certain

actions which have already happened" (118).

Part (v) of STD corresponds

to this view about the supposed connection between desert and time.

The view that desert bases are always located in the past is

supported by any number of examples.

If you deserve an apology,

this is

because you have been insulted, not because you are going to be
insulted.

If you deserve punishment,

this is because you have committed

some wrong, not because you will commit some wrong.

If you deserve a

reward, this is because you have done something good, not because you

are going to do something good; and so on.

In general,

then,

it appears

that the basis for desert must be located in the past.
(vi)

E is a burden to

P.

Desert is often attributed to those who

have borne some burden, such as "..effort, sacrifice, work, risk,

responsibility, inconvenience, and so forth" (Sadurski, 116).

Consider

the relentless medical researcher who sacrifices her own health for

others’; the firefighter who risks his life to save a child; the

executive of a major corporation who bears ultimate responsibility for
thousands of employees; the person who willingly accepts a major

inconvenience to help a friend through a difficult time: all these
people are deserving in virtue of the "burden" they bear.

Furthermore,

those whose actions require no sacrifice, risk, responsibility,
inconvenience, and so on, are often held to deserve nothing for
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performing them.

The idea is that there is desert only if there is some

"cost" to the agent.
An argument in support of this intuition is due to Miller.

Miller, as noted above, believes that "...a desert basis consists of

personal attributes which are generally held in high regard.

People

who tend to perform actions involving work, risk, sacrifice,

responsibility, inconvenience, etc., are for that reason generally held
in high regard.

But people who tend not to perform actions that involve

no such burdens are,

for that reason, not highly regarded.

regarded with indifference, sometimes contempt.

They are

If Miller is right,

it

follows that those in the former category are deserving; those in the
latter category are not.

Sadurski would put this by saying that the

basis for desert is burdensome.
(vii) X can be distributed to

P.

Sadurski writes:

To say that X deserves P makes sense only when it is
imaginable that P can be distributed or attributed.
To say
"I was working very hard all year therefore I deserve good
weather during my vacations" is erroneous except as a
metaphor.
(Page 118.)

Good weather is not something that can be distributed; anyway, it cannot
be distributed by people.

deserved.

Therefore, Sadurski reasons, it cannot be

In a slogan: The deservable is distributable (by people).

Perhaps the idea behind this slogan is that just as 'ought’ implies
'can’,

so 'deserved’

implies 'distributable’.

Let that serve as a presentation and explanation of STD.

STD

contains much of what is accepted by philosophers who have written about
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desert.

But my view is that every part of
STD is false.

I

now turn to

a defence of that view.

The refutation of Sadurski*s theory
(i)

P is responsible for

E.

I

in virtue of some property or action,

property or action.

do not accept that if P deserves x

then P is responsible for that

Many clear cases of desert involve a person who

suffers some evil, is not responsible for suffering
it, yet deserves

something for suffering it.

All kinds of sufferings could be adduced as

examples: disease, disaster, crime, insult.

A person may not be

responsible for suffering one or another of these things,
but each can
be a basis for deserving sympathy, relief, treatment,
reparation, or

apology.

Therefore, it is false that the deserving subject must be

responsible for the desert base.

There are properties for which one may

not be responsible for possessing, but that can be bases for
desert.^®
(ii)

P is a person,

desert must be a person.

I

I

reject the suggestion that the subject of

believe that manuscripts and mathematical

puzzles, for example, can deserve consideration or attention; that trees

and earthquakes can deserve admiration or awe; that baseball teams can

deserve championships; that corporations can deserve to be sued; that
cities can deserve publicity; and so on.^^
about non-persons literally.

And while

I

I

take these desert claims

believe that perhaps some such

claims can be adequately translated into claims about what people
deserve,

I

do not believe that every such claim can be thus translated.
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Consider, for example, the following
desert claim:
an interesting city;

it deserves better publicity."

"Cleveland is

Perhaps this claim

IS shorthand for a set of claims
about the deserts of various people

(the mayor, members of the city council,
downtown merchants) who have

worked hard to improve Cleveland.

But what of the claim that the

Lowenheim-Skolem theorem deserves attention?
from, say,

This seems quite different

the claim that Lowenheim and Skolem deserve
admiration for

discovering the theorem.

Or what of the claim that Union Carbide

deserves to be sued billions of dollars for the
Bhopal disaster?

This

claim can be true even if there is no particular
Union Carbide employee
(or group of employees) who deserves to be sued
billions of dollars for

the Bhopal disaster.

These claims suggest that non-persons can be

subjects of desert.
(iii)

E is effort exerted by

The difficulty with this view

P.

requires a distinction between two contrary positions about desert
bases,

monism and pluralism.

Monism is the view that there is only one

basis for desert; pluralism is the view that there is more than one.
(iii)

is a form of monism.

for desert.

According to it, effort is the only basis

There are other versions of monism.

worth is the only basis for desert.

G.

W.

One is that moral

Leibniz and W. D. Ross seemed

to accept this latter version of monism.
(iii)

is false.

For suppose it were true that the effort you

exert is the only basis for your desert of anything.

Suppose further

that one day you are brutally assaulted by a group of thugs.

made no effort to get assaulted,

Since you

(iii) entails that you deserve nothing.
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This is clearly wrong.

You now deserve sympathy,
compensation, apology,

and perhaps other things.
As

see it, all monisms about desert
are false.

I

than one basis for desert.

I

There is more

believe these include (but are probably

not exhausted by) innocent suffering,
need, being a person, past
receipt, entitlement, moral worth, and
effort.

A profound and pressing

question is whether there is any way to
Justify these claims about what
IS (and what is not) a desert base.

Sher devotes an entire book to

attempting to answer this question.

Sher’s project is the subject of

Chapter

The subject comes up again in Chapter

5.

(iv)

E is valuable to P’s society.

of this view about desert.

7.

offered two interpretations

I

On the first interpretation, for E to be

"valuable" to P’s society is for E (that is, its presence
or

performance) to contribute to that society’s good.

This is false, for

the simple reason that one can deserve punishment or
some other evil for

harming one’s society.

So perhaps what Sadurski meant is this:

a basis for P s desert of x,

P’s society.

I

If E is

then E is either valuable or damaging to

believe this is false.

As

I

deserving without being part of any society.

see it, one can be
I

postpone a defense of

this controversial claim until the next chapter.

There

I

explain (and

ultimately reject) various versions of the prominent view that desert is
somehow "institutional."
On the second interpretation, for E to be "valuable" to P’s

society is for E (that is, its presence or performance) to be generally

admired or held in high regard by that society.
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I

reject this second

version of (iv).

My view is that at least some properties
and actions

are bases for desert even if no one ever
admires or detests them.
(Virtue,

for example, seems a basis for deserving
admiration or

happiness, regardless of the general attitude
toward virtue.)
this claim is also controversial.
4

However,

postpone its defense until Chapter

I

.

(v)

E occurs prior to

t.

I

reject the widespread assumption that

desert bases are always located in the past.

Christopher New recently

argued that it is possible to deserve punishment prior
to committing an
offence.
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Even more recently, Fred Feldman has called attention to

several examples that seem to show conclusively that bases
for desert
need not be anchored in the past.^^
the Make-a-Wish Foundation.

One of Feldman’s examples concerns

The Foundation attempts to offer

extraordinary benefits to terminally ill children
for example.

benefits.

-

trips to Disneyland,

Many people feel that such children deserve these

The reason is not (or not necessarily) that these children

have already suffered, but rather that they will suffer.

desert bases are in the future, not the past.

Thus, their

Another of Feldman’s

examples concerns a soldier who volunteers for a dangerous mission.
soldier might be honored prior to his mission.
not because of what he has done;

about to do.

The

This honor is deserved

it is deserved because of what he is

Thus, the soldier’s desert base is located in the future.

These examples show that desert is not always "backward-looking."
(vi)

E is a burden

to P.

Burdens, on Sadurski’s view,

include

effort, sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility, and inconvenience.
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Thus

understood, however, bases for desert
need not be a burden to those who
are deserving in virtue of them.

For example, you can deserve an

apology in virtue of being insulted, even
though your being insulted
required no sacrifice, work, risk, responsibility,
or inconvenience.
Even if the insult was not an "emotional"
burden for you, this would not

make the ensuing apology undeserved.

Besides, there are other bases for

desert that clearly are not burdens.

Suppose, for example, that there

is a wonderfully talented violinist.

She loves nothing more than

playing the violin, and she plays beautifully.

She may deserve

admiration or respect in virtue of her beautiful playing,
even though
playing the violin is not at all burdensome to her.
(vii) X can be distributed to

P,

deservable is necessarily distributable.
distributed.

I

do not accept that the

Some deserved things cannot be

These include things that people are incapable of

distributing, such as good fortune good weather.

But they also include

what we happen to be unable to distribute at the moment they are
deserved.

A trivial example is compensation.

It is possible that X

deserves financial compensation from Y, even if Y is unable to pay.
Another example concerns apologies.
from Y, but Y is now dead.

Suppose that

X

deserves an apology

The apology cannot be given, but it is

nonetheless deserved.

What desert is not
The results of this chapter can be summarized in seven points.
First, there is no obvious connection between desert and responsibility;
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at any rate,

it is possible for a subject to be
deserving in virtue of a

property for which he or she is not responsible.

non-persons can be subjects of desert.
bases, not merely one.

Second, persons and

Third, there are many desert

Fourth, there is no interesting sense in which
a

desert base must be "valuable" to society.

Fifth, bases for desert need

not be located in the past, but may sometimes be
located in the future.
Sixth, desert bases need not constitute a "burden"
to the deserving

subject.

Seventh, whether one deserves something does not hinge on

whether or not it can be distributed.
Some of these points have,
chapter.

Others clearly have not.

chapters that follow.
which

I

I

hope, been established in this
I

will consider them in some of the

Those considerations culminate in Chapter

7,

in

present my own theory of desert.
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CHAPTER

3

INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF DESERT

Introduction
In the spring of 1994,

in a Singapore jail,

an American citizen

named Michael Fay received three violent strokes
with a rattan cane.
The blows ripped through his skin and left
permanent scars across the

width of his back.

This was Fay’s legally prescribed punishment for

spraying graffiti on a row of cars parked along a Singapore
street.

Although caning is a standard form of punishment in Singapore,
many in the United States reacted with horror to Fay’s
treatment.
some did not; some thought Fay deserved the caning.

But

However, it was

rare to find someone of this view who also believed that caning would
be
an appropriate punishment for vandals in the United States.^
At first blush, this position (that Fay deserved a caning for his

vandalism in Singapore, but would not deserve this for a similar act of
vandalism in the U.S.) seems inconsistent.
the inconsistency is merely apparent.

But on one view of desert,

On this view, no one deserves

anything "in the abstract," but only according to the rules or purposes
of the social institutions in which he finds himself.^

On this view.

Fay’s caning was deserved because his vandalism occurred in Singapore,

where one of the legal rules is that vandals shall be caned.

Since

there is no such rule in the US, vandals here do not deserve to be
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caned.

The alleged inconsistency vanishes on this
"institutional"

theory of desert.
In this chapter,
in terms of social

examine some recent attempts to explain desert

I

institutions.

theories of desert,

(I

"social institution.")

I

refer to them as institutional

make no attempt to elucidate the notion of
I

believe that institutional theories of desert

are defective, but that calling attention to their
defects sheds light
on some of desert’s most salient features.

A crude institutional theory of desert
I

desert.

propose to begin by discussing a crude institutional theory of
I

am not aware of any philosopher who holds this theory -

though, as will be pointed out later,

some philosophers.

I

it is suggested by the writings of

do believe that this crude theory is presupposed

in some everyday discussions of desert - for example,

Michael Fay’s punishment.

T1

in discussions of

The theory is this:

deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
social institution, I; a rule of I is that those
who participate in I and have F shall receive x;
the rules of I apply to S; S has F.
S

T1 is rather plausible.

professional boxing.
the heavyweight bout.

the heavyweight title.

Consider the social institution of

Suppose George Foreman knocks out Mike Tyson in
People might say that for this. Foreman deserves

This is not because a boxer "preinstitutionally"

deserves the title if he punches out his opponent.
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It is not as though

the institution of boxing was invented
so that boxers could get the

titles they deserve!

Without the institution of boxing, there
would be

no boxers, matches, or heavyweight titles.

Therefore, the existence of

those rules is a necessary condition of Foreman’s
desert of the

heavyweight title.

Indeed,

it may seem sufficient for Foreman’s
desert

of the title that he satisfied the rule that a
boxer who knocks out his

opponent in the heavyweight championship fight shall
receive the

heavyweight title.

At least, that is the idea behind Tl.

Despite Tl’s plausibility,
defects.

I

believe it suffers from several

Perhaps the most obvious one is this.

Tl entails that in the

complete absence of social institutions, no one can deserve anything.

I

think that reflection on a somewhat fanciful case will suggest that even
in the complete absence of social institutions,

be deserving.

The case is this.

it is still possible to

Imagine a world with no social

institutions: no laws, rulers, governments, religions, and so on.

only people in this world are Abel and Cain.

The

Abel is industrious.

He

built his own shelter, made his own clothes, and hunts his own food.
Cain is slovenly.

He lives in a cave, runs around naked, and gets by on

the few berries and roots he can be troubled to gather.

Neither Abel

nor Cain knew the other existed until Abel, out hunting, stumbled across

Cain sleeping in the bushes.

strangled Abel to death.

Without provocation, Cain leapt up and

Cain then stole Abel’s clothes, spear, and the

bag in which Abel had carried a freshly killed rabbit.

When Cain came

upon Abel’s shelter, he took up residence until it became uninhabitable
due to neglect.

Then Cain resumed his slothful life in the forest.
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Now consider the following desert claims:
Abel deserves his

possessions; Abel deserves not to be killed;
Cain deserves not to have

Abel’s belongings; Cain deserves punishment
(or some other ill) for

killing Abel.
be.

Indeed,

These claims seem true.

If T1 were true,

they could not

it is not difficult to imagine that a society
might form

Itself with the intention of distributing goods
and evils in accordance

with what people deserve.
impossible.

But if T1 were true, this would be

Prior to society’s formation, no one could deserve

anything.
The tale of Cain and Abel may be too fanciful to convince
the

staunch institutionalist.

No matter.

T1 has other defects, one of

which can be brought out by considering the following case.

Suppose an

ice-fisherman has been warned by a reliable authority that the ice on
the lake is perilously thin.

Cavalierly disregarding this warning, he

drives his truck out on the thin ice anyway.

He parks it there and

walks several yards away to do some fishing.

As expected, his truck

falls through the ice, leaving him stranded.

A natural feeling is that

other things being equal, this is just what the man deserves for his
recklessness.

But observe that, at least in this world, there is no

social institution with the rule that those who recklessly drive trucks
out on thin ice shall lose their trucks.
an institution seems ludicrous.

Indeed, the very idea of such

T1 seems unable to handle this sort of

case.

The case of the ice-fisherman is meant to reveal a basic defect of
Tl.

The defect is this.

T1 requires the existence of some social
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institution for every true desert-claim, even
though there are true

desert-claims to which no social institutions
can be plausibly held to
correspond.

The claim that the ice-fisherman deserves
to lose his truck

through the ice is only one example.
Jones,

Another example is the claim that

in virtue of suffering a series of misfortunes,

bit of good luck.

now deserves a

This claim could be true, even though there is no

social institution with a rule that those who suffer
misfortune shall

experience a bit of good luck.

Another example is the claim that, other

things being equal, every person deserves a fair share of
life.

claim

(I

This

believe) is true, but there is no social institution with a

rule that people shall receive a fair share of life.

Notice that the

point is not merely that there are no such institutions.

It is that the

proponent of T1 is forced to either reject these apparently genuine
desert-claims, or posit some rather peculiar social institutions.
A third problem for T1
a theory of desert at all.

is this.

Rather,

T1 is not plausibly construed as

it is more plausibly understood as a

theory of entitlement, which is different from desert.

These points can

be brought out by considering a few cases of entitlement.

Suppose a

person is named in a legally binding will as the beneficiary of the

testator’s estate.

That person is entitled by a rule of law to that

estate. Consider next the runner who first crosses the finish line in
the Olympic 100 meter sprint.

rule to the gold medal.

This runner is entitled by an Olympic

Consider, finally, the host of a dinner party.

He is entitled by a rule of etiquette to an expression of thanks from

his guests.
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These cases suggest the following theory of
entitlement:
E

is entitled to x in virtue of F iff there is
some social institution, I; a rule of I is that
those who participate in I and have F shall
receive x; S participates in I S has F.
S

;

With one minor difference, E is Tl!

The difference is that 'deserves’,

as it appears in Tl, has been substituted with 'is
entitled to’

in E.

Thus, Tl better understood as a theory of entitlement, not as
a theory

of desert.

This would not matter if entitlement and desert are the same.

They are not.

Entitlement is different from desert.

This point has

been recognized in the literature^, and can be seen by recalling the
cases above.

In each case,

it is possible that the person entitled to

the estate, the gold medal, or the expression of thanks does not deserve
it.

So,

for example,

deserve the estate.

if the beneficiary is a wicked person,

he may not

If the sprinter won only because the most skilled

runner tripped near the finish line, then she may not deserve the gold.
If the host was boorish and the food awful,

gratitude.
deserve.

In these cases,

then he may not deserve any

people are entitled to things they do not

Entitlement is therefore different from desert; Tl ignores

this difference.
It is worth noting that at least one philosopher has crafted an

institutional theory of desert that does not conflate entitlement and
desert.

This is David Cummiskey, who explains desert not in terms of

institutional rules, but rather in terms of institutional purposes.

explains this idea with the help of an example:
36

He

A race is a social institution which is
usually constructed
tor some specific purpose.
We cannot conclude that someone
deserves to win the race without. .. appealing to
the purpose
ot the race.
When we say that the most skilled deserves to
win then we are assuming that the point of the
race is to
reward skill.
Since rewarding skill is the point of the
institution it also is the appropriate basis of desert.^

Julian Lamont seems to commit himself to a similar idea
in this passage
This practice [of grading students] normally has behind it
some purpose, or at least some defining value, which plays
an essential role in the setting of the desert-basis.
For
instance, sometimes it is to indicate a person’s
demonstrated potential in a particular occupation or in
higher education.
In such cases, students who are clearly
above or below the threshold for a B grading do not deserve
that grade, no matter how hard they have tried.
Sometimes
the purpose is simply to indicate to the students. .. their
objective mastery of the subject (and this type of grading
can be very different from the previous one).
Sometimes the
grade... is to indicate to the students their level of effort
in the subject.
Sometimes the desert-basis is decided by
other persons or institutions, sometimes by the teachers
themselves.
What is important to notice is that the desertbasis is determined by other values or purposes, rather than
by something internal to the notion of desert itself.^

The gist of these passages is relatively clear.

It can be

expressed as follows:

T2

S deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
institution, I; a purpose of I is that those who
have F shall receive x; S participates in I S
;

has

So,

for example,

F.

if a purpose of the institution of racing is to honor

the most skilled runner, then the most skilled runner deserves to be

honored.

If a purpose of the institution of grading is to indicate to
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the students their level of effort, then
the students who exert the most

effort deserve the best grades.
The important thing to notice is that unlike
Tl, T2 does not

conflate desert and entitlement.

This is because institutional purposes

are different from institutional rules, and
entitlement is explained (in
E)

in terms of institutional rules.

Thus,

it will be possible under T2

to be entitled to something without thereby deserving
it, and vice

versa.
To see this, recall Cummiskey’s example of the social
institution
of racing.

Suppose the purpose of this institution is to honor the most

skilled runner.

Suppose further that the rule in a particular race is

that the runner who first crosses the finish line shall receive the
prize.

Suppose, finally, that the runner who crosses the finish line

first is not the most skilled.
prize, but does not deserve it.

Then this runner is entitled to the
The most skilled runner deserves it,

according to T2, since the purpose of the institution is to reward the
most skilled runner.

Therefore, T2 does not conflate desert and

entitlement.
However, T2 and Tl are vulnerable to a fourth objection, which

believe to be the gravest thus far considered.
and T2 generate morally repugnant results.

The problem is that Tl

Suppose, for example, that

there is a legal system with rules (or purposes) according to which

traffic violators shall receive life imprisonment.

If Tl or T2 were

true, traffic violators who fell under these rules would actually

deserve life imprisonment.

Suppose next that there is an academic
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I

grading system with a rule (or purpose) that
those with blond hair and
blue eyes shall receive the highest possible
marks.

T1 and T2 entail

that those who fall under those rules really
deserve the highest marks.

Suppose next that there is a system of etiquette
with the following
rule:

Those who fail to cover their mouths during a sneeze
shall have

their hands dipped in boiling chicken fat.

If these institutional

theories were true, then rudeness could be grounds for torture.
These are absurd results.

No matter what rules or purposes there

are, no one can deserve life imprisonment for double
parking.

No one

can deserve high marks on a physics exam for being blonde and
blue-eyed.
No one deserves to have a hand immersed in boiling chicken fat,
merely
for failing to cover a sneeze.

Clearly, something has gone wrong with

the institutional theories of desert considered thus far.

The problem is not hard to see.

Neither T1 nor T2 places any

moral constraint on the supposedly desert-conferring rules or purposes
of institutions.

Without such a constraint, as we have seen, the door

is left open for all sorts of repugnant results.

This suggests that an

institutional theory with such a constraint will fare much better than
T1 and T2.

Let us examine such a theory.

A rawlsian approach
In a few passages from his remarkably influential A Theory of

Justice, John Rawls appeared to advance an institutional theory of

desert.

Like the theories thus far considered, the rawlsian theory

explains desert in terms of the rules (or purposes, in Cummiskey’s
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theory) of institutions.

The important difference is that on the

rawlsian theory, there is a moral constraint
on those rules.

The

constraint is that desert-conferring institutions
must be just.

As will

be shown, this constraint protects the rawlsian
theory of desert from

some of the objections that plagued T1 and T2.

According to a standard view, justice obtains to the extent
that
people get what they deserve.

A proponent of this standard view

explains justice in terms of desert.

Rawls rejects the standard view.

He believes that justice has nothing to do with desert.®

does not explain justice in terms of desert.

Indeed,

Thus, Rawls

in passages

suggesting his commitment to an institutional theory of desert, Rawls
appears to do the opposite: namely, explain desert in terms of justice!
Rawls

...it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert.
It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation
as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by
it, those who, with the prospect of improving their

condition, have done what the system announces that it will
reward are entitled to their advantages. ... But this sense of
desert presupposes the existence of the cooperative
scheme.
.

.

.

The case [of the relation of justice to desert] is analogous
to the relation between the substantive rules of property
and the law of robbery and theft.
These offenses and the
demerits they entail presuppose the institution of property
which is established for prior and independent social ends.
For a society to organize itself with the aim of rewarding
moral desert as a first principle would be like having the
institution of property in order to punish thieves.®
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Not only the content of these remarks,
but also their context (in

each case they serve as a response to the
objection that Rawls’s theory
of justice ignores desert) have suggested
to several commentators that

Rawls endorsed an institutional theory of
desert.

Samuel Scheffler, for

example, writes:

On [Rawls’s] way of understanding desert, the idea
that
social institutions should be designed in such a way
as to
ensure that people get what they deserve makes about as
much
sense as the idea that universities were created so that
professors would have somewhere to turn in their grades, or
that baseball was invented in order to ensure that batters
with three strikes would always be out.®

Another commentator, George Sher, reads Rawls similarly:

In his major work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that
desert of reward and recompense are. .. artifacts of social
institutions which in turn are justified in quite different
ways.
Instead of imposing constraints upon our choice of
social institutions, personal desert is only established
within and by such institutions.^®

The rawlsian theory of desert is relatively clear: to deserve

something is to be entitled to it under institutional rules that are
just.

Let us try to make this theory more precise.

One possible statement of the rawlsian institutional theory of

desert is this:

T3

deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
social institution, I; a rule, R, of I is that
those who participate in I and have F shall
receive x; R is just; S participates in I S has
S

;

F.
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This is a plausible interpretation of Rawls’s
own remarks.

Moreover, it

does not generate the morally repugnant results
that T1 and T2
generated.

To see this, reconsider the traffic rule that
penalizes

double-parkers with life imprisonment.

This rule is plainly unjust.

Likewise for a rule that awards the best grades in a
physics class to
people with blond hair and blue eyes, and a rule of etiquette
that

punishes rudeness with torture.

Rules like this fail to satisfy T3’s

requirement that desert-conferring institutional rules are just.
But if T1 and T2 are implausible, so is T3.

Like T2 and T3, T3

entails that in the absence of social institutions, no one deserves
anything.

Like T1 and T2, T3 requires its proponent to either reject

apparently genuine desert-claims, or posit some peculiar social
institutions.

Finally,

like Tl, T3 conflates desert and entitlement.

In

these respects, T3 is no improvement over Tl and T2.
However, T3 may not capture the spirit of the rawlsian view.

As

see it, the spirit of that view might be expressed counterf actually

People actually deserve things in virtue of the fact that if there were
just social institutions, those institutions would entitle those people
to those things.

For personal reasons,

I

prefer to express this in

terms of possible worlds:

T4

S deserves x in virtue of F iff there is some
world, w, and some social institution, I, in w;
a rule, R, of I is that those who have F shall
receive x; R is just; S has F.^^
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I

T4 is more plausible than T3.

Like T3,

repugnant results that T1 and T2 generated.

it avoids the morally

Unlike T3, T4 is not

vulnerable to the objection that if it were true, then
no one would
deserve anything in the absence of (actual) social
institutions.
is because T4 ranges over all possible worlds,

This

and a proponent of T4 can

appeal to some of those worlds to account for the truth of
desert-claims
in worlds without social

institutions.

Recall, for example, the claim

that Cain deserves punishment (or some other ill) for murdering
Abel.

This claim seems true, even though there are no social institutions in
that world.

This is no problem for the advocate of T4, who can note

that there is a social institution in some world with the just rule that

murderers shall be punished.

It is that otherworldly institution,

the

advocate of T4 can claim, that accounts for Cain’s desert of punishment.
In this way,

the advocate of T4 may be able to handle many desert-claims

that seem true at institutionless worlds.
Many, but not all.

killed by Cain.

Recall the claim that Abel deserves not to be

This claim seems true.

As

I

see it, this is because

other things being equal, people deserve a fair share of life.
Consequently, they deserve not to have their lives unnaturally shortened
by murder.
life,

But if it is true that each person deserves a fair share of

then T4 requires the existence of some social institution with a

rule that persons shall receive a fair share of life

-

either that, or

the rejection of perfectly plausible desert-claims.
I

now turn to consider a final objection to the rawlsian

institutional theory of desert.

The objection is that even if T4 avoids
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the morally repugnant conclusions
generated by T1 and T2,

some of its own.

it generates

This objection requires some explanation.

As has been emphasized, the rawlsian theory
of desert places a

moral constraint on the rules of desert-conferring
institutions.

constraint is that those rules must be just.

The

Thus, a proper evaluation

of T4 depends on an understanding of the concept
of justice that it

depends on.

What concept of justice is it?

One thing is clear:
to desert.

So,

it cannot be a concept of justice that appeals

for example,

it cannot be the venerable view that

justice is the getting of what’s deserved.

viciously circular.

Otherwise T4 would be

It would explain desert in terms of justice,

justice in terms of desert.

and

This would be unacceptable.

A natural alternative conception of justice is, obviously, Rawls’s

conception.

This is not the place for a full exposition of Rawls’s

theory of justice.

Fortunately, the substance of Rawls’s theory of

justice is contained in two relatively straightforward principles'^:

The Liberty Principle: Each person is to have an equal right
to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for all.
The Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are (a) to the greatest
benefit to the least advantaged; and (b) attached to offices
and positions that are open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.

It will not be necessary to rehearse Rawls’s proustian efforts to

explain and defend these principles.

The objection that

I

wish to level

against the rawlsian theory of desert depends only on an understanding
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of the Difference Principle and what
it requires.

I

shall ignore the

Liberty Principle in what follows.
The intuition behind the Difference
Principle is plausible enough.
It is that social and economic
inequalities should,

the worst off group.

But by how much?

in justice,

benefit

The answer to this question is

determined by the fact that the Difference Principle
is a maximizing
principle.

It requires that a perfectly just institutional
framework

maximize the welfare of the socially and economically
worst off.
a slightly less-than-perfect institutional
framework will

not maximize the welfare of the worst off group.

Thus,

improve but

As Rawls explains:

"while the difference principle is, strictly speaking, a
maximizing

principle, there is a significant distinction between the cases
that
fall short of the best arrangement

"By how much?" is:

So the answer to the question

"As much as possible."

Now we are in a position to pose the final objection to the

rawlsian theory of desert.

The objection is based on a remark made by

Tom Campbell in the midst of his penetrating discussion of the

Difference Principle:

There is... the problem of what to do about disadvantages
which cannot be specifically rectified, but only compensated
for, such as liability to serious and painfully incurable
illness.
Clearly, even an equal share of resources will be
insufficient to redress such imbalance of satisfactions and
medical care in itself will not greatly alter the situation.
Does this mean that the difference principle would involve
putting more and more resources towards marginal
improvements in the lot of persons with such a low quality
of life? Society would then become one large hospital or
welfare institution, to which end all social co-operation
would be ultimately geared.
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Campbell is imagining a society in which the
worst off group is

composed of people who suffer from painful and
incurable diseases or
handicaps.

To avoid the most excruciating pain, and to
enjoy even a

minimal level of satisfaction, these unfortunate
people require

tremendous amounts of medical care and other benefits.

Campbell’s point

is that the Difference Principle seems to
require "putting more and more

resources towards marginal improvements" in the lives of
these people.
Indeed,

if even a marginal

improvement can be obtained by imposing huge

taxes on the advantaged groups, then the Difference Principle
(which is
a maximizing principle) would seem to require it.

The force of this objection is easier to grasp by comparing two

possible societies.
classes.

In each society,

there are several socio-economic

The worst off class is the class, described above, of those

who suffer from painful and incurable diseases or handicaps.

Let us

numerically indicate the net distribution of benefits and burdens to
each class, thus:

SI

Upper Class:
Upper Middle Class:
Middle Class:
Lower Middle Class:
Lower Class:
Worst Off Class:
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+ 500
+ 300

+ 100
+ 50

-50
-500

S2

Upper Class:
Upper Middle Class:
Middle Class:
Lower Middle Class:
Lower Class:
Worst Off Class:

-5
-6
-7
-8
-9

-499

Campbell’s objection is, in effect, that the Difference
Principle
forces us to say that S2 is more just than SI.

This is because the

worst off class in S2 is better off than the worst off class
in SI.
Apparently, Campbell’s intuition is that this is wrong.

necessarily less just than S2.

Indeed,

if the

SI

is not

distribution in S2 arises

within an institutional framework that imposes severe taxes on the other
classes, S2 may be less just than SI.

Campbell’s point can now be turned into an objection to the
rawlsian theory of desert.

The objection is this.

Presumably, an

institutional rule operating in S2 is that those not in the worst off
group must contribute huge sums of their own money in order to achieve a

marginal improvement in the lot of the worst off class.

Since this rule

seems required by the Difference Principle, it must be a just rule by

Rawls’s lights.

These points, coupled with T4, entail that those who

are not in the worst off group deserve to be aggressively and

oppressively taxed!
As

I

see it, this is a morally repugnant result.

Other things

being equal, no one deserves to suffer such a system of taxation.

Of

course it is unfortunate that there are people whose lives will be

somewhat more miserable without such a system.
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It might even be morally

right for people to voluntarily sacrifice large
portions of their income
for the sake of minimal improvements in the
lives of the worst off.

But

no one deserves to have his or her own standard
of living drastically

worsened for the sake of such minimal improvements in
the lives of
others.

Therefore, T4 is defective.

others already discussed,

I

In light of this defect and the

conclude that the rawlsian theory of desert

should be rejected.^®

A rule-utilitarian approach

This is not the end of institutional theories of desert.

There

are many possible moral constraints that an institutional theorist might

place on the rules of supposedly desert-conferring institutions;
therefore, there are many possible versions of the institutional theory
of desert.

Justice is only one such constraint.

Indeed, since there

are different and competing conceptions of justice, there is (at least
in logical space) a collection of "justicized" institutional theories of

desert.

A thorough refutation of the institutional approach, then,

would seem to require the refutation of each theory.

Needless to say,

I

will not attempt that herculean task here.

What

I

propose to do instead is this.

One moral constraint that

an institutional theorist of desert might place on the rules of desert-

conferring institutions is that those rules maximize utility.

Something

like this "rule-utilitarian" theory of desert is suggested by Richard

Brandt.

propose to examine Brandt’s theory in some detail.
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In contemporary philosophical usage,

the term 'utilitarianism’

used to name any one of several distinct
theories.

is

It is customary to

divide these theories into two sorts: act-utilitarianism
and ruleutilitarianism.

If anything unites act-utilitarianisms,

it is roughly

the thesis that the moral status of an action - its
rightness or its

wrongness

-

is determined by the consequences that would
obtain if that

action were performed.

If anything unites rule-utilitarianisms,

it is

roughly the thesis that the moral status of an action is determined
by
the consequences that would obtain if there were a rule permitting
that

action.

Although act-utilitarian theories of desert have been

suggested^®, our interest is in a rule-utilitarian theory of desert.

This is because an institutional theory of desert purports to explain

desert in terms of the rules of institutions, not in terms of individual
actions or their consequences.
Perhaps the most influential and well-developed contemporary

version of rule-utilitarianism is Richard Brandt’s "Ideal Moral Code"
theory.

IMC

Brandt states this theory as follows:

An act is right if and only if it would not be
prohibited by the moral code ideal for the
society; and an agent is morally blameworthy
(praiseworthy) for an act if, and to the degree
that, the moral code ideal in that society would
condemn (praise) him for it.^^

It is somewhat unusual to construe utilitarianism as Brandt has

done: namely, as a theory of not only the moral status of actions, but

also the moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of agents.
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This,

however,

is why Brandt’s rule-utilitarianism
is of interest here.

For

what else is it to be blameworthy or praise
worthy, except to be

deserving of blame or praise?

So,

IMC seems to include a theory of

desert (of praise and blame at least).
IMC contains or presupposes several technical concepts.
the concept of a moral code.

One is

A moral code is a set of moral rules.

Examples of moral rules include: "Keep your promises,"
"Honor your
father and mother," "Help others," "Avoid injuring others,"
"Improve

yourself," "Bring about just distributions," and so on.^2
this set should be consistent:

Presumably,

it should not contain rules that

contradict each other, or rules that direct agents to perform
incompatible actions.

It should also be complete:

the rules taken

together should cover every situation that is likely to arise in the
relevant society.
A second technical notion is that of a moral code’s being ideal

for a society.

Brandt explains that a moral code is ideal for a society

"...if and only if its currency would produce at least as much good per

person as the currency of any other moral code."^^

That is, a moral

code is ideal for a society if and only if no other moral code would, if

current in that society, produce a greater net good per person.
A moral code is current in a society, on Brandt’s view, just in

case two conditions are satisfied:

First, a high proportion of the adults in the society must
subscribe to the moral principles, or have the moral
opinions, constitutive of the code.
[P] robably it would
not be wrong to require at least 90 percent
agreement. ... Second, we want to say that certain principles
.
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.

.

A,

B, etc. belong to the moral code of
a society only if
they are recognized as such.
That is, it must be that a
large proportion of the adults of the society
would respond
correctly if asked, with respect to A and B, whether
most
members of the society subscribed to them. 2“*

That is, a moral code is current in a society just in
case (i) at least
90 percent of the adults in that society subscribe to it; and
(ii) most

adult members of that society believe that most members of that
society

subscribe to that code.
An agent subscribGs to a moral code if the following conditions

are met.^^

First, the agent is generally motivated to perform actions

that are permitted by the code, and to avoid performing actions

forbidden by it.

Second, the agent will tend to feel guilty or

remorseful if she thinks that she has performed some action forbidden by
the code - unless she has some excuse for performing it.

Third, the

agent will tend to think less of those who perform actions forbidden by
the code.

Finally, the agent will think that these dispositions,

feelings, actions, and attitudes of hers are justified.
It is important to understand that IMC does not entail that if a

moral code ideal for some society is not actually current in that
society, then actions performed in that society fail to have any moral
status.

This is because on Brandt’s view, the moral rightness of an

action performed in a given society is determined by whether or not that
action would be permitted by the moral code ideal for that society if it
were current in that society.

Since IMC is also a theory of desert, it

therefore allows that there can be desert (at least of praise and blame)
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in the absence of social

institutions and their rules.

Is IMC a plausible theory of desert of blame
and praise?

Answering this question may be easier if that theory
is considered
separately from Brandt’s theory of moral rightness.

Recall that the

theory of desert of blame and praise, as stated by Brandt, is
this:

An agent is morally blameworthy (praiseworthy) for an act
if, and to the degree that, the moral code ideal in
that
society would condemn (praise) him for it.

This theory is incomplete.

It states only a sufficient condition on the

moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of agents.

A more complete

theory would state sufficient and necessary conditions, thus:

IMC*

I

An agent is morally blameworthy (praiseworthy)
for an act if and only if, and to the degree
that, the moral code ideal in that society would
condemn (praise) him for it.

presume that Brandt would accept IMC*.

At any rate, there is no

indication that he would not.

Crucial to IMC* is the notion of a moral code condemning (or
praising) an agent.

Brandt does not explain this notion, but it is

natural to construe it as follows:

C

So,

A moral code condemns an agent for performing a
type of action just in case a rule of that code
forbids the performance of actions of that type.

for example,

if one of the rules of the moral code ideal for a given

society is that lying is not permitted, then agents in that society who
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lie thereby come to be blameworthy

-

that is, deserving of blame.

One problem with this suggestion is that the
analogous suggestion
for a moral code’s praising an agent is
implausible.

To see this,

suppose a moral code praises an agent for performing
a type of action
just in case a rule of that code permits the
performance of actions of
that type.

Now suppose, as seems plausible, that one of the
rules of a

moral code ideal for a given society is that it is
permissible to tie

one’s right shoe before tying one’s left shoe.

If the current

suggestion were correct, then agents in that society who tie their
right
shoe before tying their left shoe would thereby come to be praiseworthy
that is, deserving of praise.

This seems wrong.

Ordinarily, a normal

adult person does not deserve praise for tying his right shoe before his
left shoe.

Furthermore, it may be that another rule in the moral code

ideal for that society is that it is permissible to tie one’s left shoe

before tying one

s

right shoe.

(That is, the moral code ideal for that

society permits one to tie either shoe first.)

If so,

then the current

proposal generates the result that people in that society would deserve

praise every time they lace up their shoes!

Similar arguments would

show that praise is deserved for performing any sort of trivial act.

This seems wrong.

Another notion crucial to IMC* is degree of desert of blame and
praise.

degrees.

There can be no doubt that desert of these things comes in
I

you deserve.

can deserve more blame than you deserve, or less praise than

Brandt tries to account for these degrees of desert by

building into IMC* "degrees" of condemnation (or praise) by the moral
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code ideal for a society.

Brandt does not explain what it could mean
to

speak of such "degrees," but one possibility
is this.

focusing on desert of blame.

Let us begin by

Suppose that punishments are attached to

some of the rules of the moral code ideal
for a given society, so that

those who violate those rules are punished.

This allows us to say that

degrees of desert of blame are just the degrees
of severity of the

punishments attached to these rules.

So,

to say that a rule severely

blames an agent for performing a type of act is to
say that there is a
severe punishment for actions of that type; to say
that a rule mildly

blames an agent for performing a type of act is to say
that there is a
mild punishment for committing actions of this type.
may seem to accommodate degrees of desert of blame:

In this way,

IMC*

degrees of desert

of blame are degrees of severity of punishment.

The analogous proposal for degrees of desert of praise is this.
Let us suppose that rewards are attached to some of the rules of the

moral code ideal for a given society, so that those who obey them are
rewarded.

This allows us to identify degrees of desert of praise with

the values of those rewards.

(I

of value this might be.

on this suggestion, to say that a rule

So,

leave aside the question of what sort

highly praises an agent for performing a type of act is to say that
there is a highly valuable reward for performing actions of that type;
to say that a rule lowly praises an agent for performing a type of act
is to say that there is a minimally valuable reward for performing

actions of that type.

In this way,

IMC* may seem to accommodate degrees
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of desert of praise: degrees of desert
of praise are degrees of value of

reward.

These attempts to account for degrees of
desert of blame and

praise reveal the need for a more general
theory of desert.

To see

this, suppose that the moral code ideal
for a society contains a rule

that prohibits lying.

Suppose further that there is a punishment

attached to this rule, so that liars are punished.
in that society tells a lie.

answer is clearly "No."

deserved punishment.

So,

As

Now suppose someone

Would any punishment be appropriate?
I

The

see it, the appropriate punishment is the

for example,

if the agent’s lie was trivial,

then the agent deserves mild punishment.

If the agent’s lie was

seriously damaging, then the agent deserves severe punishment.
What is it for an agent to deserve punishment?

provide an answer to this question.

This is because IMC* is not a

theory of desert of punishment (or reward).
blame and praise.

IMC* does not

It is a theory of desert of

Thus, the plausibility of IMC^ appears to hinge on

the plausibility of some theory of desert of punishment and reward.
Indeed,

I

suspect that the plausibility of that theory would itself

depend on the plausibility of a general theory of desert.

What might a

general theory of desert look like, on Brandt’s view?

Brandt does not propose a general theory of desert.
think that if he were to propose one,

BTD

However,

it might look something like this:

S deserves x in virtue of F if and only if S has
F, and a rule in a moral code ideal for S’s

society is that those who have F shall receive
X.
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I

BTD treats desert as entitlement
according to rules that are part
of a moral code ideal for the relevant
society.
For example, S deserves

punishment to some degree of severity in
virtue of lying if and only if
S lies and is thereby "entitled"
to a punishment of that degree of

severity by a rule in a moral code ideal
for S’s society

.

To take a

different example, S deserves a reward for
capturing a wanted felon if
and only if S captures a wanted felon
and is thereby entitled to a

reward by a rule in a moral code ideal for
S’s society.
I

believe that BTD is false.

It is possible to be entitled to

something by a rule within a moral code ideal for
one’s society, yet
fail to deserve it.

To see this, consider the moral rule that elderly

people shall receive care and assistance from their
children.

It seems

likely that this rule will be part of a moral code
ideal for many
societies,

including our own.

BTD,

together with this rule, entail that

elderly people in that society deserve care and assistance from
their
children.
society.

Now suppose that

I

Suppose further that

am an elderly person living in that
I

have been an abusive, unloving, and

irresponsible father to my children.
aged,

Suppose, finally, that

am now

feeble, and in need of medical care and financial assistance.

these circumstances,

it would be implausible to suppose that

deserve care and assistance from my children.
assistance at all,

I

If

I

I

In

now

deserve care and

may deserve it from the state, or from my former

employer, but certainly not from the children to whom
grief.

I

I

gave nothing but

This example shows that BTD is defective, provided that the
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aforementioned rule is indeed part of a moral
code ideal for this
society.

Consider next the moral rule that those to
whom promises have been
made shall receive what was promised.

It seems likely that this rule

will be part of a moral code ideal for many
societies,
own.

Now suppose that you have promised to loan
me your car.

further that if
BTD,
car.

including our

I

receive it,

I

will use it to run down my enemies.

together with this rule, entail that
This is absurd.

I

deserve the loan of your

Whatever prima facie claim

I

had to the car in

virtue of your promise is completely mitigated by the
fact that
use it to run people over.

Suppose

Thus,

I

will

if the rule regarding promises is

indeed among the rules in a moral code ideal for that society,
then

there is reason to reject BTD.
An advocate of BTD might reply to these arguments by claiming that

the aforementioned rules would never be among the rules of a moral code
ideal for a society.

However, such a claim would be implausible.

If

those rules are moral rules at all, then surely there is a moral code
ideal for some society that contains one or another of them.

This suggests that a supporter of BTD might argue that these rules
are not moral rules at all, and hence not part of any moral code.
this,

too,

is implausible.

If "Keep your promises"

But

is a moral rule,

then why not "Those to whom promises have been made shall receive what
they have been promised?"

If "Honor your elders"

is a moral rule,

they

why not "The elderly shall receive care and assistance from their

children?"

After all, it seems as though one would be as effective as
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the other if given as moral advice.

I

conclude that there is no basis

for denying these rules the status of
moral rules.
I

further conclude that Brandt’s rule-utilitarian
theory of desert

of praise and blame, and the general theory
of desert suggested by it,

are not acceptable theories of desert.

If there is an acceptable rule-

utilitarian analysis of desert, Brandt has not found

it.

Conclusion
In spite of the apparent failure of institutional
theories of

desert, there is something plausible about them.

plausibility derives from the following fact:

As

I

see it, their

Many objects of desert,

and many bases for deserving them, are institutional artifacts.

Consider first some typical objects of desert, or things deserved:
grades, championships,
on.

financial compensation, promotions, wages, and so

Each of these is an artifact of a more or less identifiable

institution.

Perhaps it is reflection on these objects of desert that

has led some philosophers to suppose that desert itself is an artifact

of social institutions.

Next, consider some bases for desert: excelling

on a physics exam, winning the Boston Marathon, closing the big deal

with Microsoft.

None of these could exist without the existence of a

social institution and its rules.

Perhaps it is reflection on these

bases for desert that has led some philosophers to conclude that desert

itself is an artifact of social institutions.
However, reflection on other objects and bases of desert suggests
that desert itself is not an artifact of social institutions.
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For

example, consider the claim that Jack deserves
punishment in virtue of

killing an innocent person, or the claim that Jill
deserves respect in
virtue of being a human being, or the claim that Joe
deserves gratitude
from his parents in virtue of his efforts to take care
of them in their

old age.

These and many other cases of desert seem not to depend on the

existence of institutions.

Indeed, some of these cases suggest that a

desire that people get what they deserve might prompt people to create
institutions

-

the institution of punishment,

for example.

It may have

been reflection on these sorts of cases that led Feinberg, for one, to

declare that desert

...is not logically tied to institutions,

practices, and rules.
How can a theorist of desr

*'

account for the dependence of some

desert objects and desert bases on social institutions, on the one hand,
and the independence of some desert objects and desert bases from social

institutions, on the other?

Is a compromise between institutional and

preinstitutional theories of desert possible?
One possible compromise is due to

N.

Scott Arnold.

In the course

of a discussion of desert of profits, Arnold made the following

distinction:

...there are two kinds of desert claims - institutional and
noninst itutional
The latter directly reflect general moral
assessments of a person’s character. Thus it is in this
sense that good people deserve to be happy... and wicked
people deserve to be miserable. On the other hand,
institutional deserts are logically connected to particular
social institutions.
The basal reasons. .. that ground
[institutional] desert claims are determined by the nature
of the institution and need not have any independent
significance.
This distinction between institutional and
noninstitutional deserts comes out quite clearly in the case
.
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of contests such as sporting events.
The naturally talented
athlete who demonstrates the greatest proficiency
deserves
to win, even if he is an unsavory character
and even if his
untalented opponent trains harder.^®

As

I

understand it, the compromise suggested by these
remarks is

that there are two concepts, each meriting the
name 'desert’.

One is

the concept of institutional desert; the other is
the concept of

noninstitutional desert.

If this suggestion is correct,

the conflict

between institutional theorists of desert, on the one hand,
and

preinstitutional theorists of desert, on the other, is merely apparent.
Rather than contradicting one another, advocates of these theories
are

merely talking past each other.
For two reasons,
I

I

do not favor this compromise.

One is that, as

hope has been shown, institutional theories of desert are defective.

If they are theories of anything,
is misleading,

they are not theories of desert.

then, to label them theories of desert

institutional

theories of desert.

-

It

even

Another is that there seems to me

to be a better compromise, one that does not fracture the concept of

desert.

The compromise is this.

Common to the institutional theories of

desert considered thus far is the idea that desert is somehow determined
by rules.

More specifically, the idea is that to deserve something is

to be entitled to it according to some sort of rule.

that this idea

-

My suggestion is

rather, what is plausible in this idea - can be

captured by accepting the following proposal:
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Entitlement is a basis

for desert, but not the whole of desert.

proposal in detail in Chapter

7,

Although

I

explain this

a few remarks here may be helpful.

My view is that there are many bases for desert.

I

believe these

bases include effort, achievement, moral worth, being
a person, need,
and others.

Many of these bases

not institutional artifacts.

entitlement.

As noted,

I

-

need and effort, for example

not desert itself,

are

But on my view, another desert base is

defend this claim in Chapter

are generated by institutional rules.

institutional artifact.

-

7.

Entitlements

Hence, entitlement is an

If this is right,

then a basis for desert, but

is purely institutional.

This is a compromise position.

It attempts to capture not only

what is plausible in institutional accounts of desert (namely, that

entitlement has a deep relationship to desert), but also what is
plausible in preinstitutional theories of desert (namely, that desert
can arise in the absence of social institutions and their rules).

Of

course, the tenability of this compromise can be assessed only in the

light of a complete theory of desert that includes it.

theory in Chapter

I

present such a

7.
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CHAPTER

4

DESERT AND THE EMOTIONS

Introduction

"Emotions occupy a fundamental place in our moral lives."

Or so

claims Justin Oakley in his recently published book, Morality and
the
Emotions.^

My view is that desert also occupies a fundamental place in

our moral lives.

If Oakley and

I

are right, it would not be surprising

if the emotions and desert turned out to be deeply connected.

In fact,

there is a tendency among writers on desert to posit a

deep connection between desert and the emotions.

Joel Feinberg’s

seminal paper, "Justice and Personal Desert," is an excellent example of
this tendency.

Therein Feinberg claimed:

"If we were all perfect

stoics ... there would be no use for the concept of desert."^

I

suspect

that behind this assertion is the belief that the basic objects of
desert, the things we ultimately deserve, are expressions of emotion.
Not just any emotion, but rather a special class of emotions.

On

Feinberg’s view, these include gratitude, appreciation, resentment,
remorse, sympathy, and concern.

Feinberg calls these emotions the

"responsive attitudes":

...responsive attitudes are the basic things persons deserve
and... 'modes of treatment’ are deserved only in a derivative
way, insofar perhaps as they are the natural or conventional
means of expressing the morally fitting attitudes. Thus
punishment, for example, might be deserved by the criminal
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only because it is the customary way of expressing
the
resentment or reprobation he "has coming."^

Feinberg’s idea seems to be that if the "basic things"
people

deserve are expressions of emotion, then a world of emotionless
or
stoic

people would have "no use" for the concept of desert.

rate, people in that world will never get what they deserve.

end of this chapter,

I

At any

Toward the

will return to Feinberg’s view of the connection

between desert and the so-called "responsive attitudes."
Meanwhile, consider another philosopher who envisages a

relationship between desert and the emotions.

This is Samuel Scheffler,

who has recently argued that our "...reactive attitudes presuppose a

preinstitutional notion of desert that is incompatible with liberal
principles of justice."^

That is, the character of such emotions as

indignation, gratitude, and respect suggests (to Scheffler, at any rate)
that ordinary folk implicitly believe what some influential contemporary

theorists of justice reject: namely, that the notion of desert is

conceptually prior to the idea of justice, and that it can be used to
judge the justice of institutions and their rules.
Scheffler’

s

The details of

argument for this claim are not relevant here.

The point is

simply that Scheffler connects (though in a way different from Feinberg)
desert to emotions

.

Yet another philosopher who posits a connection between desert and
the emotions is David Miller.^

main topic of this chapter.
reasons.

I

Miller’s view of this connection is the
choose to examine Miller’s theory for two

One is that his proposal is the most detailed of those that
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posit a desert-emotion connection.

Another is that Miller’s theory

promises to supply an interesting criterion
of desert basehood.

This

criterion, if correct, could be used (and
Miller attempts to use it) to

settle long-standing debates over whether
desert bases include need,
suffering, moral worth, and others.

desirable.

Such a principle is clearly

Thus, Miller’s view demands serious attention.

Desert bases and the appraising attitudes
s

conception of the link between desert and certain

emotions can be introduced in the following way.
base.

Desert requires a

That is, if a person deserves something, then he or she deserves

it /or possessing some property (e.g.,

having innocently suffered) or

performing some action (e.g., committing a crime).

As Feinberg

insisted, "Desert without a basis is simply not desert."^
A related point has been thought to hold for a certain class of

emotions: gratitude, resentment, admiration, remorse, sympathy, and
others.

These emotions (the "reactive attitudes," in Peter Strawson’s

famous terminology®) seem to require a basis.

Like desert bases, the

bases for these emotions are either properties possessed or actions

performed by individuals.
you for something

-

So,

for example,

if

I

admire you,

say, your fine musical talent.

you resent me for something

-

say,

I

admire

If you resent me,

for some misdeed of mine.

for gratitude, remorse, sympathy, and many other emotions.

Likewise
These

emotions are different from emotions such as malaise, joy, fear, and
anxiety, which seem not to require a basis.
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It is possible to be

anxious,

for example, without being anxious about
anything in

particular.

But it is not possible to be resentful, for
example, and

not resent someone for something in particular.
Now we are in a position to understand Miller’s view
of the

connection between desert and emotion.

It is that the bases for

reactive attitudes ("appraising attitudes," in Miller’s
terminology) are
also the bases for desert.

Miller writes:

To understand the relationship between a desert basis and a
judgement of desert, it is helpful to... look at certain
attitudes which one person may hold towards another:
attitudes such as admiration, approval, and gratitude, for
which I shall use the generic term 'appraising attitudes’.
It is plain that, like judgements of desert, these
appraising attitudes demand a basis, which consists of
features of the person (or his conduct) towards whom the
attitude is held.
If I admire someone, I must admire him
for something (for his intelligence, or for his skill at
playing the violin)
The range of possible desert bases
coincides with range of possible bases for appraising
attitudes.
(Page 89.)

As

I

understand him. Miller is proposing that whatever is a basis

for an appraising attitude is also a basis for desert, and that whatever
is a basis for desert is a basis for an appraising attitude.

In other

words:

MT

F is a desert base if and only if F is the basis
of an appraising attitude.

MT is plausible.
and approval.

Consider the appraising attitudes of admiration

These attitudes are directed toward people who possess

qualities that are desert bases.

Examples of these desert bases include
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athletic skill, industriousness, and moral excellence.

appraising attitudes of abhorrence and contempt.

Or consider the

These attitudes are

often aimed at those who exhibit qualities that are
desert bases.

Examples of these desert bases include ineptitude,
slovenliness, and
wickedness.

The coincidence of desert bases and appraising attitudes
in

these and other cases lends some credence to MT.
MT is plausible for other reasons.

First,

it is inconsistent with

the implausible view that there is only one basis for desert.

this view

monism

in Chapter 2.)

(I

called

There is surely more than one basis

for emotions such as gratitude, resentment, admiration, contempt, and so
on;

thus, MT implies that there is more than one basis for desert.

Second, MT implies that people need not be responsible for bases of
desert.

This is because at least some appraising attitudes

-

sympathy,

for example - may be appropriately directed at people in virtue of

properties for which they are not responsible

-

for example,

innocent

suffering.

Third, MT implies that desert bases need not be located in

the past.^

For example,

it is possible to be grateful to someone not

only for what she has done, but also for what she will do; or to detest

someone not only because of what he has done, but also for what he will
do.®

Since the bases for these appraising attitudes are located in the

future, MT implies that desert bases can be located in the future.

Fourth, MT implies that non-persons can be subjects of desert.

A

seeing-eye dog, for example, can be the object of admiration or
gratitude; therefore, it can be a subject of desert.

were endorsed in Chapter

2.

These implications

If they are correct, MT gains plausibility.
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MT captures the essence of Miller’s version of the
desert-emotion

connection.

However, as will become apparent in the next section,
MT is

too crude to serve Miller’s purposes.
be refined.

To meet those purposes, MT must

This can be done in the following way.

Let us divide

appraising attitudes into two sorts: positive and negative.

appraising attitudes are

pro

respect, gratitude, and so on.

attitudes.

attitudes.

Positive

They include admiration,

Negative appraising attitudes are "con"

They include contempt, disrespect, resentment, and so on.

Presumably, bases for "good desert" or desert of benefit will be bases
for positive appraising attitudes; bases for "bad desert" or desert of

harm will be bases for negative appraising attitudes.

These points

allow us to state a clarified version of Miller’s version of the desert-

emotion connection:

MT*

F is a desert base for x if and only if (i) x is
a benefit and F is the basis of a positive
appraising attitude; or (ii) x is a harm and F
is the basis of a negative appraising attitude.®

Using the theory
As

I

noted earlier, one of the striking aspects of Miller’s view

of the desert-emotion connection is that it provides an interesting

criterion for desert basehood.
believes.

At any rate, this is what Miller

He argues against regarding various things as desert bases,

and these arguments depend on the truth of (what
Let us examine these arguments.

70

I

have called) MT*.^°

Writers on desert disagree about what is and
what is not a basis
for desert.

One disputed desert base is need.

that need is a desert base.

Some philosophers say

Feinberg is an example.

He writes:

A man with a chronically sick wife or child
deserves
compensation since through no fault of his own he has
greater need than others; and the same is true of the
man
with a large number of dependents.

Miller disagrees.
desert.

His view is that need is not a basis for

He argues as follows:

What disqualifies needs from being taken as grounds for
desert is. .that no one wishes to have them, or admires
others for having them.
(Page 86.)
.

In this passage, Miller is not being as careful as he should be.

He claims to show that need is not "grounds for desert" by showing that

need is not a basis for admiration (or, presumably, any other positive

appraising attitude).

But the most Miller has shown is that need is not

grounds for deserving anything good.

Need, for all that Miller has

said, may be a basis for some negative appraising attitude.

If so,

it

could be grounds for desert; that is, it could be a basis for deserving

something bad.
Indeed, some needs seem to be bases for negative appraisal.

To

see this, suppose a profoundly insecure man needs to belittle other

people in order to feel happy.
the man with contempt.

This need may be a basis for regarding

Or suppose a fantastically gluttonous man needs

to eat five pounds of meat daily in order to maintain his weight.
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This

need may be a basis for regarding the man with
disgust.

Or suppose a

masochist needs to feel pain in order to retain her
sense of self-worth.
This need may be a basis for pitying her.

These examples suggest that

need may be a basis for various negative appraising
attitudes.

If it

is, MT* entails that need is a basis for bad
desert.

Consider next Miller’s argument against several other purported
desert bases:

Needs are not unique in being generally inappropriate as a
basis of desert.
The same is true of beliefs, or
preferences, or interests; we cannot claim that people
deserve benefits because of what they believe, and again the
reason is that there is nothing in the actual holding of a
belief (as opposed to the process of arriving at it) that we
can appropriately admire.
(Page 86.)

Beliefs, preferences,

interests: none, argues Miller,

appraising attitude.

Therefore, none is a basis for desert.

Once again. Miller is not being very careful.

is a base for an

What he means to

argue is that beliefs, preferences, and interests are not something we

"admire;" hence, they are not bases for deserving anything good.

Miller

has not shown that these things are not bases for negative appraising

attitudes; nor,

if MT* is assumed,

has he proven that they are not bases

for desert of something bad.

Indeed,

it seems that beliefs,

preferences, and interests can be

bases for negative appraising attitudes.

Suppose, for example, that

Jones believes one race of human beings is intrinsically inferior to

another race.

It would be quite natural to regard Jones with contempt

in virtue of his believing such a thing.
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Or suppose Smith prefers to

converse with his mouth full of masticated
food.
regard Smith with disgust for this.

Most of us would

Or suppose Roberts has an

irrational interest in some hopeless, doomed
project.
might regard him with pity.

If contempt,

For this, we

disgust, and pity are negative

appraising attitudes, and if MT* is true, then beliefs,
preferences, and
interests can be bases for bad desert.
But once it is admitted that beliefs (etc.) can be bases
for bad

desert,
desert.

it is implausible to deny that they can also be bases
for good

Indeed,

it seems that beliefs can be bases of good desert.

Consider this dialogue by William Galston:

John deserves to be the leader of our spiritual community.
Why?
A: Because of the unusual purity and sincerity of his
Christian belief.
A:
B:

I

believe that similar examples could be adduced to show that

preferences and interests can be bases for good desert.
It is important to see that these criticisms do not impugn MT*.

This is because MT*, by itself, entails nothing about whether a

particular property is a basis for desert, or a basis for some

appraising attitude.

To yield such results, MT* must be conjoined with

a substantive view about what is and what is not a basis for appraising

attitudes, or a substantive view about what is and is not a basis for
desert.

The upshot is that an advocate of MT* need not accept Miller’s

arguments that need, beliefs, preferences, desires, and pain are not
bases for (good) desert.

Those arguments presuppose what an advocate of
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MT* can reject: namely, Miller’s substantive
view that these things are
not bases for positive appraising attitudes.

Why Miller’s theory is false
Nevertheless, there are two reasons for thinking that MT*
is
false.

One can be brought out by considering Miller’s argument
against

a popular view about why wages are deserved.

According to this view,

wages are deserved as compensation for the suffering one’s work
involves.

Miller rejects this theory:

Generally, when we think of work as involving human
costs... we are thinking of what the person is suffering, not
of the good qualities he is displaying.
I
do not think that
these features can serve as a basis for desert. ... [for] a
desert basis consists of personal attributes which are
generally held in high regard.
Pain cannot therefore be a
ground for desert [of wages]
though the courage shown in
withstanding pain might be.
In so far as we consider the
costs themselves which are involved in work... our judgements
of deserved compensation must be interpreted. .. not as desert
judgements in the true sense, but as judgements about the
making good of unwarranted deprivation.
(Page 112.)
,

I

benefit.

understand the argument of this passage as follows.

Thus, MT* requires that the basis for deserving them must be

the basis of some positive appraising attitude.

basis for any appraising attitude.
all,

Wages are a

But suffering is not a

Therefore, if wages are deserved at

they are never deserved as compensation for work-related pain or

harm.

This argument reveals a defect with MT*.

brought out by way of a dilemma.

appraising attitude, or not.

The defect can be

Suffering is a basis for some

Suppose that it is not.
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Then if MT* is

true,

suffering is not a basis for desert of any
kind.

suffering is a basis for desert.
person is mugged.
injuries.
care.

But surely

To see this, suppose an innocent

In the course of her attack,

she suffers serious

For this she may deserve sympathy, compensation,
and medical

She may also deserve that the mugger be prosecuted
to the fullest

extent of the law.

She deserves all this in virtue of suffering the

attack and the injuries.
that MT* is correct,

So,

suffering is a basis for desert.

it follows that suffering is the basis for some

appraising attitude, positive or negative.

Suffering is unlikely to

be the basis of a negative appraising attitude.

If it were, MT* would

entail that suffering is a basis for bad desert.
implausible.

That would be

It is more plausible that suffering is a basis for desert

of good things (financial compensation,

for example).

could this be?

suffering

So,

must be the basis for some positive appraising attitude.

What attitude

Pity and sympathy seem to be the only candidates.

these are not really modes of positive appraisal.
attitudes.

Assuming

Indeed,

Yet

They are not "pro"

it seems highly counterintuitive that suffering

should be the basis of a "pro" attitude of any kind.

Thus,

if suffering

is a basis for deserving good, MT* requires that suffering be the basis

of some positive appraising attitude - but there seems to be no positive

appraising attitude appropriate to suffering.
with MT*.

This reveals a defect

It is that suffering is basis for desert of good, but there

seems to be no basis for positive appraisal that corresponds to

it.

The second reason for rejecting MT* can be brought out by

recalling a point made by

G.

E.

Moore.
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Consider the property of being

desirable.

How does one discover whether something has
this property?

One answer, which seems to have suggested
itself to John Stuart Mill, is
that one looks around and sees whether the
thing is actually desired.
If it is actually desired,

then it is desirable;

if not,

not.

point was that this is not a good test for desirability.

For,

Moore’s
as Moore

maintained, a thing’s desirability is not dependent on
whether or not it
IS desired.

This is evidenced by the fact that it is possible that

people will desire that which is really undesirable.

There is no

necessary connection, then, between that which in fact desirable, on the
one hand, and that which is in fact desired, on the other.
A similar point can be made about bases for appraising attitudes.

To see this, suppose that you admire me.

It does not follow that

possess any property that makes me worthy of admiration.

I

For it is

possible to admire someone for whom contempt would be appropriate.
There is no necessary connection between that which is in fact
admirable, on the one hand, and that which is in fact admired, on the
other.

This fact allows us to ask a general question:

Given an

appraising attitude, what is an appropriate basis for that attitude?
Miller sometimes writes as though the appropriateness of a basis for an
appraising attitude is determined by whether or not that attitude is
actually directed towards those who exemplify that basis.

Now it is not actually necessary for me, the maker of the
judgement [that Smith deserves to win the race], to have
this attitude of admiration myself .... Still I live in a
community in which most people would take up the relevant
appraising attitude toward hard athletic training, and hence
,
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can give Smith’s training as a reason for his
desert.
(Page 90.

I

...a [good] desert basis consists of personal attributes
which are generally held in high regard.
(Page 112.)

These passages suggest the following:

is a basis for an appraising attitude, A, if
and only if most people adopt A towards those
who have F.
F

This is an untenable view, for the reason noted above: namely,
that from the fact that most people direct an appraising attitude

towards someone in virtue of possessing some property, it does not
follow that this property really is a basis for that attitude.
if MT* were construed in accordance with the theory above,

Besides,

then what

counts as a basis for desert would be determined by contingent facts
about what "most people" make the objects of their appraising attitudes.

This would be an implausible account of desert basehood.

To see this,

suppose that most people are contemptuous of those who are morally
virtuous.

Then moral virtue would be the basis for the appraising

attitude of contempt.

Since contempt is a negative appraising attitude,

MT* would entail that moral virtue is a basis for deserving harm.

This

is an absurd result.

In other places. Miller appears to accept the difference between

being, as a contingent fact, the basis of someone’s appraising attitude,

and being an appropriate basis for that attitude.

For example:

...we cannot claim that people deserve benefits because of
what they believe, and... the reason is that there is nothing
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in the actual holding of a belief .. .which
we can

appropriately admire.

(Page 86.)

When we make a judgement of desert, we are judging
the
appropriateness of this particular individual, with his
qualities and past behavior, receiving a given benefit or
harm - an appropriateness which is make intelligible by
considering the appraising attitudes that we may take up
towards the person.
(Pages 92-93.)

The question is, what does Miller mean by 'appropriate’?

A

natural answer is this:

A basis for an appraising attitude is an
appropriate basis for that attitude if and only
if those who exemplify that basis deserve to be

the object of that attitude.

To see that this is a natural answer to the question, consider a
few examples.

Take those who possess great musical ability.

These

people are appropriately admired because, in virtue of their talent,
they deserve to be admired.

Similarly, those who are morally wicked are

appropriately detested because they deserve to be detested.

Similarly,

those who innocently suffer are appropriately shown sympathy because
this is what they deserve; and so on.

In general,

then,

it seems that a

basis is appropriate to an attitude just in case those who exemplify
that basis deserve to be the object of that attitude.

Miller cannot help himself to this natural understanding of what
it is for a property to be an appropriate basis for an appraising

attitude.

If he did, MT* would amount to this:

F is a desert base for x if and only if (i) x is
a benefit and those who exemplify F deserve
positive appraisal; or (ii) x is a harm and
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those who exemplify F deserve negative
appraisal

This is an explanation of being a desert base in terms
of desert.
One would have thought that if there were an explanation
of desert, it

would go in precisely the opposite direction, explaining
desert in terms
of its bases.

Anyway, the main attraction of MT* - namely,

its promise

as a principle for determining what is and is not a basis
for desert
is entirely lost on this current proposal.

-

For if the question is what

counts as a desert base, then it is no help to be told, as the theory
above tells us, that bases for desert are those things that make people
deserving.

This is as helpful as saying, for example, that bases for

admiration are those things that make people admirable.
Thus, the second defect with MT* is that it may amount to an

explanation of desert basehood in terms of bases that are appropriate to
various emotions, but this notion of appropriateness seems to be nothing
more than the concept of desert itself.

If so,

then MT* is vacuous.

Is there a desert-emotion connection?

The failure of Miller’s theory raises the question of whether

there is any interesting link between desert and the emotions.
final section,

I

In this

briefly consider two further views: Feinberg’s and my

own.

As noted at the outset, Feinberg’s view seems to be that desert

and emotions are connected in the following way:

Whenever one deserves

something, what one deserves is that some emotion be expressed.
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The

forms of treatment that are in fact received

punishment, wages, and so on
in a derivative way,

- are,

-

prizes, grades,

in Feinberg’s words,

"deserved only

insofar perhaps as they are the natural or

conventional means of expressing the morally fitting attitudes."
for example,

if you deserve a prize,

then you deserve that admiration be

expressed.

If you deserve a good grade,

expressed.

If you deserve punishment,

be expressed.

So,

If you deserve a wage,

you deserve that approval be

then you deserve that resentment

then you deserve that gratitude be

expressed; and so on.
Note that unlike MT*, Feinberg’s view is not really a substantive

theory of desert basehood.

It merely asserts an interesting connection

between objects of desert and the emotions.

The connection is this:

Whenever a form of treatment is deserved, this treatment is really just
the expression of some emotion that deserves to be expressed.
A bit of reflection, however, casts doubt on Feinberg’s view.

Suppose, as seems plausible, that every newborn child deserves to live a

relatively long life.

(This is one reason why it is especially tragic

when young people die: they have been robbed of their "fair share" of
life.

)

We may hope that each child gets the share of life that it

deserves.

We may be happy if it does, or unhappy if it does not.

it is clear that what the child deserves - namely,

life - is not that some emotion be expressed.

But

a relatively long

Or, taking a different

example, suppose a person has suffered a long stretch of misfortune.

Other things being equal, this person now deserves some good luck.
may hope that this happens, and be sad if it does not.
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But what the

My

person deserves
be expressed.

-

I

namely, a bit of good luck - Is not that
some emotion

think these examples show that Feinberg’s
view of the

desert-emotion connection is false.
Despite my rejections of Miller’s and Feinberg’s
views,
accept that there is an interesting desert-emotion
connection.

version of it is simple:

Some emotions are desert bases.

I

do

My

My reason for

saying this is based on two things: the view that moral
virtue is a

basis for desert, and the view that moral virtue has
something to do
with the emotions.
Moral virtue has traditionally been regarded as a basis for
desert.

The idea is that those who are virtuous deserve happiness.

Those who are wicked deserve to fail to be happy.

But as Aristotle

argued in the Nicomachean Ethics, a person is virtuous not merely for

performing the right sorts of actions in the right sorts of
circumstances, but also for feeling the appropriate emotions to the

appropriate degree.

If this is correct,

as

I

believe it is, then

emotions are a constituent of a basis for desert.
Feinberg said "If we were all perfect stoics.
use for the concept of desert."

The truth,

..

there would be no

believe, is rather that if

I

we were all perfect stoics, then there would be no use for the venerable

notion

- a "law of

justice," in Leibniz’s opinion

deserve happiness, and the wicked do not.^®

-

that the virtuous

For if Aristotle is right

about emotions and virtue, then emotionless people would lack virtue.
Hence, they would lack an important basis for desert.

can see,

That, so far as

is all there is to the elusive desert-emotion connection.
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CHAPTER

5

JUSTIFYING DESERT-CLAIMS

Introduction
Hard workers deserve success.

Wrongdoers deserve punishment.

Victims of negligence deserve compensation.

applicant deserves the job.

The best qualified

The most able athletes deserve victory.

Conscientious students deserve good grades.

The virtuous deserve

happiness.

Many people would accept these platitudes without thinking twice.
If pressed to justify them,

however, these people might be nonplussed.

They might (after recuperating) protest that these and kindred "desertclaims" are so obviously true that there is no way, and no need, to

justify them.
For a philosopher, this response might seem unsatisfactory.

David Lewis eloquently put

it:

It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes
that others accept without thinking twice.
A dangerous
profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited
than platitudes, but a useful one.
For when a good
philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out
that the platitude was essentially right; but the
philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not think
twice could not have met.
In the end the challenge is
answered and the platitude survives, more often than not.
But the philosopher has done the adherents of the platitude
a service: he has made them think twice.
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As

George Sher has provided us this service
with respect to the

platitudes about desert.

Indeed, his book Desert is (as far as

I

know)

the only attempt at a full-scale justification
of desert-claims

available in print. ^

if his project succeeds,

believe our platitudinous desert-claims.

we will have reasons to

We will also gain the

intellectual satisfaction of knowing that our beliefs
about desert are
linked to other, more fundamental beliefs, and are not
simply "adrift"
in

conceptual space.

Even better, perhaps, we will have settled debates

about what is and what is not a basis for desert of various
things.

If,

on the other hand, Sher’s justificatory project fails,
no harm is done.
Thus, there are good reasons to undertake it, and no good
reason not to.

A summary of Sher’s project

Before proceeding, a brief summary of Sher’s project may be
helpful.

Sher writes:

...one of my central aims is to display the

underlying justification of desert-claims" (xi).

In one place,

Sher

says desert-claims are "...claims that persons deserve things" (x).^

offers a list of fifteen examples:

1.

2.

Jones deserves his success; he’s worked hard for it.
Smith deserved more success than he had; he gave it his

all.
3.
Walters deserves the job; he’s the best-qualified
applicant.
4.
Wilson deserved to be disqualified; he knew the deadline
for applications was March 1.
5.
Jackson deserves more than minimum wage; his job is
important and he does it well.
6.
Baker deserves to win; he’s played superbly.
7.
Miss Vermont deserves to win; she’s the prettiest
entrant.
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He

Anderson deserves his twenty-year sentence; he planned
the murder.
9.
Brown may have known that he wouldn’t be caught, but he
still deserves to be punished.
10.
Winters deserves some compensation; he’s suffered
constant pain since the shooting.
11.
Lee deserves a reward; he risked his life.
12.
Benson deserves some good luck; he’s a fine person.
13.
Gordon deserves some good luck; he’s had only bad.
14.
McArthur deserves a hearing; he’s an expert on the
subject.
15.
Cleveland deserves better publicity; it’s an
interesting city.
(Pages 6-7.)

8.

According to Sher, these and all other desert-claims have (at
least implicitly) the form *M deserves

X

for A’

M is the object of

desert, X is the thing deserved, and A is the reason for M’s deserving
or what Sher,

X

following Joel Feinberg, calls a "desert basis" (7).

Actually, Sher is not interested in justifying desert-claims like
1-15,

at least not directly.

After all, one might "justify" any one of

desert-claims 1-15 by appealing to one or more of the platitudes about
desert.

For example:

Hard workers deserve to succeed.
Jones is a hard worker.
Therefore, Jones deserves to succeed.

This argument is a "justification" of the particular desert-claim that

Jones deserves success.

But it is not very deep, because the platitude

that hard workers deserve to succeed has been left unjustified.

Sher

wants to provide deep justifications of particular desert-claims, such
as 1-15 above, by justifying more general desert-claims, such as the

claim that hard workers deserve to succeed.
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It will be helpful to have a list of the
general desert-claims

that Sher attempts to justify^:

to experience the expected consequences

oi their free actions.
C2.
People deserve what they have diligently tried to

achieve.
C3.
People deserve punishment for their wrongful acts.
C4.
People deserve compensation for the wrongful harm they
suffer.
C5.
People deserve wages for the work they do.
C6.
People deserve prizes/good grades for performing well
according to the relevant rules.
Cl.
The best-qualified applicant deserves the job.
C8.
People who perform virtuous acts deserve to be rewarded.
C9.
Virtuous people deserve happiness.

How does Sher justify these desert-claims?

In theory,

Sher does

not commit himself to any particular method of justification:

...I accept, and find liberating, a metaethic that holds
that there are no a priori limits to what counts as an
acceptable philosophical account. What will turn out to be
intellectually satisfying often cannot be known in advance.
Page xii
(

.

)

But in practice, Sher’s justifications are naturally interpreted as

arguments intended to entail a general desert-claim.
is how

I

At any rate, that

will interpret them.

Sher’s justifications, whatever their nature, have something in
common: each involves an operative principle that is moral-normative or

axiological.®

It will help to have a list of the principles to which

Sher appeals in his justifications of C1-C8’:

PI.
P2.

Freedom is valuable.
Persons are valuable.
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P3.

P4.

P5.
P6.
P7.

For every good G, every person M, and every
period of time P, if M has less (more) of G than
he should during P, then M should have
correspondingly more (less) of G or some related
good than he otherwise should during some later
period P’
Conventions for evaluating performance ought to
be honored.
Persons should be treated as rational agents.
Gratitude is owed to those who make sacrifices
to benefit others.
The morally virtuous have greater moral worth
than those who are not morally virtuous.

The moral-normative principles make use of the concepts ought or
should]

the axiological principles make use of the concepts value or

worth.

But whatever their classification®, Sher appears to believe that

PI

is crucial to the justification of Cl;

and so on down the lists.
C3,

C4

,

and C5.)

P2 to the justification of C2;

(Sher appeals to P3 to justify desert-claims

Thus, Sher’s justificatory project is intended to be

"...an account of the moral underpinnings of desert" (x).

One of Sher’s

fundamental theses, then, is that desert has "moral underpinnings" or

"normative roots."
Sher’s justificatory project is pluralistic: "...desert need not
have any single normative basis.

Instead, the different classes of

desert-claims may owe their justification to irreducibly different
principles and values" (xii).

Indeed, Sher does not propose a grand

ethical principle, or even a set of unified ethical principles, that

would justify all or even most interesting desert-claims.

He offers

instead a plurality of ethical principles to justify an assortment of

general desert-claims.

88

So much by way of summary.

Sher’s justificatory project,
looking at it.

certain

I

Before turning to the details of
want to briefly discuss another way of

I

have spoken of Sher’s project as an attempt
to justify

platitudes" about desert, or as an attempt to justify
general

desert-claims."

These desert-claims specify certain bases for desert:

effort, wrongdoing, suffering, achievement, virtue,
and so on.

So,

one

could use those general desert-claims to draw up a list
or catalogue of

desert bases.

Thus, another way to view Sher’s project is as an attempt

to justify a particular catalogue of desert bases.

offer this as an alternative way of looking at Sher’s project

I

for the following reason.
of desert,

claims

I

I

In Chapter 7, where

I

present my own theory

attempt to draw up a catalogue of desert bases.

One of the

make with respect to this catalogue is that it is difficult if

not impossible to Justify it.

Although there are, of course, things

that we intuitively feel are bases for desert, and things that we

intuitively feel are not bases for desert, these intuitions are (as
see it) difficult if not impossible to justify.
if those intuitions are correct,

basic.

I

My view, then, is that

they must be taken as epistemologically

By saying that these intuitions are "epistemologically basic,"

do not mean that we are not justified in believing them.

I

I

do mean that

they are incapable of being justified by some more fundamental principle
or principles.

This claim - that our intuitions about what is and what is not a

basis for desert are, when correct, epistemologically basic
strike some as outlandish.

-

might

It strikes me as somewhat outlandish,
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too.

It is not a claim

make,

I

prefer to make.

It is a claim

feel forced to

I

in virtue of failing to find any convincing
justification of our

considered views about what is and what is not a basis
for desert.
is one reason why

I

This

dedicate a chapter to Sher’s heroic efforts to

justify the platitudes about desert:

I

believe that his attempt fails,

and that its failure is evidence for my view (which

I

adopt tentatively

and reluctantly in Chapter 7) that there may be no way to
justify those

platitudes about desert, no way to justify the correct catalogue of
desert bases.

Another reason for dedicating a chapter to Sher’s attempt to

justify desert-claims is this.

Several of Sher’s justifications depend

on principles that assert connections between desert and other ethical

concepts, such as value and moral obligation.

A deep and important

question is whether there are any such connections between desert and
those other ethical concepts.

I

think that there are such connections,

and that reflection on Sher’s attempts to justify desert-claims reveals
at least some of them.

Desert, freedom, and expected consequences

Sher begins Chapter

3

of Desert with an observation:

"It is

widely recognized that free action has some important link to desert"
(37).

Sher thereby agrees with those writers who assert that freedom

and desert are importantly linked.

Indeed, Sher’s project in this

chapter is to explain this supposed "desert-autonomy link" (38).
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The link, in Sher’s view,
a desert basis (49).

is this:

But for what?

free or "autonomous" action is

His answer is that the performance

of a free action is a basis for deserving
its consequences (38);

specifically, performing a free action is a basis
for deserving its

expected consequences (39-40).

Sher dubs this the "expected-consequence

account" of the supposed link between free action
and desert.^

Although Sher does not formulate it in this way,

I

believe the

general desert-claim he intends to justify is this:

(Cl)
People deserve to experience the expected consequences
of their free actions.

This general desert— claim is supposed to "capture the essence"
of

specific desert-claims that Sher does mention:

1.
Wilson, who knowingly submitted his application late,
deserves to be disqualified.
2.
Harris, who didn’t bring his raincoat, deserves to get

wet.

Simmons, who didn’t study for his exam, deserves to
fail.
4.
Jake, who drove his truck out on the thin ice, deserves
to have his truck fall through the ice.
(Page 41.)
3.

In each claim,

someone is said to deserve "...to suffer the predictable

consequences of one’s earlier carelessness" (41).

These are the sorts

of cases where some people will say "Serves him right," or "He got what

was coming to him."

Sher is interested in justifying desert-claims involving not only
an agent’s carelessness, but also an agent’s resourcefulness:
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Just as the man who leaves his umbrella home when
it rains
deserves to get wet, so too does the man who brings
his
umbrella deserve to reach his destination dry. More
important, we believe that persons who resourcefully
seize
opportunities deserve the resulting benefits, that persons
who carefully make and execute plans deserve success,
and
that persons who forego immediate benefits in expectation
of
longer-range gains deserve those gains.
(Pages 41-42.)^°

In all these cases,

agents are said to deserve the expected

consequences of their free choices

-

choice was careless or resourceful.

regardless of whether the agent’s
Hence, what Sher seems to be

assuming is that the real basis for desert in these cases cannot be the

carelessness or resourcefulness of the agent, but rather the common
element in each case: namely, the agent’s free or "autonomous" choice.

Sher’s attempted justification of Cl can be drawn from the

following passage:

Few would deny that person ought to be able to choose and
act freely, and indeed that their doing so is of paramount
importance.
[But] any value that attaches to an autonomous
act might carry over to that act’s consequences.
Because
(at least some of) those consequences are part of what an
agent chooses, it would be quite arbitrary to say that it is
good that the agent perform the act he has chosen, but not
good that he enjoy or suffer that act’s predictable
consequences.
Since choice encompasses both acts and
consequences, any value that attaches to the implementation
of choice must belong equally to both.... In light of this,
one natural reason for saying that free agents ought [i.e.,
deserve] to enjoy or suffer specific consequences is that
those consequences, where predictable, have acquired value
from the fact that they are part of what the agent has
chosen.... In that case, what justifies our desert-claim will
be the value of the retrospective aspect of freedom itself.
(Pages 39-40.
.

Here is how

I

.

.

understand the argument of this passage:
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Freedom is valuable (PI).
If 1, then the exercise of freedom (that
is, the
performance of free actions) is valuable.
3.
If the exercise of freedom is valuable,
then
experiencing the expected consequence of one’s free
action
is valuable.
4.
If experiencing the expected consequence of
one’s free
action is valuable, then one deserves to experience
the
expected consequence of one’s free action.
5.
Therefore, one deserves to experience the expected
consequence of one’s free action (Cl).
1.

2.

Sher summarizes the crux of the argument:

"...it is generally

sufficient for an outcome’s having value, and the agent’s consequently

deserving it, that that outcome have been predictable from the agent’s
earlier activities" (67, my emphasis).
Sher does not feel it necessary to argue for PI, the first premise
that freedom is valuable.

He merely says this:

Few would deny that persons ought to be able to choose and
act freely, and indeed that their doing so is of paramount
importance.
These claims, whatever their exact
interpretation, are central to our shared moral scheme.
Page 39.
(

The question of whether freedom is good cannot, however, be

treated so lightly.

For one thing, the answer to that question depends

on what is meant by *good’.

Sher is right that few would deny that the

exercise of freedom can be extrinsically good.
to Sher’s argument.
is its exercise.

But this is irrelevant

Sher wants to show that if freedom is good, then so

From the fact that freedom is extrinsically good, it

does not follow that the exercise of freedom (the performance of a free
act)

is extrinsically good.

If the performance of a free act causes the
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agent harm, then that particular exercise of freedom is
extrinsically
bad.

Sher must mean, then, that the exercise of freedom is

intrinsically good.

Is it?

We might try to answer this by imagining

two extremely similar worlds.

The only difference between them is that

people have freedom in one world but not in the other.

If the free

world is intrinsically better than the unfree world, then freedom is
intrinsically good.

this,

I

have no fixed intuitions regarding this thought-experiment.

I

am not alone.

In

Consider the confessions of this ethicist:

One problem for me is that my intuitions about what has
intrinsic value are not sufficiently firm.
Freedom, for
example, is a source of puzzlement.
Sometimes I think that
freedom is good only as a means, and then at other times I
become convinced that it is good in itself, even when it
produces nothing else of value.

Hence,

it is difficult

(for some) to know whether PI, the first premise

in Sher’s justification of Cl,

is true.

For the sake of argument,

however, let it be granted that freedom is intrinsically good.

Let it

even be granted that freedom’s being intrinsically good means that the

exercise of freedom
good.^^

- the

performing of free acts

-

is intrinsically

Let it be granted, then, that the first two premises in Sher’s

argument for Cl are true.
A crucial question is whether it is true, as Sher’s third premise

asserts, that if the performance of a free act is intrinsically good,

then the agent’s experiencing the "expected" consequence of that act is
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also intrinsically good.

Sher’s argument for this premise, recall, was

that "it would be quite arbitrary to say that it
is good that the agent

perform the act he has chosen, but not good that he enjoy
or suffer that
act’s predictable consequences" (39).
do not think this would be at all "arbitrary."

I

To see this,

suppose you dive into frigid water to save a drowning child.

Just

before diving in, you are skeptical about your chances to save the
child.

Although you hope to save the child, what you actually expect is

to suffer intense pain, cramp up, and drown before you reach the child.

But since you feel you have no morally acceptable alternative, you dive
in.

Just as you expected, you suffer intense pain, cramp up, and drown

before you reach the child.
If so,

This,

if anything,

is intrinsically bad.

then it is false that experiencing the expected consequence of a

free act is intrinsically valuable.

Another crucial question is whether it is true, as Sher’s fourth
premise asserts, that if experiencing the expected consequence of one’s
free action is intrinsically valuable, then one deserves to experience

the expected consequence of one’s free action.

I

suspect that this

premise depends on a general principle that asserts a certain connection

between the concept of value and the concept of desert.
it seems,

VD

The principle,

is this:

If receiving (experiencing) x is intrinsically
good for S, then S deserves to receive
(experience) x.

The crucial question, then, is whether VD is true.
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I

think the answer is "no."

As

I

see it, there is no reason to

suppose that an experience’s being intrinsically good
for a person has

anything to do with whether or not the person deserves
that experience.
The ancient Romans, for example, might have taken
tremendous pleasure in
the spectacle of Christians being devoured by lions in
the Colosseum.

Suppose their pleasure, considered in isolation, was intrinsically
good
for them.

Clearly, this is no reason for supposing that the ancient

Romans deserved those pleasures!
This is not to say that there is no connection between the concept
of value and the concept of desert.

are such connections.

One such connection can be brought out by

considering a simple case.
not.

Indeed, my own view is that there

So,

You deserve a dollar.

I

suppose you have worked hard, and

deserve nothing.

Suppose next that

who do not deserve it, happen to get the dollar.
do not get the dollar.

I

have
I,

You, who deserve it,

Other things being equal, it would

(I

believe)

have been much better for you to have gotten the dollar than for me to
have gotten it.

The natural explanation for this is, of course, that

you deserved the dollar and

I

did not.

This simple case suggests that,

other things being equal, receiving what one deserves is intrinsically

better than failing to receive what one deserves.

DV

That is:

If S deserves x,

then S’s receiving x is
intrinsically better than S’s not receiving
(other things being equal).

x

An important feature to notice about DV is that, like VD, it

asserts a connection between desert and value.
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The connection, however.

IS reversed.

Sher assumes that something’s being intrinsically
valuable

for a person is a reason to think that the
person deserves it.

Sher assumes the truth of something like VD.

That is,

My assumption is that if a

person deserves something, this is some reason for thinking
that the
person’s receiving it will be intrinsically better than the
person’s not

receiving it.

That is,

Besides, if

I

I

assume the truth of DV.

have understood him, Sher went wrong in supposing

that Cl captures the essence of the specific desert-claims that
he

wishes to justify.

It seems to me far more natural to suppose that,

in

the cases Sher mentions, the basis for desert is not freedom, but

carelessness and prudence.

According to this natural view, carelessness

or recklessness is a basis for deserving to suffer its harmful

consequences to oneself; thoughtfulness or prudence is a basis for

deserving the consequences that are pleasant to oneself.

Thus, one who

accepted this alternative view would replace Cl with a pair of desertclaims:

Cl(-) People deserve to suffer the harmful, selfaffecting consequences of their careless or
reckless actions.

Cl{+) People deserve to enjoy the pleasant, selfaffecting consequences of their thoughtful or
prudent actions.

My own view is that these are plausible desert-claims.
the case of Jake.

melting ice.

Return to

He was reckless in driving his truck out on the

It was his stupid recklessness that makes us feel that he

deserves that his truck fall through the ice, whether he expected that
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or not.

Or consider the case of Wilson, who knowingly
submitted his

application late.

This was a careless thing to do.

carelessness he is disqualified, then so be

it.

If because of his

That is what we

intuitively feel he deserves, whether he expected it or not.

Or

consider the person who prudently carries his umbrella to work,
on the

expectation of rain.

We feel that this person deserves, other things

being equal, to stay dry.
I

suggest, then, that Cl is not among the platitudes about desert.

Sher should not bother trying to justify it.

In light of the cases he

describes, the desert-claims that Sher ought to justify, if any, are

better captured by Cl(-) and Cl(+).
This raises the question of how, if presented with Cl(-) and
Cl(+), Sher would attempt to justify them.

One thing is clear.

could not justify them by appealing to VD.

For one thing, VD is false.

But even if VD were true,

reason is simple.

He

it could not be used to justify Cl(-).

The

The antecedent of VD has to do with what is

intrinsically good for a person.
people deserve to suffer.

intrinsically valuable.

Cl(-) is claim about the harms that

Suffering a harm is not,
So even if VD were true,

I

believe,

it could not be

invoked to justify Cl(-).

Desert and diligence
In Chapter 4 of Desert,

Sher seeks to justify the following sorts

of desert-claims:

1.

Conscientious students deserve to get good grades.
98

2.
3.

Athletes who practice regularly deserve to
do well.
Businesspeople who work long hours deserve to
make

money.

Immigrants who overcome displacement and poverty
deserve
their success.
(Page 53.)
4.

In these and other cases,

to be his or her "diligence."

virtue of being diligent?

the basis for a person’s desert is said

But exactly what does a person deserve in

Sher argues that what the agent deserves in

virtue of his diligence is "...a function of his particular
efforts"
Therefore, the general desert-claim Sher wants to justify seems

(54).

to be this:

(C2)

People deserve what they diligently strive to achieve.

Unlike Cl, C2 is a common view about desert.

It is a worthwhile target

of an attempted justification.

Sher’s argument for C2 is contained in the following passages:

...persons themselves matter.... If persons themselves
matter, then what matters to persons should matter as well.
This line of reasoning makes is plausible to say that
desires confer some value on their objects. ... But if so,
then sustained efforts will indeed confer more value than
desires if the objects of such efforts matter to persons in
a deeper way [than merely desiring those objects].
Moreover ... the objects of diligent striving do matter to
persons more deeply, for diligent striving represents a far
greater commitment than does mere desire. ... [This is] the
correct explanation of why the diligent ought [i.e.,
deserve] to succeed.
They ought to succeed because their
sustained efforts are substantial investments of themselves
- the ultimate sources of value - in the outcomes they seek.
Pages 57-62
(

Here is how

.

I

)

understand the argument of these passages:
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Persons are valuable (P2).
If 1, then what persons desire to achieve
is valuable.
3.
If what persons desire to achieve is
valuable, then what
they diligently try to achieve is valuable.
4.
If what persons diligently try to achieve is
valuable,
then people deserve what they diligently try to achieve.
5.
Therefore, persons deserve what they diligently strive
to achieve (C2).
1.

2.

An evaluation of this argument can begin with considering
premise
1,

or P2.

Sher’s explanation of P2, the principle that persons are

valuable, occurs in this passage:

Put most simply, the belief is that persons themselves
matter - that they are, in some sense, "ends in themselves."
(Page 57.

Sher does not specify in what sense persons are "ends in

themselves."

But the dictum that persons are "ends in themselves" is

usually a premise in an argument for the kantian view that we should
never treat other persons merely as means to our own ends.
view is controversial, and not entirely clear.

does not defend or explain it.

This kantian

Sher, astonishingly,

He says only that it is "plausible" and

"...in the current context, beyond dispute" (57).
So let us take up the second premise, or what Sher calls the

"desire-confers-value thesis."

The thesis, in Sher’s words, is (or

provides) that we can "...infer from *M desires

valuable in itself’" (56).

X’

to 'M’s having X is

Sher claims (55) that the desire-confers-

value thesis "received its classic statement" from Ralph Barton Perry.
Perry said:
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[a]ny object, whatever it be, acquires value
when any
interest, whatever it be, is taken in it.^‘*
•

•

•

Perry s considered view was that something is
good(bad) if and

only if someone desires(is averse to) it; and that
something is

intrinsically good(bad) if and only if someone desires(is
averse to) it
for its own sake.^^

Hence, Perry would accept the desires-confer-value

thesis, which appears to be that if M desires x (for its own
sake), then
X is valuable

(in itself).

If the desires-confer-value thesis is true,

then (Sher argues) so

is the ef fort-confers-value thesis:

Persistent attempts to achieve a result, and sacrifices made
to obtain it, are the strongest possible evidence of a
stable and enduring desire for it. More deeply, desire and
effort may be conceptually related; for on various accounts,
it is impossible to desire something without being disposed
to try to get it.
If even the former connection holds, then
all diligently pursued outcomes are desired.
Hence, if all
desired outcomes have value, then so too do all outcomes
that are diligently pursued.
(Page 58.)

For argument’s sake, let us grant that if desires confer value on

their objects, then so do diligent efforts.

premise

3.

That is, let us grant

One question that remains is whether desires do "confer

value" on their objects in the way that Sher, following Perry, claims.
I

think not.

As critics of Perry were quick to point out, his theory of

intrinsic value would make even the most reprehensible thing

intrinsically good, provided that someone desired it as an end in
itself.

A similar point would cut against the ef fort-confers-value

thesis.

Hence, there is little reason to accept either thesis.^®
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Let us turn, then, to premise

4.

According to it, if what people

diligently try to achieve is valuable, then people deserve
what they

diligently try to achieve.
premise.

This seems to be the argument’s crucial

It asserts a connection between what is valuable

(intrinsically valuable, let us assume) and what is deserved.

therefore appears to be an instance of VD.
false.

But as

I

It

have argued, VD is

There are no grounds for supposing that something’s being

intrinsically valuable to a person provides any reason for a person’s

deserving it.

Indeed,

reflection on simple cases suggests that at least

one connection between desert and value is quite the reverse.

connection is expressed in DV.

That

Thus, Sher’s justification of C2 fails,

ultimately, in just the way that his justification of Cl failed.
However,

it may be that Sher does not really depend on the

desires-confer-value thesis.

Recall that the desires-confer value

thesis is supposed to secure the ef forts-confer value thesis, which in
turn is supposed to secure that the goals of diligent striving are
valuable.

In one passage,

Sher seems to advance an argument for this

lattermost conclusion that does not depend on the desires- or effort-

confers-value thesis:

Since our lives are constituted by our actions, our time and
energy are thus the very stuff of which we fashion our
lives.
Hence, any agent who devotes a major portion of his
time and energy to achieving a goal is quite literally
(Page 62.
making that goal a part of himself.

Persons are "constituted," in part, by the goals they desire and

diligently strive for.

(Sher dedicates Chapter 9 of his book to an

102

explanation and defense of this view of
persons.)
valuable (P2).

Hence,

its constituents,

But persons are

if the value of a thing is due to
the value of

then what persons desire and strive for
is valuable.

This may be Sher’s real argument for the claim
that diligent effort

confers value upon its object.
claim justifies (C2).

If it is,

then his view may be that this

As evidence, here is the rest of the passage
in

which Sher summarizes that putative justification:

...[the diligent] ought to succeed because their sustained
efforts are substantial investments of themselves - the
ultimate sources of value — in the outcomes they seek.
Reversing Marx’s aphorism that value is congealed labor, we
might express the point by saying that (sustained and goaldirected) labor is congealed value. Of course, this
suggestion is only as convincing as the view that persons
are constituted by the specific acts they perform, and by
the specific act-related traits they possess.
(Page 62.)

This argument does not show that the objects of diligent striving
are valuable.

It depends on the implausible claim that persons are

"constituted" by their goals, or that a person’s goals can be "quite
literally

parts of that person.

consider the following case.
total nuclear disarmament.

To see that this view is implausible,

Suppose a particular statesman’s goal is
If Sher’s view about persons is correct,

then the statesman has total nuclear disarmament as one of his parts.
But how could the state of affairs expressed by 'total nuclear

disarmament’ be in any real sense "part" of a person?

(What if total

nuclear disarmament is never achieved?)
Even if it were granted that people have their goals as parts, and
even it were granted that this gives value to those parts, Sher does not
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explain how this would justify the claim that
people deserve what they

diligently strive to achieve.
step: namely,

Sher’s justification fails at the crucial

from the premise that what persons diligently
strive to

achieve is valuable, to the desert-claim that persons
deserve what they

diligently strive to achieve.

It fails,

I

would argue, because this

step can be made only by relying on a principle akin to
VD.

Sher is right, though, that the "value" of an outcome that
someone
has struggled to achieve is relevant to the question of
whether he

deserves it.

Sher himself supplies two examples that illustrate the

point:

A safecracker does not deserve to escape with the contents
of a vault because he has spent five years tunneling into
it; neither does a political fanatic deserve to succeed at a
painstakingly plotted assassination.
(Page 67.)

In cases like these,

the agent strives to attain an evil.

The

evil of the goal mitigates what might otherwise be the agent’s desert of

that goal.

The opposite effect can occur in cases where the goal is

especially good.

To see this, suppose that two people relevantly

similar to each other are striving equally hard to achieve their

respective goals.

One person’s goal is neurotic: to know the precise

number of blades of grass in his lawn.
a vaccine for the AIDS virus.

The other’s altruistic: to find

Although there is no difference in the

intensity of their efforts, my intuition is that, other things being
equal, the AIDS researcher deserves to achieve her goal more than the

blade-counter deserves to achieve hers.
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The natural explanation for

this is that the researcher’s goal is
especially good, whereas the

blade-counter’s goal

is,

at best, neutral.

If this is right,

then the

"value” of a diligently pursued goal affects one’s
desert of it.
However,

in cases like these,

the value (or disvalue) does not, as

Sher would have us believe, come from the agent’s
diligent striving.
Rather,

it comes from the goal itself.

The desires or efforts of an

agent have no effect on the value of the goal

-

or if they do, this

inherited "value" has no obvious effect on the agent’s desert of
the
goal.

rather than say with Sher that diligence confers value on its

So,

object,

I

would say instead that the fact that one has been diligent has

a certain "weight" that influences one’s desert, but this can be

outweighed by, among other things, the value of one’s goal.^’

Desert and wrongdoing
It is a platitude that wrongdoers deserve punishment.

Sher notes

that neither the expected-consequence account nor the ef fort-confers-

value thesis justifies it.

That is, neither account:

...explains why persons who have acted wrongly now deserve
Wrongdoers do not diligently pursue their
own punishment; neither is it always predictable from their
acts.
Thus, if their desert is to be understood, it must be
in terms of some third sort of justification.
(Page 69.)
to be punished.

In Chapters

5

and

6

of Desert, Sher turns his attention to justifying

the general desert-claim:

(C3)

People deserve to be punished for their wrongful acts.
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Sher

s

justification of C3 depends heavily on Herbert
Morris’s

famous essay, "Persons and Punishment "i®
.

Here is how Sher understands

the essence of Morris’s argument:

...punishment is fair because it removes an advantage that
the wrongdoer has but others lack.
Those who obey the rules
abjure the advantage they could obtain by interfering
with
others in proscribed ways. Those who break the rules gain
this advantage.
Because they gain it without giving up the
additional advantage they get from the self-restraint of
others, they end up with more than their fair share of
advantage.
In punishing them, we remove their excess
advantage, and so restore a fair balance of burdens and
benefits.
(Page 77.)

Morris’s suggestion is that criminal wrongdoers benefit from breaking
the law, and from the failure of others to break the law.
if a thief robs a bank,

he obtains a financial benefit.

For example,
He also

benefits from the fact that others have not robbed the bank before he
did.

So the thief benefits from the general public’s self-restraint,

and his lack of it.

This supposedly upsets a fair balance of benefits

and burdens.

Punishing the criminal is intended to restore that

balance.

for example, the thief’s financial benefit (or some

So,

equivalent) is (if possible) returned to the proper owners, and the
thief is imprisoned.

He is thereby placed under a far greater degree of

restraint than law-abiding citizens.

In this way, Morris seems to be

saying, punishment is "fair."

Sher modifies Morris’s view in several ways.

discussion to the punishment of law-breakers.

Morris restricts his

Sher wants to justify the

claim that wrongdoersy not merely law-breakers, deserve punishment.
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So,

as a first step towards justifying
this broader claim, Sher appeals
to

the concept of "the moral law"
(82).

Wrongdoers violate the moral law;

criminals violate the civil law (at least).

Next, Sher rejects Morris’s

suggestion that "...the wrongdoer’s extra
benefit, and so too his

deserved punishment, is determined by the
amount of profit he receives
from acting wrongly" (81).

For in some cases moral wrongdoing, the

wrongdoer may not "profit" in any tangible way.
gains, on Sher’s view,
tnora.1

What the moral offender

is the benefit of "liberty" or "freedom"
from the

rsstrictions that othsrs typically observe (83),
However, Sher’s view is not, as one might expect, that
the

wrongdoer’s benefit is to be measured in terms of the amount
of freedom
that the wrongdoer supposedly gains by flouting the moral law.
on Sher’s view,

Rather,

it is to be measured in terms of "...the strength of the

moral prohibition that is violated."

Specifically:

The stronger the

prohibition, the greater the benefit from transgressing it (82-83).
Thus, on Sher s account, wrongdoing results in an excess of a supposed

benefit: namely, transgressing the moral law.

Sher now invokes a general principle that will, he thinks, provide
the crucial step in his attempted justification of the claim that

wrongdoers deserve punishment.

He calls it the "principle of diachronic

fairness"

DF3

For every good G, every person M, and every
period of time P, if M has less (more) of G than
he should during P, then M should have
correspondingly more (less) of G or some related
good than he otherwise should during some later
period P’.
(Page 94.)
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The word 'should’ occurs several times in DF3.
the moment, that it means 'deserves’.

Let us assume,

Thus interpreted, DF3 expresses a

thesis about desert and the receipt of good and evil
over time.
thesis, roughly,

for

The

is that past receipt and future receipt of
good or evil

are bases for what one deserves now.

I

find this thesis plausible.

discuss and endorse a version of it in Chapter

I

7.

Sher appears to use DF3 to justify C3 in the following way.

According to Sher
excess,

s

account of wrongdoing, wrongdoing results in an

for the wrongdoer, of the supposed benefit of transgressing the

moral law.

DF3, as

I

am understanding it, states (in effect) that those

who enjoy an excess of some benefit at some time deserve to have less of
that benefit at some other time.

Freedom is a benefit, and punishment

often takes the form of a restriction on one’s freedom.

Thus,

it seems

that Sher’s account of wrongdoing, conjoined with D3, justifies C3.
I

find this justification implausible.

First, Sher’s account of

wrongdoing is obscure: it is hard to know, and Sher does not tell us,
what the "moral laws" are.
are,

Second, even if we knew what the moral laws

it seems rather odd to claim that transgressing those laws is,

general, some sort of "benefit"

-

in

unless, of course, one subscribes to a

hobbesian view of morality, but Sher never explains or defends any such
theory.

Besides, even if Sher’s account of wrongdoing were accepted, he

seems not to provide a deep justification of C3.

For, on the current

interpretation of DF3, Sher’s justification of C3 amounts to this:
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1.
Excessive past receipt of some good is a
basis for
deserving less of some good.
2.
Wrongdoing results in excessive receipt of

some good
(such as freedom).
3.
Therefore, wrongdoing is a basis for deserving
less of
some good (such as freedom, by way of punishment).

Given his overall project, which is the justification
of major desertclaims, what Sher ought to be attempting to justify
is the first premise
of this argument: namely, that excessive past receipt
of some good is a

basis for deserving less of some good now.
is just a corollary of DF3,

is DF3.

what Sher ought to justify (but never does)

For this principle, as

general desert-claim.

Moreover, since this premise

I

have understood it thus far,

is a

Therefore, it cannot provide a deep justification

of other desert-claims.

Perhaps
that the word

I

have misunderstood DF3.

My assumption thus far has been

should’, as it occurs in DF3, means 'deserves*.

assumption may be mistaken.

This

Perhaps the word 'should’, in at least one

of its occurrences in DF3, means 'morally should’.

This possibility is

suggested by Sher’s remark:

...desert of punishment ... ref lects the demands of diachronic
fairness. .. .On one natural interpretation, these demands and
requirements are precisely obligations,... (Page 196.)

Indeed, perhaps Sher’s intention is to provide a principle linking

the concept of moral obligation to the concept of desert.

DF3 can be

interpreted as just such a principle:

DF3*

For every good G, every person M, and every
period of time P, if M has less (more) of G than
he morally should during P, then M deserves to
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have correspondingly more (less) of G or some
related good than he otherwise deserves during
some later period P’.

Understood this way, DF3* asserts a connection between what
a person
ought to receive what a person deserves.

think a simpler principle,

I

one that Sher may depend on here and (as we will see) later
on, is this:

OD

If S morally ought to receive x,
to receive x.

then S deserves

OD asserts a connection between the concept of moral obligation
and desert.

Moreover, OD could be used in a deep justification of C3,

the claim that wrongdoers deserve to be punished.

The justification

would go something like this:

Wrongdoers ought to receive punishment.
If S morally ought to receive x, then S deserves to
receive x (OD).
3.
Therefore, wrongdoers deserve punishment (C3).
1.

2.

If sound,

this little argument would provide a deep justification of C3.

For none of its premises is itself a general desert-claim.
respect,

it

is an improvement over what appeared,

In this

on one interpretation

of DF3, to be Sher’s justification of C3.

However, the argument is not sound.
is false.

Premise

2,

the OD principle,

There is little reason to suppose that S deserves x merely

because S morally ought to receive

x.

This can be seen most clearly by

considering the contrapositive of OD: namely, if it is not the case that
S

deserves

x,

then it is not the case that S morally ought to receive

no

x.

So,

for example, consider a lifeboat situation.

is adrift.

There is enough food for only four of them.

be thrown overboard if the rest are to survive.

that none deserves to be thrown overboard.
lifeboat,

A group of five people

Thus, one must

It seems safe to assume

However, for anyone in the

it may nevertheless be true that he or she
morally ought to be

jettisoned.

Otherwise all will die.

This example suggests that OD is

false.

This is not say, however, that there is no connection between

desert and moral obligation.
such connection.
So,

Indeed,

I

believe there is at least one

It can be brought out by considering a simple case.

suppose that you deserve an apology.

morally ought to receive

it.

Other things being equal, you

This is because, other things being equal,

the person who insulted you ought to offer you an apology.

This case

suggests that there is a general connection between desert and moral
obligation.

DO

The connection can be expressed as follows:

If S deserves x,

then S ought to receive x
(other things being equal

The important thing to notice is that DO, like OD, asserts a

connection between desert and obligation.
reversed.

However, the connection is

Sher’s assumption appears to be that the fact that S ought to

receive x is a reason for supposing that S deserves x; that is, Sher

assumes something akin to OD.

My assumption is that S’s deserving x is

a reason (though not conclusive) for supposing that S ought to receive
x;

that is,

I

assume the truth of DO.

Ill

It appears,

then, that Sher’s justification of C3 is in
trouble.

His justification of C3 depends crucially on DF3,
the "principle of

diachronic fairness."

On one natural interpretation, DF3 is itself

a.

general desert-claim, and therefore cannot provide a deep
justification
of CF3.

On another natural interpretation, DF3 seems to depend on
the

truth of OD.

But OD is false.

It reverses an ostensible connection,

expressed by DO, between desert and moral obligation.
if there is a justification of CF3,

I

conclude that

Sher has not found it.

This is particularly unfortunate in light of the fact that Sher
invokes DF3 to justify other desert claims.

In Chapter 6,

Sher attempts

to justify "...a whole range of desert-claims that appear to require

some trans-temporal balancing of benefits and burdens" (91).

These

include not only claims that persons deserve punishment:

...but also claims that persons deserve sums of money, or
opportunities, to compensate for wrongly inflicted harm or
suffering.
In addition, they include many more modest
claims that persons deserve relief from burdens that were
not wrongfully inflicted.
For example, someone who has had
persistent bad luck may be said to deserve a change of
fortune.
Finally. .. they include claims that persons who
have worked for others deserve wages as compensation.
(Page
91.)

Thus, the three general desert-claims that Sher attempts to justify with

the help of DF3 are as follows:

(C3)

People deserve to be punished for their wrongful
acts.

(C4)

People deserve compensation for the wrongful
harms they suffer.

(C5)

People deserve wages for the work they do.
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Given the difficulties just discussed,

I

think there is little

reason to review Sher’s attempts to justify C4
and C5 with the help of
DF3.

Therefore,

I

shall press on to a discussion of Sher’s attempt
to

justify desert-claims involving merit.
things to say about desert of wages, but

(Sher does have some interesting
I

take these up in Chapter 6.)

Desert and merit
At the beginning of Chapter

7,

Sher states that his "...main aim

will be to discover why the deserving parties - in this case, the

meritorious

-

should have what they are said to deserve" (109).

Sher

distinguishes "moral merit" from "nonmoral merit":

The morally meritorious include both people who perform
single transcendent acts of heroism or sacrifice and persons
whose generosity or compassion is woven through their lives.
The nonmorally meritorious include athletes who run faster
than others, scientists who discover cures for deadly
diseases, and job applicants who score highest on qualifying
exams.
(Page 109.)

In this chapter,

merit.

Sher tries to justify desert-claims involving nonmoral

In particular:

(C6)

People deserve prizes/good grades for performing
well according to the relevant rules.

(C7)

The best qualified applicant deserves the job.

Let us take up Sher’s attempted justification of C6.
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Sher argues that "...the best competitor’s desert of
victory and
the prize, and the student’s desert of his grade, reflects
the demands
of veracity"

veracity"?

(196).

What, according to Sher, are the "demands of

How are those demands supposed to justify C6?

According to Sher, there is a "principle of veracity" that
"...requires that we not say what we know to be false, but... does not
require us to say everything we know to be true" (112).

Sher argues

that "something like the principle of veracity" operates in contexts

that "...presuppose conventional structures which establish tests for

excellence and rewards or prizes for passing those tests" (115).

The

principle Sher has in mind is that "...where there are conventions for

evaluating performance, their dictates ought to be honored" (116).

That

is:

(P4)

Conventions for evaluating performance ought to
be honored.

Sher claims that by "...appealing to veracity, we can justify the

desert-claims that arise when persons display merit in conventionally
structured contexts" (117).

That is, P4 is supposed to justify C6, the

desert-claim that people deserve prizes/good grades for performing well
according to the relevant rules.
Sher is not explicit about how P4 is supposed to do this.

Let us

suppose that Sher is advancing the following argument:

Conventions for evaluating performance ought to be
1.
honored (P4).
2.
If 1, then people who perform well according to relevant
rules deserve prizes or good grades.
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Therefore, people who perform well according to
the
relevant rules deserve prizes or good grades.

3.

Let us grant premise

question is whether premise
correctly, premise

2

or P4

1,

for argument’s sake.

is true.

2

If

I

Then the

have understood Sher

depends on a view about the connection between

desert and moral obligation.

The view is that if S ought to receive

then S deserves to receive x.
is expressed by OD.

,

But OD,

x,

We have encountered this view before.
I

argued,

is false.

It

There is no reason for

supposing that the fact that S morally ought to receive x is grounds for
S s

deserving

x.

(Quite the reverse,

I

claimed: S’s deserving x is

grounds for it being true that S ought to receive
correct, then the above argument is unsound.

x.

)

If this is

It does not justify C6.

Perhaps there is an alternative interpretation of Sher’s

justification of C6.

Sher may be suggesting that the mere fact that

someone has satisfied the conditions of some contest, or excelled

according to some rules, and is therefore entitled to some prize or
grade,

is a basis for the person’s deserving that prize or grade.

short, entitlement is a basis for desert.

If

it is,

In

then (other things

being equal) people deserve prizes/good grades for performing well

according to the rules that entitle them to those prizes/good grades.
I

happen to believe that entitlement is a basis for desert (see

Chapter 7).

However, even if that is granted, the basic justificatory

question remains unanswered.

For what justifies the claim that, other

things being equal, people deserve that to which they are entitled?
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Until this question is answered, Sher will not have provided
a deep

justification C6.
Let us turn, then, to Sher’s attempt to justify the claim
that

people deserve the positions for which they are qualified (C7).

This

passage seems crucial for understanding that attempt:

...selecting by merit is a way of taking seriously the
potential agency of both the successful and the unsuccessful
applicants.
Conversely, when an applicant is selected on
some other basis, there is a recognizable if elusive sense
in which he and his rivals are not taken seriously.
And
this suggests that we may justify selection by merit by
arguing that persons ought to be taken seriously in the
relevant sense.
I
believe, in fact, that some argument of
this sort does underlie the claim that best-qualified
applicants deserve jobs and educational opportunities.
(Pages 121-122.
)

The argument appears to be that if we ought to take people "seriously"
(in some sense),

them.

then people who are best qualified for jobs deserve

But in what sense should people be taken seriously?

this justify C7?

And how does

Let us begin with the first question.

Sher claims that "...the requirement that we select among

applicants on the basis of their qualifications is a consequence of the
more general requirement that we treat all persons as rational agents"
(126).

So to say that we should "treat people seriously" is,

for Sher,

to say that we ought to treat people as rational agents.

Sher explains that to treat persons as rational agents is to treat

them as agents who can deliberate, choose, and act autonomously (126).
When an employer takes a person’s qualifications seriously

-

that is, as

qualifications that the applicant has chosen to obtain and has acted
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autonomously in attaining them

-

the employer treats the applicant as a

rational agent.

Sher’s view is that treating people as rational agents is "..the

rationale for the claim that the best-qualified deserves to be chosen"
What exactly is the rationale?

(127).

Sher writes:

What needs to be shown is not that only the best-qualified
applicant is owed treatment as a rational agent, but rather
that he, and only he, is owed the contested position. To
establish this, I have argued that only selection by
qualification treats all applicants as rational agents, and
that under such selection, the best-qualified applicant, and
he alone, is owed the position.
On this account, what the
best-qualified applicant alone is owed just is what he alone
deserves.
(Page 127.

This passage suggests that Sher’s justification of C7 amounts to this:

1.

2.

People should be treated as rational agents (P5).
If 1, then the best-qualified applicant deserves the

job.
3.

Therefore, the best-qualified applicant deserves the job

(C7).

Let us grant for argument’s sake the truth of premise

For

I

think it is clear that premise

2

is false.

1,

or P5.

It moves from a claim

about what people should or ought to receive, to a claim about what

people deserve to receive.

This move assumes a mistaken view, expressed

by OD, of the connection between moral obligation and desert.

plausible view of one such connection is,
If so,

then premise

2

I

(A more

believe, expressed by OD.

cannot be used in a sound justification of C7
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Desert and virtue
Let us turn, finally, to Sher’s attempt to
justify desert-claims

that mention virtue.

Virtue, for Sher,

is "moral merit."

According to

Sher, people exhibit moral merit "...when they display
a virtuous

character or perform specific acts of courage, thoughtfulness,
or
generosity" (132).
As Aristotle realized, not every person who performs a virtuous

act is a virtuous person.

Nevertheless, Sher thinks, persons who

perform virtuous acts deserve some sort of reward (133).

Those who are

virtuous persons also, Sher believes, deserve something: "...an

excellent character seems in itself to be a significant desert-basis"
Following

(136).

W.

D.

Ross and others, Sher’s view is that the

virtuous deserve happiness (132).

Thus, Sher wants to justify two

desert-claims: that persons who perform virtuous acts, but who may not
be virtuous persons, deserve rewards (C8); and that virtuous persons

deserve happiness (C9).

Let us turn to Sher’s attempted justification

of C8.

People who act so as to benefit others are often said to deserve
rewards.

Sher considers a number of cases: the person who returns to a

burning building to save another; the companion who looks after a widow
in her declining years;

the person who assists a stranded motorist; the

foster parents who take in children nobody else wants.

virtuous acts, these people deserve some reward
have virtuous characters.
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Because of their

whether or not they

Sher argues that "...where persons are said
to deserve rewards for

specific acts of virtue, their desert may well
be grounded in debts of

gratitude that these acts engender" (133):
Where persons make sacrifices to benefit others, those
others are standardly thought to owe them debts of
gratitude.
Thus, when we say that benefactors deserve
rewards, the real point may be that their beneficiaries
owe
them such debts.
(Page 133.)

Sher notes that gratitude is "owed" to those who make sacrifices
to

benefit others (P6).

He seems to be arguing that the desert of those

who make such sacrifices is "grounded" in debts of gratitude.

another way, Sher seems to arguing that P6 justifies C8:

Put

"...desert of

reward for heroic or helpful acts sometimes draws force from the

requirements of gratitude" (196).

In other words:

1.
Gratitude is owed to those who make sacrifices to
benefit others (P6).
2.
If 1, then people who perform virtuous acts deserve to
be rewarded.
3.
Therefore, people who perform virtuous acts deserve to
be rewarded (C8).

Let us grant, for argument’s sake, that gratitude is owed to those

who make sacrifices to benefit others.

premise

2

premise

2,

If

is true.

Then the question is whether

This depends on how 'is owed to’, as it occurs in

is understood.

'is owed to’ means

'is deserved by’,

For understood that way, premise

2

then premise

asserts this:

2

seems true.

If gratitude is

deserved by those who make sacrifices to benefit others, then people who
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perform virtuous acts deserve to be rewarded.

Indeed, this is trivially

true if gratitude is a sort of reward.
If premise 2

is understood in this way,

provide a deep justification of C8.

deserved by’ in premise
same in premise

premise

1,

1.

2,

the argument fails to

For if 'is owed to’ means 'is

then it must (for validity’s sake) mean the

But if 'is owed to’ means 'is deserved by’

in

then that premise asserts that gratitude is deserved by those

who make sacrifices to benefit others.

seems to be a platitude about desert!

This seems true.
If so,

In fact,

it

then it cannot provide a

deep justification of another platitude about desert, such as C8.

Perhaps 'is owed to’, as it occurs in the above argument, does not
mean 'is deserved by’.

Perhaps it is meant to express not the concept

of desert, but the concept of moral obligation.
this:

If so,

the argument is

People who make sacrifices to benefit others morally ought to

receive gratitude; if so, then those people deserve rewards; therefore,

people who make sacrifices to benefit others deserve rewards.
My evaluation of this argument should come as no surprise.

The

move from what people morally ought to receive to what they deserve to

receive is, in my view, illicit.

It depends on a mistaken view,

expressed by OD, of the connection between desert and moral obligation.
A correct view of such a connection,

I

believe,

is expressed by DO - but

DO cannot be used to justify C8.
What,

finally, of Sher’s attempt to justify C9, the claim that

virtuous people deserve happiness?

Summarizing his attempt, Sher says:

"...I defended the claim that virtuous persons deserve to be happy by
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arguing that such persons are themselves worth more
than others, and
hence that their happiness must be worth more as
well" (196).

That is,

Sher wants to justify C9 with:

(P7)
The morally virtuous have greater moral worth than
those who are not morally virtuous.

Sher defends P7 by arguing, firstly, that "seeking value is part
of what confers worth on persons;" secondly, the virtuous seek value

more than persons who are not virtuous (143).

In support of the claim

that seeking value is part of what confers worth on persons, Sher admits
that he appeals only to "sketchy considerations" (143).

He is

nevertheless willing to "...assume that the worth of persons is due
partly to the fact that they have a concept of value and seek to realize
it"

(143).

For argument’s sake let us assume it, too.

In support of the claim that the virtuous seek value more than

those who are not virtuous, Sher says this:

...the moral virtues that interest us are all heightened and
concentrated propensities to seek forms of value. When
someone is fair-minded and honest, he automatically seeks to
do what is right.
When someone is generous, sympathetic,
considerate, or kind, he automatically seeks to bring good
results.
In each case, the person exemplifies, to a higher
degree than others, the value-seeking propensity that is
crucial to the worth of persons. And because he does, we
may reasonably suppose that he acquires greater worth than
do others from his possession of it.
(Pages 143-144.)

For argument’s sake, let us grant that the moral virtues are "heightened
and concentrated propensities to seek forms of value."
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Let us also

grant that those who possess these propensities have
"greater worth"
than those who do not.
So,

Sher’s argument is relatively clear:

"the desert of the

virtuous" can be justified by "...the fact that they seek value
to a
greater degree than others, and thus have greater worth" (145).

In

other words:

1.
The morally virtuous have greater moral worth than those
who are not morally virtuous (P7).
2.
If 1, then the happiness of those who are morally
virtuous is more valuable than the happiness of those who
are not morally virtuous.
3.
If the happiness of those who are morally virtuous is
more valuable than the happiness of those who are not
morally virtuous, then virtuous people deserve happiness.
4.
Therefore, virtuous people deserve happiness (C9).

Let us grant, for argument’s sake, the truth of premises

The crucial question is whether premise

3

is true.

Premise

3

depend on a view of the connection between value and desert.

1

and

2.

appears to
This view

can be expressed as follows:

VD’

Premise

3

If A’s receiving x is more valuable than B’s
receiving x, then A deserves x (more than B
deserves x).

is more or less an instance of VD’

plausibility of premise

3,

If so,

then the

and the soundness of Sher’s justification of

C9, depend on the truth of VD’
is false.

To see this, suppose that you have worked hard in

the garden all day.

You come inside, covered with sweat and grime, to

VD’

drink a cold beer.

This gives you a moderate amount of pleasure.
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Now

suppose that

I,

who have been lazing around the house all day,
would get

a tremendous amount of pleasure - much more
pleasure than you actually

get - from drinking that beer.

My receiving that beer would,

way, be more valuable than your receiving that beer.

clearly does not follow that
Indeed,

premise

is false.
3

But from this it

deserve the beer more than you do!

may not deserve the beer at all.

I

that VD

I

in this

This example shows,

I

think,

It also shows that there is no reason to accept

of Sher’s justification of C9.

This is not to say that there is no connection between desert and
value.

Indeed, my view is that there are such connections.

expresses one such connection.
the case at hand,

DV’

DV

Another connection, more pertinent to

is this:

If A deserves x more than B deserves x, then A’s
receiving x is more valuable than B’s receiving
X (other things being equal).

Like VD’

,

DV’

expresses a connection between desert and value.

The connection, however, is reversed.

This suggests that Sher’s

justification of C9 gets things backwards.

It suggests,

in other words,

that here (as elsewhere) Sher relies on a mistaken conception of the

relation(s) between desert and other moral concepts.

Conclusion
Sher’s justificatory project seems to be a failure.

My personal

opinion is that the major premises (that is, PI through P7) of Sher’s

justifications are too obscure or too controversial to provide any
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convincing justification of the targeted desert-claim.
accept those major premises (as

I

that Sher s justifications fail.

did,

But even if we

for argument’s sake),

it appears

This is because the minor premises of

those justifications depend on false principles (that is, VD,
VD’

,

and

OD) that assert various connections between desert and the
concepts of

value and moral obligation.
However, Sher’s failure is instructive for at least two reasons.
First,

it forces us to recognize that desert does have connections to

the concepts of value and moral obligation.

these connections are expressed by DV, DV’

I

believe that some of

and DO.

,

Second, Sher’s

failure to justify some major desert-claims is some evidence for

supposing that the platitudes about desert, if accepted at all, must be
accepted as among the first principles of ethics.
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CHAPTER

6

DESERT AND WAGES

Introduction
Women tend to earn less than their male colleagues.

Furthermore,

women tend to earn less than men who hold jobs that are nominally

different but relevantly similar (in terms of skill, responsibility,

working conditions) to their own.
protest these facts.

Advocates of "comparable worth"

Their protest often takes this form:

differences in pay between men and women are undeserved.^
for this claim is simple.

Those
The argument

Some facts are relevant to the wage one

deserves for performing a given job, and some are not.

In the vast

majority of cases, the argument continues, being a man or being a woman
is not relevant to the wage one deserves for performing a given job;

relevant are (say) the skill, responsibility, and working conditions
required by job.

Thus, those whose jobs are comparable with respect to

these facts deserve comparable pay.

Therefore, women and men who work

the very same jobs deserve equal pay.

Furthermore, women and men who

work jobs that are nominally different but relevantly similar also

deserve equal pay.
This argument clearly presupposes an account of what is and what
is not a basis for deserving a wage, or a theory of desert of wages.

Such a theory interests not only advocates of comparable worth.
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It also

interests those (like me) who believe that justice
obtains to the extent
that people get what they deserve.

For us, the justice of wealth-

distributions in industrialized countries cannot be assessed
without a
theory of desert of wages.

This is because in those countries, wages

constitute the bulk of the average person’s income.

Theories of desert of wages have been proposed.
sections of this chapter,

I

In the first few

consider the most prominent among them.

Each suffers from unique difficulties, but they share a fundamental
defect.

This defect is symptomatic of a common but (as

misguided way of thinking about desert in general.
section,

I

I

see it)

In the penultimate

describe this way of thinking and suggest an alternative.

I

conclude by applying this alternative to desert of wages in particular,
and sketching its implications for the comparable worth debate.

Before proceeding, some terminological points are in order.

Let a

wage be whatever payment is given to a person in return for his or her

contracted work.^
food,

The wage may be cash or some other benefit such as

lodging, vacation time, and so on.

Work is the attempted

provision of some service, such as lawn-mowing or lawyering.

Thus, a

necessary condition on deserving a wage is doing some contracted work.

Contracted work is, of course, work that has been contracted.

But as

I

understand them, contracts can be formal or informal, explicit or
implied.

There need not be a signed document.

There need only be some

sort of agreement between the relevant parties that the service will be

provided in return for some sort of payment.
this agreement need not even be actual.^
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In some circumstances,

The effort theory

With those points made, let us begin by considering the
effort
theory of desert of wages.

Joel Feinberg describes a version of it:

...the principle of ef fort. .would distribute economic
products not in proportion to successful achievement but
according to the degree of effort exerted. According to the
principle of effort, justice decrees that hard-working
executives and [equally] hard-working laborers receive
precisely the same remuneration....^
.

Feinberg’

s

statement captures the basic idea behind the effort

theory: the more effort one exerts on the job, the higher the wage one

deserves.

ET:

This idea can be put as follows:

Worker A deserves a higher wage than worker B
iff A exerts more effort than B; A and B deserve
the same wage iff A exerts the same amount of
effort as B.

The leading argument for ET appears to be this.®

deserved either for our efforts or for their success.
within our control, but their success is not.

efforts is matter of luck or accident.
through mere luck or accident.

Wages are
Our efforts are

The success of one’s

Desert, however, cannot arise

Thus, wages are not deserved for the

success of our efforts, but rather for our efforts alone.
This is a bad argument.

First, there is no reason to believe that

effort and success exhaust the possible bases for deserving a wage.
the very least, an argument is needed to support such a claim.

At

Second,

it is not true that desert cannot arise through mere luck or accident.
If it were true,

then bad luck and horrible accidents could not make one
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deserving of, say, a stretch of good luck, or compensation.^

Finally,

it is highly implausible that the success of one’s
efforts is always a

matter of luck or accident

-

unless this means merely that there is a

chance that one’s efforts will not succeed.

That is certainly true, but

there is a difference between the possibility of one’s efforts failing,
on the one hand, and their success being "accidental" or "lucky," on
the

other.

For example, your efforts to read this paper may fail; but if

they succeed, this probably will not be a matter of luck or accident.
Besides, the effort theory generates implausible results.
two garbage collectors.

Compare

One finds it very easy to lift heavy bags of

rubbish all day, and can do it quickly.

Another finds the task

difficult, and must exert three times the effort to achieve the same
results.

I

f

ET were true, the second garbage collector would deserve a

wage perhaps three times greater than the first.

That seems incorrect.

Surely it is more plausible that they deserve the same wage, or even
that the first collector, since he can perform his job more efficiently,

deserves a higher wage than the second.
Or compare two corporate executives.
other, and each works tirelessly.

generous wage.

Each works as hard as the

ET entails that each deserves a

But one does excellent work.

to dramatic profits for the company.

Her diligent efforts lead

For this, she deserves a raise.

Meanwhile, the other’s efforts constantly backfire.

His efforts, though

conscientious, result in substantial losses to the company.
he may deserve demotion to a lower-paying position.

not deserve a raise.
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For this,

Certainly he does

The advocate of ET cannot reply to these examples
by saying that

other things being equal, workers who exert more effort
deserve more
pay.

one

For this is to admit that factors other than effort
can affect
s

desert of a wage.

This is precisely what an advocate of ET must

deny.
In rejecting ET

deserving a wage.

,

I

am not rejecting the idea effort is a basis for

On the contrary,

I

think it is.

effort is not the only basis for deserving a wage.
some of those other bases.

In the meantime,

I

am arguing that

Later

I

will discuss

let us consider a different

theory.

Market value theories
The literature on desert of wages is sometimes characterized as a

debate between those who think that a worker’s effort is the appropriate
basis for deserving a wage, and those who believe the worker’s actual

contribution or productivity is the appropriate basis.®

Typical

statements of the contribution theory of wages include;

A man’s reward should depend on the value of the
contribution which he makes to social welfare in his work

activity.
Justice, according to this principle [of contribution],
requires that each worker get back exactly that proportion
of the national wealth that he has himself created.

According to the contribution theory, the wage you deserve
is a function of the amount of contribution you have made.^^
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The value of a worker’s contribution is often
identified with its

market value.

But the contribution’s value could be identified with

something else -say, its "intrinsic" value, or its utility.
are several versions of the contribution theory.

Thus, there

discuss only

j

the version that identifies the contribution’s value with its
market

value.

I

call it the "market value theory" of desert of wages.

According to the market value theory, the basis for deserving a
wage is providing a marketable service, and the amount deserved for

providing it is equal to the free-market value of that service.

In

Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer describes such a theory:

the market, if it is free, gives to each person exactly what
he deserves. .. .The goods and services we provide are valued
by potential consumers in such-and-such a way, and these
values are aggregated by the market, which determines the
price that we receive.
And that price is our desert, for it
expresses the only worth our goods and services can have,
the worth they actually have for other people.

A market value theory of desert of wages seems to be based partly

on the plausible intuition that unless the work one does has some sort
of value to others, then one cannot deserve a wage for it.

The market

value theory then identifies this value with market value.

Also, this

identification makes for a relatively simple theory.
the market value of a thing

-

unlike its utility, or the amount of

effort that went into producing it
least in theory).

This is because

-

is relatively easy to determine (at

As David Miller writes:

...if we want desert to form the basis of a social practice
rather than being an idea that is used merely to form a
series of idiosyncratic judgements - we need a non-arbitrary

-
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public standard to measure it.
In this light, the
attraction of a market-based criterion is very
considerable.

However attractive a free-market value theory of desert
of wages
may be, it cannot be properly evaluated without stating it more
precisely.

This will require attention to the notion of a "free

market.

The United States is often said to have "free market" economy.

This is because a significant portion of the means of production is in

private hands, and there is much less governmental interference in the

workings of the US economy than in the economies of, say, France,
Mexico, or Cuba.

If this is the sort of "free market" that advocates of

the market value theory of desert of wages have in mind, then they must

accept that all wages currently received in the US are deserved.

Accepting this would trivialize the comparable worth debate.
Advocates of comparable worth maintain that women tend to earn less than
they deserve, given that their male colleagues, or men who work in

nominally different but relevantly similar jobs, tend to earn more.
however,

If,

it is a necessary truth that the wage one deserves in a US-

style "free market" is precisely the wage that one receives, then those

advocates are contradicting themselves.

They would be maintaining (in

effect) that women manage to earn less-than-deserved wages, while

earning precisely what they deserve.
worth are not guilty of this.
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Surely advocates of comparable

Thus, what advocates of market value theories must
have in mind is

not a US-style free market, but rather an "ideal" or "perfectly
free"
market.

In neoclassical economics,

a perfectly free market is a

hypothetical market with the following features.

demand for goods and services.

There is supply and

The means of production are entirely

privately owned and there is no state interference in the market’s
operations.

Firms and consumers in this market are psychological

egoists: they always seek to maximize their own welfare.

They also

operate under certainty: they know the outcomes of their alternative
actions.

As a consequence of certainty, firms and consumers in a

perfectly free market have, in the words of economists Richard Wolff and
Stephen Resnick, "...perfect information about price and wage
movements.

This conception of a "free market" may be used to formulate a

version of the market-value theory of desert of wages:

MVTl

deserves wage W at t for providing some
service R in market M at t iff (i) S provides R
in M at t and (ii) if M were free at t, then W
would be the market price of R at t.
S

To find out whether someone deserves a wage for providing a

service in the actual market, MVTl directs us to consider the closest

possible perfectly free market in which that service is provided.
price of that service in that market is the wage one deserves for

providing it in the actual market.
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The

I

believe that MVTl is not the correct theory
of desert of wages.

It entails that many people who intuitively
deserve wages deserve no

wages at all.

To see this, consider the case of Mr. Porkbelly.

commodities trader in the actual market.
job.

He is a

Porkbelly excels at his

Mr.

He assiduously researches the market, works long
hours, and almost

always makes his clients a good deal of money.

Intuitively, Mr.

Porkbelly deserves a decent wage for his work.
MVTl entails that he deserves nothing.

As noted above, consumers

in a perfectly free market possess perfect information
about price

movements.

They do not have to speculate.

But commodities trading is

speculation about the price movements of commodities.

Thus, consumers

in a free market would not demand the services of commodities traders.

The price of that service would therefore be zero.

It follows that Mr.

Porkbelly deserves no wage at all for the work he does.
is true,

Indeed,

if MVTl

then most workers on Wall Street deserve nothing!

This difficulty can be avoided by adjusting the idea of a free
market.

Let a free market be similar to the perfectly free market

sketched above, except that firms and consumers do not operate under
certainty.

market MVT2.

Call the theory that incorporates this conception of a free
MVT2 avoids the conclusion that Wall Street workers

deserve nothing.

In that market,

people must speculate about price

movements
However, MVT2 falls to the following case.

works in a Soviet-style controlled economy.
of corn for each year.

Consider Ivan, who

His job is to set the price

This job requires a high level of mathematical
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and organizational skills.

considerable responsibility.

It also involves extensive training and

The working conditions are abysmal:

cramped office is cold and windowless.
and does his job well.

Ivan’s

Despite this, Ivan works hard

Intuitively, Ivan deserves a decent wage.

MVT2 entails that Ivan deserves nothing.

If the market in which

Ivan worked were free, there would be no such job as "setting the
price
of corn for each year."

market forces.

The price of corn would be "set" entirely by

Put another way,

if we go to the possible free market

closest to Ivan, we find that his service of setting the price of corn
has no market value whatsoever.

Since that value or price would be

Ivan’s deserved wage, it follows that Ivan

-

in the actual market -

deserves nothing for doing his job.
An advocate of MVT2 might reply that Ivan has marketable skills,
e.g.

mathematical and organizational, and their exercise would have a

price in a free market.

That price would be Ivan’s wage for exercising

those skills, and that wage is what Ivan actually deserves for doing his
job.

In other words,

Ivan’s job should not be thought of as "setting

the price of corn for each year," since that would indeed be a worthless

service in a perfectly free market, but rather as "exercising such-andsuch degree of mathematical and organizational skills," which would have
a positive market value and would deserve a wage.

A similar reply might

be made on behalf of Mr. Porkbelly by advocates of MVTl.

This reply assumes that exercising mathematical and organizational
skills "in the abstract" counts as a service.
I

This is implausible.

As

see it, the exercise of a skill counts as a service only if directed
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toward some project.
of corn for each year.

market.

In Ivan’s case,

the project is setting the price

That project has no positive value in a free

Of course Ivan could apply his mathematical and organizational

skills to a different project, but the question is not whether
Ivan

would deserve a wage for providing some service, but whether he
deserves
a wage for the service he actually provides.

MVT2 entails that Ivan

deserves nothing.
Besides, there are displays of skill that have no market value,

but that may nevertheless deserve a wage.

Suppose, for example, you are

a wealthy but slightly eccentric person who lives near a sandy beach.

One day a derelict man knocks on your door asking for work.
him, but have no work for him to do.

arrangement.

You pity

So you make the following

If only he will count grains of sand at the beach,

will pay him some sort of wage.

The man agrees to this.

he counts thousands of grains of sand.

you

So every day

This job requires tremendous

patience, steady hands, and a relatively high degree of mathematical
skill.

It also involves eye and back strain,

sunburn.

For doing this, you pay him a wage.

not to mention serious
He deserves it.

This is

not because his particular display of skill has market value; it does
not.

This is not to say that the market value of the service one
provides, or the skills and talents one exhibits in providing it, are

irrelevant to the wage one deserves.

deserving a wage.

It is to say that there is more to

Thus, we must look elsewhere if we wish to find the

correct theory of desert of wages.
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Compensation theories
Work can be drudgery, an imposition on one’s time, or a danger
to

one’s health.

This has suggested to some philosophers that if wages are

deserved, they are deserved as compensation.

James Dick, for example,

writes that the notion of compensation "...provides the most powerful
and important ground for justifying differences in incomes."^®

Feinberg agrees:

Joel

"...economic income cannot plausibly be construed as

prizes or rewards, and can be spoken of as 'deserved’ only insofar as it
is compensation...."^^

Feinberg continues:

Not only unpleasant and hazardous work but also terribly
responsible positions and functions requiring extensive
preliminary training deserve compensation. Here is the real
basis for the claim that the executive and the physician
deserve higher incomes: not that their superior abilities
deserve rewards, but rather that their heavier loads of
responsibility and worry and (for doctors) their longer
periods of impoverished apprenticeship deserve
compensation.

Feinberg’ s idea is that wages are deserved as compensation for at
least three factors:

responsibility.

length of training, working conditions, and

The more training and responsibility, and the worse the

conditions, the higher the wage one deserves.

Let us formulate

Feinberg’ s compensation theory as follows:

CTl

deserves wage W for doing job J iff (i) S does
and (ii) W is adequate compensation for the
training, responsibility, and working conditions
that J involves for S.

S
J;
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For purposes of evaluating CTl,
the notion of compensation.

it is important to be clear about

In one place,

Feinberg observes that

"...persons deserve compensation for harm wrongly inflicted by others."
In another,

he stipulates that 'compensation’

which are no one’s fault.

In each case,

is deserved for "...losses

Feinberg’

s

idea is that the

basis for deserving compensation is some sort of harm or loss.

CTl thus

implies that wages are deserved on the basis of harm or loss.
If taken as a general view about deserving wages,

this is clearly

false.

Consider the medical student who enjoys the rigors of medical

school,

later thrives as an impoverished intern, and still later takes

tremendous pleasure in practicing medicine.

Or consider the happy

graduate student who finds no pleasure greater than hours of intense
study, who later savors the demands and responsibilities of teaching.

Indeed, consider anyone who is happy in his or her job, and who enjoyed

qualifying for it.
deserved.

In all such cases, CTl entails that no wage is

This is plainly wrong.

Perhaps George Sher’s compensation theory will fare better than
CTl.

Sher’s view is that "...a wage is deserved when a worker’s

receiving it would rectify the subordination of his purposes to those of
others."^®

Sher’s argument is this:

...when a person works for another, his unremunerated labor
violates a standard that requires that no one’s purposes be
subordinated to the purposes of others. This situation is
clearly rectified by the restoration of equality between
what the worker has done for others and what those others
wage, which the employee can convert
have done for him....
to goods or services of his own choosing, is singularly well
suited to serve this function. And this, I suggest, is the
basic reason the wage is deserved.
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Sher

idea is that working involves subordinating one’s
own

s

interests to the interests of one’s employer, and that this
sort of

subordination makes one deserving of compensation or "rectification."
The deserved wage, then, adequately compensates for having
one’s

interests thus subordinated; or:

CT2

S deserves wage W for doing job J iff (i) S does
and (ii) W is adequate compensation for the
subordination of interests that S must undergo

J

to do J.

CT2 hinges on the assumption that work involves a subordination of

one

s

purposes to another’s.

As Sher writes "...our account presupposes

that labor is not among workers’ primary goals.

If taken as a claim

about all wage-deserving workers, this presupposition is clearly false.

There are those whose work involves no subordination to the goals of
others.

If CT2 is true,

then if these people deserve any pay at all,

they deserve less pay than those whose goals are being "subordinated" to
the goals others.

Sher realizes that this poses a problem for CT2:

"...the stronger

intuition appears to be that willing workers deserve as much pay as
others.

Thus, to defend our account, we must somehow disarm that
intuition.
It is a
This is... not difficult to do.
commonplace that the most committed and willing workers are
generally also the best. Thus, although these workers come
closer than others to pursuing their own purposes, they also
In
generally do more to advance the purposes of others.
part, the intuition that they deserve to be paid as much as
others may reflect a belief that these two factors cancel.^"*
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Sher’s argument is that there are (at least) two
factors, rather
than the single factor of interest-subordination,
determining the wage a

person deserves.

These are (i) how much his work requires the

subordination of his goals to others’ goals, and (ii) how much
good his
work does for others.

If his work requires very little subordination,

he deserves a correspondingly lower wage - unless his work
does a lot of

good for others,

in which case "these two factors cancel."

I

presume

this means that the person deserves as much pay as a similar worker

whose goals are being subordinated but whose work does not do as much
good for others.

Apart from abandoning CT2, Sher now assumes that the most

committed workers are "generally also the best."
but irrelevant.

This seems plausible,

It is possible for there to be committed and willing

workers whose work is no better, or better for others, than those who
are not as committed and willing.

Sher’s account implies that those

workers deserve less pay than relevantly similar workers who are not as

committed and willing.

This is absurd.

Other things being equal, these

workers deserve the same amount of pay.
A related difficulty arises with respect to discontented workers.

Sher’s account implies that they deserve more pay than their less

discontented workers.

But, Sher asks,

"...isn’t it highly

counterintuitive to say that a worker with negative attitudes deserves a
higher wage than his more constructive colleague?"^^
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Sher’s response:

Just as a very willing worker is apt to perform well,
a very
unwilling one is apt to perform badly. The dissatisfied
worker s labor is likely to be relatively unproductive.
This means that he is apt to be less deserving than others
by one measure even if more deserving by another.^®

It is a plausible empirical assumption that workers who are

dissatisfied with their jobs often fail to be as productive as
colleagues who are satisfied with their jobs.

But this is irrelevant.

A worker who dislikes his job may perform as well or better than a

worker who likes his job.
insurance

-

(My father,

for example,

loathed selling

yet he was the best salesman in the region!)

Sher’s account

implies that the unhappy worker deserves more pay than the satisfied
worker.
I

This seems wrong.

believe these arguments reveal the basic flaw of compensation

theories:

People can deserve wages, but often not as compensation.

Job-related harms are, of course, relevant to the wage one deserves for
doing it.

But it is oversimple to construe all deserved wages as

compensation.

A different approach
I

believe that an acceptable theory of desert of wages will be

more complicated than any of those considered thus far.

because the range of bases for deserving a wage is,

broader than those theories allow.

I

This is mainly

believe, much

My view is that these bases include

not only the effort one makes, the value of one’s services, and one’s

working conditions, but also the wage to which one is entitled by
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contract or convention, the fact that one is a
person, certain needs one
may have, one’s moral worth, one’s past and
future receipt of other

goods and evils, and probably others.

I

believe that a theory of desert

of wages must allow that the wage one deserves may
involve any of these
(and perhaps other) factors.^’

Rather than develop this suggestion in detail,

defend it against two objections.

I

will instead

Doing this may shed a bit more light

on my view about desert of wages.

The first objection is this:

deserved for the reasons

I

My suggestion that wages can be

mentioned contradicts a natural and

heretofore unquestioned presupposition of a standard way of thinking
about desert.

This presupposition can be brought out as follows.

There

are various forms of treatment that people can deserve: punishment,

reward, apology, compensation, prizes, gratitude, and so on.

The

presupposition is that for each sort of deservable treatment, there is
one desert-base or small set of desert-bases unique to it.
example,

Thus,

for

it is said that punishment is deserved for committing some

wrong (but not for anything else); reward is deserved for heroics (but
not for anything else); apology is deserved for being insulted (again,
not for anything else); compensation is deserved for being wrongfully
harmed; grades are deserved for academic performance.

And wages,

depending on the theory, are deserved for effort, for providing a
marketable service, or for the training and conditions one’s work
involves.

My suggestion that wages can be deserved for any number of

reasons flies directly in the face of this presupposition.
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This presupposition of the standard view is at the very
core of
Joel Feinberg’s influential paper, "Justice and Personal
Desert."

In

that paper, which first appeared more than thirty years
ago^®, Feinberg

attempts to analyze the concept of desert.
following way.

His analysis proceeds in the

First he draws up a list of the sorts of treatment that

people can deserve:

Awards of prizes
Assignments of grades
3.
Rewards and punishments
4.
Praise, blame, and other informal responses
5.
Reparation, liability, and other modes of
compensation.
1.

2.

Then Feinberg attempts to specify the bases for deserving these
forms of treatment.

In each case,

to the form of treatment.

the purported desert bases are unique

This is why Feinberg says "...the bases of

desert vary with the mode of deserved treatment."®®

And since for

Feinberg wages are deserved as compensation, the bases for deserving a
wage are just those that are bases for deserving compensation.®^

Thus,

bases for deserving a wage are not to be confused with bases for

deserving prizes, rewards, grades, or any other sort of deservable
treatment.

Other writers have accepted Feinberg’s assumption that for each
form of deservable treatment, there is a desert base or small set of

desert bases unique to it.

David Miller, for one, claims:

...the basis for desert - the characteristics in virtue of
which people are said to deserve this or that - appears to
change according to the kind of benefit in question.®^
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Robert Young, to take another example, writes:

.. .whether someone deserves to
win the World Chess
Championship will be determined by utterly different
considerations from those that are relevant to whether
someone deserves to be given life imprisonment, and utterly
different again from whether someone deserves to be awarded
compensatory damages for injuries sustained as a result of
medical negligence.

I

believe that this way of thinking about desert in general, and

hence about desert of wages in particular, is fundamentally misguided.
I

therefore believe that it is no objection to

ray

view that it

contradicts the standard way of thinking about desert.

To see why

I

think the standard view is false, we should begin by considering

something other than wages.

Consider grades.

An important basis for deserving a good grade is

(in many cases) performing well on tests and assignments.

not be the only basis.

But this need

Suppose there is a student with a slight

learning disability, and a physical disability that makes getting to
class difficult.

This student may not perform as well as others.

if he performs at all well,

But

he may deserve a higher grade than

"unchallenged" students whose work is no better.

Here,

in addition to

performance, effort and (medical) needs seem relevant to what grade he
deserves.

Or suppose a gifted freshman takes a senior seminar.

work may not be up to the seniors’ level.

Her

But if it is rather good, she

may deserve a higher grade than those seniors whose work is no better.
Here, age and skill seem relevant.

Or suppose a student informs a
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teacher that he must receive a "B" to graduate.

The teacher, who is

familiar with the student from a previous class, assures the
student
that a "B" is a practical certainty.
in the class,

Suppose the student then struggles

and does not quite earn a "B."

As

I

see it, the student

may nevertheless deserve one in virtue of the teacher’s assurances.
Here, something akin to entitlement is relevant.
Next, consider apologies.

being insulted.

A condition on deserving an apology is

But this is not the only relevant fact.

insulted party’s moral worth.

If he is a scoundrel,

deserves only the slightest apology.

Another is the

then perhaps he

Since he is a human being, he may

deserve some sort of apology, no matter how morally worthless he may

otherwise be.

Also relevant is the fact that he is entitled by the

rules of etiquette to an apology.

If the insulted person is especially

sensitive, and needs an apology to avoid emotional damage, then this

need may be a basis for deserving an apology.
Next, consider medical care.

Need is a basis for deserving it.

But so is moral worth and being a person.

despicable person, and

B,

For imagine that A, a morally

a morally outstanding person, need a heart.

Only one heart is available.

Each deserves it insofar as each needs it,

but B may deserve it more than A in virtue of her superior moral worth.

Suppose further that A is entitled by a living will to the heart.
too would be relevant to whether A deserved it.

That

Suppose also that B has

had several (unsuccessful) heart transplants already, and that A has had
none.

Then past receipt seems relevant to deserving the heart.

146

Also

relevant are the efforts that A and B have made
to stay relatively
healthy.
Next,

wrong.

consider punishment.

It can be deserved for committing some

But other factors are relevant to the offender’s
desert.

harm caused by the crime is clearly relevant.

But also relevant,

The
I

believe, are the offender’s background, his reasons for committing
the
crime,

the effort he put into the crime, any special medical needs
he

may have, the fact that he is a person, his moral worth, and the
penalty
to which offenders of that crime are usually "entitled."
I

suggest that what is true of grades, apologies, medical care,

and punishment

-

namely, that each can be deserved for an indeterminate

number of non-exclusive reasons

-

is also true of wages.

We have

already seen that something is plausible in each of the theories of
desert of wages considered in previous sections.

Effort, the value of

one’s services, the conditions and training one’s work involves:
are relevant to the wage one deserves.
the bases for one’s desert of a wage.

All

But even these do not exhaust

Consider, for example, a

terrifically successful but morally wicked corporate executive.

My view

is that her wickedness makes her less deserving of the handsome salary

she takes home.

deserving a wage.
his own,

So,

wickedness should be added to the list of bases for

Consider next a shoe shiner who, through no fault of

is especially financially needy.

As

I

see it, his need makes

him deserve a somewhat higher wage than the shoe shiner of equal skill
who is not as needy.

deserving a wage.

So,

need should be added to the list of bases for

Consider next the employee who has signed a contract
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that entitles her to a certain wage.

Other things being equal, the fact

that she has entered into this agreement is a basis
for her deserving
the wage to which she is now entitled.

So,

entitlement should be added

to this list of bases for deserving a wage.

Consider, finally, the man

who performs a menial and perhaps economically valueless job.

He is

nevertheless a person, and this fact makes him deserving of some wagej
that is, the fact that he is a person provides a floor below which wages
cannot, without injustice,

fall.

So,

being a person should be added to

the list of bases for deserving a wage.

It begins to appear,

then, that

there is a large number of factors relevant to the wage one deserves.
At this point it may be objected that

I

have not provided any

principled reason for deeming something a basis for desert, or that
rely on unsupported "intuitions" about what is a desert base.

second objection

I

reply as follows:

To this

The other theories of desert of

wages are no better in this respect than mine.
theorists, compensation theorists:

I

Effort theorists, value

All rely on intuitions about what is

and is not a basis for deserving a wage.

The real difference between my

theory and theirs is not that mine rests on intuitions about desert

bases and theirs do not.

The difference is rather that my theory posits

more desert bases than the others.

As far as appeals to intuitions go,

my theory and the others are partners in the supposed crime.

Comparable worth
I

conclude by briefly noting two implications that my view of

desert of wages has for the comparable worth debate.
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The first

implication is this.

As noted at the outset, advocates of comparable

worth claim not only that women and men who work in
the same jobs

deserve equal pay, but also that women and men who work
in jobs that are

nominally different but relevantly similar deserve equal pay.

These

claims imply that certain factors (for example, skill, training,
and

working conditions) are relevant to the wage one deserves, and some
(for
example, being a man) are not.

But if my view about desert of wages is

correct, then bases for deserving a wage include many others never

mentioned by advocates of comparable worth.
The second implication is that there are inherent limitations to

current

job evaluation schemes."

The schemes

specify the bases for the wage a job deserves.
deserve wages.

I

have in mind attempt to
But people, not jobs,

And the wage a person deserves depends

(I

have

suggested) not only on facts about the person’s job, but also on facts
about the person.
facts

-

Unfortunately, there is no way to know all of those

no way to know,

for example, each person’s moral worth, need, or

the benefits and burdens a person has already received.

Therefore,

there is no practical way to include these facts in job evaluation
schemes.
them,

The upshot is that job evaluation schemes, at least as we know

support neither the claim that women and men who work in the same

job deserve equal pay, nor the claim that women and men who work in jobs
that are nominally different but "relevantly similar" deserve equal pay.

This is because many of the relevantly similar features

-

that is, many

of the desert bases - are not and cannot be feasibly included in those

schemes.

Simply put, all that current job evaluation schemes support is
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the claim that other desert bases being equal, women
generally earn

less-than-deserved pay.

To put the point rather more contentiously:

For all that advocates of comparable worth have said,

individual workers

may be getting precisely what they deserve.

Notes
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her failure to find the book can be attributed to "bad luck"
or "accident".
And can greater desert ... arise through mere
luck or accident?
(Pages 327-328.)
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their (conscientious) efforts to contribute to society" (323).
Also,
Slote does not endorse this argument, but he does not reject it either.
His comment: "It is hard to know what to say" (329).
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CHAPTER

7

A THEORY OF DESERT

Let us then exAinine wore closely
wherein Desert consists.
.

-

Henry Sidgwick,
The Methods of Ethics

Introduction
My view is that the previous chapters suggest the need for a fresh

start on the topic of desert.

which

explain and defend my own theory of desert.

I

that the theory
First,

That is the goal of this chapter, in

I

I

I

hasten to add

defend lacks novelty in two important respects.

believe that my conception of desert, however much it differs

from some philosophical conceptions,

"common sense" conception.

is more or less the ordinary or

Put another way, the theory of desert

I

propose is meant to be not much more than a systematization of what
take to be ordinary beliefs about desert.

theory of desert is not novel.
similar to that of

W.

D.

In fact,

I

Second, the structure of my
its structure is strikingly

Ross’s theory of moral rightness.

It will be

useful, then, to conclude this chapter by comparing my theory of desert
to Ross’s theory of moral rightness.
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What sort of thing is desert?

There are many sorts of things: events, propositions,
physical
objects, properties, sets, and perhaps more (or
perhaps less).

natural way to begin theorizing about desert is to ask:
thing is it?

As

I

see it, the answer is clear:

But desert is not a "monadic" property.

Thus, a

What sort of

Desert is a property.

It is a "polyadic" property,

or

a relation.
If desert is a relation,

number of relata.

then (like any relation) it takes a

An interesting question is "How many?"

A natural

answer is that desert takes three relata: a subject of desert, an object
of desert, and a bssis for desert.

This is suggested by ordinary

desert-claims such as:

Smith deserves a bonus in virtue of her
increased productivity.

(a)

However,

it could be argued that

(a)

is incomplete.

For Smith not

only deserves a bonus: she also deserves it from someone or something
her boss,

for example, or the company.

-

So perhaps (a) should be

replaced by:

(b)

Smith deserves a bonus from the company in
virtue of her increased productivity.

It could now be argued that not even (b)

is complete.

This is

because Smith may deserve a bonus from the company at a certain time
immediately, say, or at the end of the year.

replaced by:
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-

So perhaps (b) should be

Smith deserves a bonus at the end of this
year
from the company in virtue of her increased
productivity.

(c)

Even (c),

it might be said,

is incomplete.

The reason is that

Smith’s desert of a bonus can change over time.

So,

may now deserve a bonus at the end of the year.

But six months ago,

for example. Smith

prior to her increase in productivity. Smith did not deserve
a bonus at
the end of this year.

Thus, Smith’s desert of a bonus at the end of the

year has changed over time: at one time, she does not deserve it; at

another time, she does.

So perhaps (c) should be replaced by:

At this time. Smith deserves a bonus at the end
of this year from the company in virtue of her

(d)

increased productivity.

If

(d)

were a paradigmatic expression of the desert relation, then

desert would take six relata:
desert;

(3)

a basis for desert;

deserved by the subject;

(5)

a subject of desert;

(1)
(4)

(2)

an object of

a time at which the object is

a time at which it is true that the subject

deserves that object in virtue of instantiating some desert base(s);

(6)

and a person from whom, or a thing from which, the subject deserves the
object.

It may appear,

then, that a schematic expression of the desert-

relation will have to take this form:

DC

At t, S deserves x at t’

from y in virtue of

F.

There is no doubt that many ordinary desert-claims, fully parsed,
will conform to DC.

But some will not; for example:
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(e)

At this time, Jones deserves some good luck;
he’s had only bad.

Good luck, though it can
from anyone or anything.

(I

believe) be deserved, is not deserved

Good luck is therefore unlike other

^

deservable things, such as a bonuses, raises, apologies, rewards, or
grades, which are deserved from someone or something.

limiting case,

Good luck is a

insofar as it seems impossible to distribute or bestow;

but there are things that can be bestowed and deserved without being

deserved from anyone in particular.
examples:

Food,

respect and medical care are

Other things being equal, everyone deserves these things

-

even though there may not be, for any particular deserving person, a

person or persons from whom these things are deserved.

Thus, every

desert-claim that expresses a case like this will, like (e), fail to
conform to DC.
(e)

fails to conform to DC in another way.

Although it does

mention a time at which it is true that Jones deserves good luck, it
does not mention a time at which this good luck is deserved.

True,

Jones deserves that there is some time at which he has good luck; to

deny this is to deny that Jones deserves good luck.

However,

it is

possible that there is not any particular time such that Jones deserves
good luck at that time.

(Perhaps Jones deserves it soon, but 'soon’

does not pick out a time.)

Thus, every desert-claim that expresses a

case like this will, like (e), fail to conform to DC.
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At this point,

it may be tempting to posit several
desert-claim

schemas, each canonical.

One would express a three-place relation, and

would capture claims like (a); another would
express a four-place
relation, and would capture claims like (b); another
would express a

five-place relation, and would capture claims like (c);
a fourth would

express a six-place relation, and would capture claims
like (d); and
perhaps even more would be needed to accommodate the variety
of

apparently genuine desert-claims.
This temptation should be avoided.

This is because to posit

several desert-claim schemas, each canonical, is to multiply desert-

relations beyond necessity.^

Let me explain.

According to a plausible principle, any relation takes the same
number of relata each time it is instantiated.^
relation expressed by 'taller than’.

exactly two relata in some case.

Take,

for instance, the

Suppose this relation takes

Then, according to this principle, the

taller than relation always takes two relata.

Any relation that takes

more or less than two relata is not the taller than relation.
Now consider the relation of desert.

just three relata in some case.

Suppose this relation takes

Then, according to the principle above,

the desert relation always takes three relata.

Any relation that takes

more or less than three relata is not the desert relation.
that we posit several desert-claim schemas.

Now suppose

Each expresses a relation,

but the number of relata taken by each relation is different.

Then

according to the principle above, the relation expressed must in each
case be a different relation.

Of course,
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it might be convenient to call

the relation expressed by each schema 'desert’; but,
strictly speaking,

each relation is distinct from the other.
My view is that this would unnecessarily fracture the concept
of
desert.

I

also believe that there is a way to accommodate the variety

of desert-claims without positing a multitude of distinct desert-

relations.

The "trick" is fairly obvious.

It is to transfer the

apparent variety of desert-claims to the desert object.
done by treating objects of desert as propositions.
I

will name propositions by using

that -clauses.
’

'

)

This can be

(As is the custom,
So,

for example,

suppose that Aaron Burr deserves that Alexander Hamilton apologizes to

Burr at noon on January

1,

1800.

This object of desert

Hamilton apologizes to Burr at noon on January

1,

-

that Alexander

1800 - is deserved

from a particular person, Hamilton, at a particular time, noon on

January

1,

be like this.

good luck.

But as we have seen, not every object of desert will

1800.
So,

for example, Jones may deserve that Jones has some

This object of desert - that Jones has some good luck

-

may

not be deserved at a particular time, or from a particular agent.

Nevertheless, it seems to be an object of desert in good standing, and
so does the more complex desert object deserved by Burr.

That said,

I

believe it would be a mistake to assert that the

canonical form for all genuine desert-claims is this:

DC*

At t, S deserves x in virtue of F.

True, DC* is an improvement over DC insofar as DC* captures many more

genuine desert-claims than DC.

But as
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I

see it, DC* fails to capture

all genuine desert-claims.

This is because, according to the theory

I

advocate below, there are two distinct desert
relations, or two concepts
of desert:

priwa facie desert and all-in desert.

these concepts, and why they are different.

Later

I

will explain

For now it is sufficient to

note that 'deserves’ as it appears in DC* is (on my
view) ambiguous

between prima facie desert and all-in desert.
Thus, my view of desert requires that DC* be replaced
by a pair of

schematic claims:

DCpf

At t, S prima facie deserves x in virtue of

DCai

At t, S all-in deserves x in virtue of

F.

F.

intended to capture all genuine claims of prima facie desert;
DCai is intended to capture all genuine claims of all-in desert.

believe that DCpf and
Accordingly,

I

DCg^j^,

I

together, capture all genuine desert-claims.

believe that desert, whether prima facie or all-in, is a

four-place relation that obtains among a subject of desert, an object of
desert, a basis of desert, and a time at which the subject deserves that

object in virtue of that basis.

A catalogue of desert bases

The term 'desert basis’ seems to have been coined by Joel Feinberg

when he wrote:

If a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must,
necessarily, be so in virtue of some possessed
characteristic or prior activity.
It is because no one can
deserve anything unless there is some basis or ostensible
occasion for the desert that judgments of desert carry with
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them a commitment to the giving of reasons. One cannot
say,
for example, that Jones deserves gratitude although he
has
done nothing in particular."
If a person says that Jones
deserves patitude, then he must be prepared to answer the
question "For what?" Of course, he may not know the basis
of Jones s desert, but if he denies that there is any basis,
then he has forfeited his right to use the terminology of
desert. .. .Desert without a basis is simply not desert.'*

Feinberg is right that desert must have a basis.
more questions.

What are the desert bases?

to make things deserving?

As

I

But this raises

How do desert bases manage

see it, these are the two most pressing

questions for any theorist of desert.

I

shall now attempt to answer

them.
In Chapter 2,

I

accepted "pluralism" about desert bases.

the view that there is more than one basis for desert.

previous chapters some of the things

I

I

This is

mentioned in

take to be bases for desert.

What follows is a more complete catalogue of desert bases.

It will be

noticed that each entry in the catalogue opens with an italicized word.
In each case,

the italicized word is meant to express what philosophers

might call a "determinable property" (such as being colored), of which
there may be innumerable "determinate properties" (such as being
scarlet, or being Vermillion)

So,

for example, the first entry in my

catalogue of desert bases is effort.

This is meant to express the

determinable property of having exerted effort.

Determinates of this

property include having exerted intellectual effort; having exerted
physical effort; and so on.
properties.

Note that even these are determinable

Having exerted intellectual effort, for example, is a

determinable property.

Some of its determinates include having stayed
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up all night studying for the physics exam, and
having labored for hours

under a broiling sun.
are desert bases are,
for example,

Note also that determinates of determinables that
in virtue of this,

themselves desert bases.

So,

having labored for hours under a broiling sun is a desert

base in virtue of the fact that it is a determinate of the
determinable

desert base of having exerted effort.^
(1)

deserving.

Effort.

It is a truism that those who work hard become

One philosopher who accepts this truism is George Sher:

Of all the bases of desert, perhaps the most familiar and
compelling is diligent, sustained effort. Whatever else we
think, most of us agree that persons deserve things for
sheer hard work.
We believe that conscientious students
deserve to get good grades, that athletes who practice
regularly deserve to do well, and that businessmen who work
long hours deserve to make money.
Moreover, we warm to the
success of immigrants and the underprivileged who have
overcome obstacles of displacement and poverty.
Such
persons^ we feel, richly deserve any success they may
obtain.

Another philosopher who accepts effort as a desert base is Wojciech
Sadurski.

As

I

explained in Chapter

is rather extreme.

2,

Sadurski’s view on this matter

He claims that "..effort is the only legitimate

basis and measure of desert."®
I

I

accept the truism that those who exert effort become deserving.

do not accept Sadurski’s extreme view that effort is the only basis

for desert.

There are many bases for desert, on my view.

Nor do

I

accept, what Sher’s remarks imply, that effort is always a basis for

deserving some benefit.

To be sure,

if a person has spent many long,

in many cases it is.

For example,

hot, dirty hours working in her
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vegetable garden, then she may deserve a thriving garden,
the admiration
of her neighbors, the pleasure she might take in beholding
and eating

the vegetables, or some other benefit.

In other cases,

is a basis for deserving evil or harm.

To see this, suppose a terrorist

aims to blow up some innocent people.

hard to achieve that end.

deserving a benefit.

however, effort

Suppose the terrorist works quite

The terrorist’s effort is not a basis for

It is a basis for deserving punishment.

Indeed,

effort can be a basis for deserving just about anything deservable.

For

there are many sorts of effort, and what is deserved in virtue of effort
will depend on what sort of effort is exerted.

For example, criminal

effort deserves punishment; altruistic effort deserves admiration;
reckless effort deserves failure; intellectual effort deserves a good
grade; heroic effort deserves a reward; and so on.®

This is a convenient place to partially explain three pieces of

terminology that
I

say,

I

will use later on to state my theory of desert.

When

for example, that effort deserves success, or that criminal

effort deserves punishment,

I

am not saying that effort is sufficient

for actually deserving success, or even that criminal effort is

sufficient for actually deserving punishment.
exerts criminal effort.

Suppose, in other words, that Jones directs

effort towards something illegal.

deserve punishment.

To see why, suppose Jones

This is not sufficient for Jones to

One reason is that the laws criminalizing the those

efforts might be morally unacceptable.

Those laws might, for example,

criminalize any attempt to practice Judaism.

If Jones attempts to

practice Judaism, he is engaged in illegal activities.
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But this is

hardly sufficient for deserving punishment.
if the laws are morally acceptable,

Another reason is that even

Jones might instantiate other desert

bases that could influence the amount of
punishment he deserves.

For

example, Jones might be the product of horribly
abusive parents.

This

may mitigate the severity of the punishment he
deserves; it might even

render any punishment undeserved.
However, even if Jones turns out not to actually
deserve

punishment,

I

maintain that his criminal effort is a basis for prima

facie desert of punishment (this is the first bit of
terminology).
mere fact that Jones broke the law is, as
of his deserving punishment.

I

The

see it, a "point in favor"

It is an objective fact about the act,

and

is relevant to whether Jones really or all-in deserves
punishment (the

second bit of terminology).

Jones all-in deserves punishment if, when

all the bases for Jones’s prima facie desert of punishment are taken

into consideration, those bases in this case outweigh (the final piece
of terminology) the bases in this case for Jones’s deserving not to be

punished.
I

will postpone further discussion of the notions of prima facie

desert, all-in desert, and weight until the other desert bases have been

considered.

In the meantime,

I

will make generous use of the notion of

prima facie desert so as to avoid misunderstandings.
(2)

Achievement.

People are deserving in virtue of their

efforts, even if those efforts do not succeed.

But people are also

deserving in virtue of their achievements, even if those achievements do
not require much effort.

Think,

for example, of the praise that is
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sometimes bestowed upon a brilliant composer.

This praise can be

deserved even if the composer finds composing easy.
achievement.

What matters is the

Likewise for the wage deserved by a carpenter, say, for

whom building and installing a staircase is a matter of
effortless
routine.

Likewise for the punishment one might deserve for a

spontaneous murder.
There are importantly different things one can achieve, and what
is

deserved for achievement depends on what is achieved.

So,

for

example, there is artistic achievement, which prima facie deserves

exhibition; political achievement, which prima facie deserves reelection*,

personal achievement, which prima facie deserves praise;

financial achievement, which prima facie deserves money; intellectual

achievement, which prima facie deserves publication; athletic
achievement, which prima facie deserves victory; and so on.

(Note that

any instance of achievement can be an instance of many sorts of

achievement, and thereby constitute a basis for deserving several sorts
of treatment.

Although the word 'achievement’ customarily carries a positive
connotation,

I

would like to say that there are negative achievements

-

for example, criminal achievements, which prima facie deserve

punishment; despicably motivated achievements, which prima facie deserve
contempt; worthless or useless achievements, which prima facie deserve
nothing; and so on.
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Worth.

(3)

Consider the claim that the Olympic Peninsula

deserves preservation, or that this giant Sequoia
deserves not to be
turned into a bunch of Dixie cups.
these claims are true.
for desert?

Let us assume for the moment that

What makes them so?

Perhaps something akin to effort is relevant to the

towering, ancient Sequoia’s desert.

desert?

But what of the Olympic Peninsula’s

It has not exerted any "effort."

anything.

What are the relevant bases

Thus,

It has not "achieved"

if it deserves anything at all,

the basis for its

desert has not yet been catalogued.^®
My view is that the basis for the Olympic Peninsula’s desert is
its worth.

I

understand "worth" broadly.

I

intend it to include the

following properties: Rarity, magnificence, beauty, and so on.
it,
I

the Olympic Peninsula possesses all these properties.

As

I

see

Furthermore,

believe that in virtue of possessing them, the Olympic Peninsula

deserves preservation.

Likewise for the giant Sequoia, the tropical

rainforest, and other things.
However,

I

intend "worth" to include not only the properties of

rarity, magnificence, beauty, and so on.

the property of moral worth.

not have moral worth.
have.

I

intend it to include also

Trees, wilderness areas, and the like do

Moral worth is something that only people can

What is moral worth?

Following tradition,

I

take a person’s

moral worth to be a function of his or her degree of virtue:

virtuous a person, the greater his or her moral worth.
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The more

A traditional assumption is that the
greater a person’s moral

worth, the greater his or her prima facie
desert of happiness.

If this

assumption is correct, then moral worth is a
basis for desert.
I

believe that this very assumption is implicit
in a remark made

by W. D. Ross.

Ross wrote:

If we compare two imaginary states of the universe,
alike in
the total amounts of virtue and vice and of pleasure
and
pain present in the two, but in one of which the virtuous
were all happy and the vicious miserable, while in the
other
the virtuous were miserable and the vicious happy,
very few
people would hesitate to say that the first was a much
better state of the universe than the second.

I

share Ross

s

intuition that, other things being equal, the world in

which the virtuous are happy and the vicious unhappy is much better
than
that world in which the vicious are happy and the virtuous miserable.

share it, because

I

believe that moral worth is a basis for desert, and

that the world is made better to the extent that people get what they
(all-in) deserve.

In typical cases,

those who are virtuous all-in

deserve happiness in proportion to their virtue, and those who are

wicked all-in deserve unhappiness in proportion to their wickedness.
Therefore, other things being equal, a world in which the virtuous are

happy and the wicked unhappy is better than a world in which the wicked
are happy and the virtuous are miserable.
I

suspect that if there is a desert base the possession of which

is sufficient not merely for prima facie desert, but also for all-in

desert,

it is a high (or low) degree of moral worth.
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I

find it

I

difficult to imagine a case in which a moral
saint deserves unhappiness,
or a case in which a truly evil person
deserves happiness.
(4)

Being a person.

Simply in virtue of being a person, you

prima facie deserve various things.

These may include a modicum of

respect; a share of happiness; a certain span of life;
basic necessities

such as food, shelter, medicine, clothing; and so on.

If there were any

doubt about this, it may be helpful to consider a brand new
baby.

natural to feel that this child deserves various things

-

attention, nurturing, education, a happy life, and so on.

It is

love,

But since the

child has done, received, and suffered so little at this early point
in
its life,

it seems that the basis for its desert of these things can

only be its personhood.
This is not to say that being a person makes one all-in deserving
of these things.

facie desert.

So,

It is to say that being a person is a basis for prima

for example,

if the child grows into a wicked person,

then this person may deserve little in the way of respect or happiness.
Also,

it is important to see that what is prima facie deserved in virtue

of being a person changes over time.

So,

for example, suppose an infant

prima facie deserves a certain amount of life

-

say,

70 more years.

But

a 65 year-old person does not prima facie deserve 70 more years of life.

Rather, what that person prima facie deserves, as far as life is

concerned, is five more years.

What about organisms that are non-persons?

There are some things

that some non-persons simply cannot deserve: for example, giant Sequoias
and blue whales cannot deserve educations, though people can.
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But does

a giant Sequoia or blue whale priraa facie
deserve anything simply in

virtue of being the sort of organism that it is?

My opinion is that

these creatures do prima facie deserve certain forms
of treatment; or,
at the very least, that they deserve to fail to
suffer certain forms of

treatment.

For example,

I

believe blue whales prima facie deserve not

to be made into dog food, and that giant Sequoias prima
facie deserve

not to be made into Dixie cups.
views, and

I

I

cannot expect others to accept these

will not attempt to argue for them.

I

will merely note

that if being a person is a basis for prima facie desert of certain
things, then it is plausible that person-like organisms prima facie

deserve, to the extent that they are person-like, what persons prima
facie deserve in virtue of being persons.
(5)

Need.

in Chapter 4,

I

believe that need is a basis for desert.

As noted

Feinberg shares this view:

A man with a chronically sick wife or child deserves
compensation since through no fault of his own he has a
greater need than others; and the same is true of a man with
a large number of dependents.

I

think it is more precise to express this view by saying that

need is a basis for prima facie desert.

sufficient for all-in desert.

sustaining medicine.

This is because need is not

To see this, suppose

a

person needs life-

Then this person prima facie deserves it.

But

suppose this person needs medicine because he has knowingly abused his

body over the

cours^=>

of several years.

Other things being equal, he

deserves this medicine rather less than the person who needs it and has
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taken every effort to stay relatively healthy.

Or suppose a person

needs money because he has frittered away all
of his funds on gambling,
drink, and sleazy entertainment.

Other things being equal, he deserves

this money rather less than the person who needs
money and is poor

through no fault of his own.

So,

need is not sufficient for all-in

desert.

Some philosophers maintain that need is not a basis for desert.

William Galston, for example, argues as follows:

If f is to serve as a desert-basis, it is a necessary
condition that x, the treatment appropriate to it, be
accorded the same normative or moral evaluation as f.
If f
is regarded as good or desirable, so is x, and similarly if
f is regarded as bad.
Clearly, need does not satisfy this
criterion; it is regarded as undesirable, but the treatment
to which it gives rise is considered desirable.

Galston s criterion is false.

Consider wages.

a wage is having to work in horrible conditions.

work in horrible conditions is undesirable.
true,

One basis for deserving
Clearly, having to

If Galston’s criterion were

it would have to follow that wages are undesirable!

apologies.
apology.

Or consider

Being viciously slandered is a basis for deserving an
Clearly, being viciously slandered is not at all desirable.

If Galston’s criterion were true,

an apology is also undesirable.

it would have to follow that receiving

These examples show that Galston’s

criterion for desert-basehood is false.

There is no reason to suppose

that if / is a desert base and regarded as good (bad), then
is deserved in virtue of

f,

x,

or what

must also be regarded as good (bad).
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Thus,

Galston’s criterion cannot be used to show that need
is not a desert
base.

Another argument against need’s being a desert base is
suggested
by those who point out, first, that we must be responsible
for the bases
of our desert, and second, that we are not responsible for
our needs.

But this argument fails.
in Chapter 2,

and as

I

As

suggested in Chapter

I

will argue further below,

and as

1,

argued

it simply is not true

that we must be responsible for the bases of our desert.

suffering, which is a basis for deserving compensation,
If this is correct,

I

(Innocent
is an example.)

need cannot be disqualified as a basis for desert

even if we are not responsible for our needs.
(6)

Receipt.

What people have received in the past is a basis

for what they prima facie deserve now.

Suppose,

have suffered miserably for many years.
joy.

mine.

Suppose that

I

have had lots of

Suppose some happiness will now fall into either your life or
You prima facie deserve it more than

I

do.

past receipt is a basis for prima facie desert.
say,

for example, that you

The reason is that

Those who have enjoyed,

a lot of good are prima facie less deserving of currently available

goods than those who have enjoyed less.

Conversely, those who have

suffered a lot of evil are prima facie less deserving of more evil now
than those who have suffered less.

My rejection in Chapter

2

of the view that desert is always

"backward looking" compels me to adopt a similar stance with respect to
future receipt of good and evil.

Thus,

I

accept that those who will

enjoy an excessive amount of good are prima facie less deserving of
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currently available goods than those who will
enjoy less; and,
conversely, those who will suffer an excessive
amount of evil are prima
facie less deserving of more evil now than
those who will suffer less.

More simply, what people will receive in the
future is a basis for what
they prima facie deserve now.
(7)

Suffering.

Excessive past or future receipt of just about

anything is a basis for prima facie deserving less of it
now.

But

I

would like to call special attention to suffering, and to
treat it as a

distinct basis for prima facie desert.

One reason for doing this is

that those philosophers who have written about desert have largely

ignored this basis for desert.^’
life,

Another reason is that, in ordinary

suffering is thought to be one of the most prominent bases of

desert.

It is customarily regarded as a basis for deserving

compensation, sympathy, apology, medical care, or some other such thing.
Of course, merely having suffered is not sufficient for all-in

desert.

For there are many possible causes of suffering, and in any

particular case the cause of suffering can mitigate one’s desert.

So,

for example, a man who loses a limb in an accident at work may all-in

deserve compensation for his suffering.

But a man who intentionally

injures himself in order to cash-in on a generous disability insurance

plan may, for this, deserve no compensation whatsoever.
(8)

Entitlement.

entitlement.
3.)

I

The last desert base that

I

consider is

(For an account of the notion of entitlement, see Chapter

believe that the relationship between desert and entitlement has

not been well understood by philosophers.
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Those who discuss these

notions tend to fall into one of two extremes.

At one extreme are those

who so sharply distinguish desert from entitlement
that these notions

seem shorn of any interesting relationship to each
other.

Remarks

typical of this view include:

Deserve," "fitting," and "appropriate," on the one hand,
and "right," "entitlement," and "rule," on the other,
are
terms from altogether different parts of our ethical
vocabularies.
.

.

...desert-claims and rights-claims do seem to answer
different questions.
When we say that persons deserve
things, we generally answer questions about what it would be
good for them to have; when we attribute rights, we
generally answer questions about what others ought to do or
refrain from doing.

At the other extreme are those who actually identify desert with
(a species of) entitlement.
in Chapter 3,

John Rawls has made remarks, already cited

that suggest his commitment to such a view:

...it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert.
It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation
as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by
it, those who, with the prospect of improving their

condition, have done what the system announces that it will
reward are entitled to their advantages. ... ^°
The case [of justice’s relationship to moral desert] is
analogous to the relation between the substantive rules of
property and the law of property and theft.
For a society
to organize itself with the aim of rewarding moral desert as
a first principle would be like having the institution of
property in order to punish thieves.

In each of the latter two passages,

the implication is that desert can

arise only under a system of just rules

-

indeed, that to deserve

something just is to be entitled to it under these rules.
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My own view (which

I

briefly discussed in Chapter

lies between

3)

divorcing desert from entitlement, on the
one hand, and wedding them on
the other.

It is that entitlement,

though distinct from desert, is a

basis (one of many) for prima facie desert.

I

offer two arguments for

the view that entitlement is a desert base.

One argument is based on the fact that institutional
theories of

desert are plausible.

At any rate, they have seemed plausible to

several eminent philosophers, each of whom treats desert
as a sort of

entitlement.

One explanation for the plausibility of those theories

is that they are true.

I

think this is a poor explanation, since (as

see it) those theories are not true.

(Again, see Chapter 3.)

I

An

alternative explanation for the allure of institutional theories is that

philosophers have confused one important basis for desert

entitlement

-

with desert itself.

-

namely,

If this explanation is correct,

then

entitlement is a basis for desert.
The second argument that entitlement is a basis for desert is

based on an imaginary case, and a view about the nature of justice.
imaginary case is this.

something

-

say,

The

Imagine that you are legally entitled to

a piece of land.

Now suppose that you are similar to

me with respect to the other desert bases.

That is, suppose we have

worked the same amount, achieved the same amount, need the same amount,
are of equal moral worth, are persons, and so on.

The important

difference is that you are legally entitled to the land.
finally, that you have and enjoy the land, and
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I

do not.

Suppose,

As

see it, there is no injustice here.

I

Furthermore,

I

accept

the venerable view that justice obtains
to the extent that people (and

other things) get what they deserve.
facts of the case described above,

deserved the land more than

I

it follows that you must have

did.

injustice in your receiving it.

From this view of justice and the

Otherwise there would have been an

And since,

in the case described,

the

only fact that relevantly distinguishes you from me is
your entitlement
to the land,

it further follows that entitlement is a basis for
your

desert of that land.
Now

I

Therefore, entitlement is a desert base.^^

would like to note an interesting implication of the claim

that entitlement is a desert base.

If entitlement is a desert base,

then a plausible principle about desert and responsibility is false.

The principle is this:

(P)

(P)

If S deserves x in virtue of performing some
action, then S is responsible for performing
that action.^'*

is plausible.

It is hard to imagine a case where someone might

deserve praise or blame, punishment or reward, for performing an action
if she

is not responsible for performing it.^^

Nevertheless, if entitlement is a basis for desert, then (P) is
false.

A simple case illustrates this point.

gunpoint to buy a lottery ticket.
purchase.

I

Suppose

I

am forced at

am not responsible for this

Suppose further that this lottery ticket turns out a winner:

it entitles me to $10,000.

things being equal)

I

If entitlement is a desert base,

deserve the cash.
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But

I

then (other

am not responsible for

buying the ticket.
Hence,

I

was coerced into buying it.

if entitlement is a desert base,

My act was not free.

then it is possible to be

deserving in virtue of performing an action for which
one is not
responsible
It may be instructive to finish off this catalogue
of desert bases

by briefly mentioning some things that
desert.

I

do not take to be bases for

An obvious point is that since, on my view, desert bases are

properties, nothing that fails to be a property is a basis for desert.
So,

for example, events, times, places, people, souls, physical objects,

fairies, centers of gravity: none is a property, so none is a desert
base.

Even among properties, there are some that seem not to be bases

for desert.

These include gerrymandered, disjunctive properties, such

as being wooden or being the square root of 27.

Other properties that

seem not to be desert bases include some perfectly natural properties,
such as having a mass of five kilograms or being positively charged.

As

a general rule for deciding whether or not a property is a basis for

desert,

I

suggest the following:

If P is neither included in the above

catalog of desert bases, nor a determinate of at least one of those
bases, then P is not a desert base.^®
A final point.

In Chapter 6,

I

argued that consideration of

desert of wages suggests that a standard way of thinking about desert is

fundamentally flawed.

According to that way of thinking, for each form

of deservable treatment, there is a desert base or small set of desert

bases unique to it.

My view is different.
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According to it, any one (or

any specific instance) of the desert bases
catalogued above can

influence the extent to which a form of treatment
is deserved.

Theories and analyses
In the previous section,

I

made some use of the concepts of priraa

facie desert, all-in desert, and weight.
my theory of desert.

These concepts are crucial to

In the next section

and state my theory explicitly.

I

shall say more about them,

Much of what

say there depends on my

I

conception of the distinction between a philosophical theory and a

philosophical analysis.

Thus,

it may be helpful to explain my

conception of this distinction before

I

attempt to present my theory of

desert
One way to approach the distinction between analysis and theory is
by way of another: namely, the distinction between the "intension" of a

predicate and the "extension" of a predicate.

The intension of a

predicate can be usefully thought of as its meaning.

A traditional

assumption in the philosophy of language is that the meaning of a

predicate is the concept (or property) expressed by that predicate.
On this assumption, the meaning or intension of 'red*, for example,
in contemporary English,

the concept of redness.

is,

The extension of a

predicate is the set of things to which that predicate correctly
applies, or the set of things that instantiate the concept expressed by
that predicate.

So,

for example,

the extension of 'red’

all the things that are red.
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is the set of

This set or extension is different from
redness, or the intension
of

'red’.

This is because the set of red things could
have contained

members other than those it actually contains,
in which case it would
have been a different set, but without this
resulting in a change in the

concept of red.
The intension/extension distinction can now be
used to illuminate
the analysis/theory distinction.

It might be said that theories and

analyses aim at different "targets."

analysis aims at an intension.

A

A theory aims at an extension.

An

theory of redness, for example, is

supposed to "pick out" the extension of 'red’.
to pick out all and only things that are red.

analysis of redness is supposed to do.

That is, it is supposed
This is not what an

It aims to reveal the conceptual

structure of redness, or the intension of 'red’.

Likewise for theories

and analyses generally.

There is more that can be said to illuminate the distinction

between theories and analyses.

A theory of X will take the form of a

statement of conditions that are supposed to be necessary and sufficient
for a thing’s being X.^®
take.
F.

There are two forms such a statement might

One is an enumeration or list of all and only the things that are

(Such a theory may not be very illuminating.)

Another (and more

illuminating) sort of theory is a specification of some property had by
all and only those things that are F.

redness,

TRl

Thus, to return to the example of

instances of theories of redness include:

X is red if and only if x is this apple, this
book, this chair, this cherry, this car
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TR2

X is red if and only if x would,

under
appropriate conditions, emanate lightwaves of
within 4000-7000 angstrom units.

An analysis of F will take the form of an
"analytic definition" of
F.

This will be a statement containing the symbol
Mf.=’, which will be

flanked on the left by the "analysandum,

"

or the concept to be analyzed,

and on the right by the "analysand," or that in
terms of which the

concept IS analyzed.

So,

for example, an analysis of redness will look

something like this (with the blank appropriately filled):

ARl

X

is red =df.

.

It is important to recognize that some concepts may be

unanalyzable

,

or

primitive."

That is, there may be some concepts with

nothing in the way of an (informative) analysand.

This is what

Moore held about the concept of intrinsic goodness.

G.

E.

It is also what

Ross, as we shall see, held about the concept of prima facie rightness.

And it is what

I

shall hold about the concept of prima facie desert.

Prima facie desert, all-in desert, and weight
My view is that the concept of prima facie desert is primitive, or
not susceptible to any enlightening analysis.

nothing can be said about it.
what prima facie desert is not.

This does not mean that

At the very least,

I

can try to indicate

To say that S prima facie deserves x in

virtue of F is not to say that S merely appears to deserve x in virtue
of F.

Nor is it to say that S actually (or all-in) deserves x in virtue
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of F.
X.

Nor IS It to say that,

Rather,

it is to say,

in most cases,

those with F all-in deserve

roughly, that S has some property that is

relevant in a certain way to whether S all-in
deserves x.3°

previous section,
in that way.

I

discussed the properties that

That is,

I

I

take to be relevant

discussed the desert bases.

to illustrate, by appealing to cases,

In the

I

also attempted

that possession of these bases is

generally insufficient for all-in desert.
It is especially important to understand that

I

do not analyze the

notion of prima facie desert in terms of the desert bases.

To see why,

consider one such attempt:

D1

S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F =df
S has F, and (ii) either F is effort; an

(i)

achievement; some degree of moral worth;
personhood; need; some amount of past or future
receipt of something; suffering; or entitlement.

An obvious flaw with this putative analysis of prima facie desert
is that it makes each desert base a basis for prima facie deserving "x,"

which could be anything at all!

To see this, suppose that S is a

person.

S

thereby satisfies the right-hand side of the analysis.

whatever

x

is,

Then

S

S

prima facie deserves it.

So,

But suppose x is punishment.

prima facie deserves punishment in virtue of being a person!

Similar arguments would, if sound, demonstrate that athletic effort is a

basis for prima facie deserving an apology; that intellectual

achievement is a basis for prima facie deserving contempt; that

wickedness is a basis for prima facie deserving admiration; and so on.^^
Clearly, these arguments are not sound.
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So, D1

is unacceptable.

It might be thought that this flaw
can be avoided by more

carefully specifying the sort of treatment
deserved in virtue of

F,

thus:

prima facie deserves x in virtue of F =df (i)
and (ii) either F is effort and x is a
wage; or F is an achievement and x is
admiration; or F is a high (low) degree of moral
worth and x is a high (low) degree of happiness
(unhappiness); or F is personhood and x is
respect; or F is a need and x is that which S
needs; or F is an excessive (deficient) amount
of past or future receipt of something and x is
deficient (excessive) receipt of that thing; or
F suffering and x is a remedy; or F is an
entitlement and x is that to which S is
entitled.
S

S has F,

One problem with D2 is that it presupposes the standard view that

associated with each form of deservable treatment is a desert base or
small set of desert bases unique to it.
6,

this view is false.

As

I

tried to show in Chapter

Reflection on desert of wages suggests that

almost any desert base might influence the wage one deserves; mutatis

mutandis for grades, apologies, medical care, punishment, and the other
forms of deservable treatment.

Suppose it were thought that this latest defect could be avoided
by an even more careful specification

treatment deserved in virtue of
themselves.

D3

The analysis

I

F,

-

not only of the sort of

but also of the Fs or desert bases

have in mind would look something like this

S prima facie deserves x in virtue of F =df S
has F and (ii) either F is intellectual effort

and X is publication, fame, a professorial
chair, admiration, or satisfaction; or F is
athletic effort and x is victory, a prize, fame.
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admiration, a raise; or F is artistic effort
and
X is patronage, fame, admiration,
respect; or F
is

There would be no point in attempting to complete
this so-called

analysis of the concept of prima facie desert.
(as well as D1 and D2

The reason is that it

suffers from a fundamental flaw.

)

The flaw is

that It is not plausibly construed as an analysis
of prima facie desert
at all.

For if D3 were an analysis of prima facie desert,

express the weaning of

'S

prima facie deserves x in virtue of F’.

Surely, though, D3 does not express the meaning of that
did,

it would

terra.

For if it

then a person who denies, say, that intellectual effort is a
basis

for prima facie desert of admiration would be guilty of failing
to

understand the concept of desert.

This is because if D3 were an

analysis, then part of the meaning of *S prima facie deserves x in

virtue of

would be that S prima facie deserves admiration in virtue

F’

of intellectual effort.

However,

it is quite possible for someone to

understand the concept of desert, yet deny that intellectual effort is a
basis for prima facie desert of admiration.
make this impossible.
this point,

I

D3 would,

if an analysis,

A similar point holds for D1 and D2.

In light of

suggest that prima facie desert be taken as a conceptual

primitive.

Another concept
is that of

weight.

I

shall take as primitive in my theory of desert

Here is an example to illustrate the concept.

Suppose you are participating in a foot race.
during training and during the race.
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You exert much effort

These efforts are a basis for

prima facie desert of the prize.
the race.

Suppose, however, that you do not win

This is a basis for prima facie not deserving the
prize.

(You are not entitled to it.)

But if your efforts were especially

strenuous, and pursued with great dedication, and if you
lost the race
by only a narrow margin, this may outweigh the fact that
you failed to

break the tape.

If it does,

deserve the prize.

and other things are equal, then you all-in

That is, your effort, which is a basis for prima

facie deserving the prize, outweighs your failure to win, which is
a

basis for prima facie deserving to not get the prize.
A similar example suggests that the same desert bases have

different weights in different circumstances.
race.

Return to the case of the

Suppose your effort was not strenuous, and you lost by a

convincing margin.

Suppose also that other things are equal.

may be that you do not all-in deserve the prize.

Then it

If you do not,

then

your effort, which is a basis for prima facie deserving the prize, is in
this case outweighed by your failure to win, which is a basis for prima

facie deserving to not get the prize.

The notions of prima facie desert and weight can now be used in a

theory of all-in desert.
simpliciter.

All-in desert is actual desert, or desert

It is different from prima facie desert:

prima facie deserve something and not all-in deserve

it is possible to

it.

(However,

it

is impossible to all-in deserve it without prima facie deserving it.

What is all-in deserved in a given case is determined by what is prima
facie deserved in that case, in the following way:
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(D)

(D)

desert.

S all-in deserves x in some circumstance
if and
only if the bases for prima facie deserving
x
that S instantiates in that circumstance
outweigh the bases, taken together, for prima
facie not deserving x that S instantiates in
that circumstance.

expresses my theory of desert.

It is a theory of all-in

It depends crucially on two primitive concepts:

desert and weight.

I

prima facie

do not particularly like the fact that my theory

depends so crucially on these notions.

However,

am skeptical about

I

the possibility of a theory of desert that does not depend
on them.

My

reason for skepticism is the failure of previous attempts to
explain

desert in terms other than prima facie desert and weight.

I

explained

those failures in previous chapters.
One might conclude from those previous failures to explain desert
that desert is illusory, or utterly mysterious.

accept that desert

I

(along with other, philosophically problematic concepts such as truth,

beauty, goodness,
illusory.

life)

is a bit mysterious.

But

I

deny that it is

Such a denial would demand so radical a departure from our

ordinary understanding of the world that it could not be taken
altogether seriously.
desert.

Besides, there is an alternative to denying

It is to enumerate and describe the various bases for desert,

and to accept prima facie desert and weight as primitive concepts in a

theory of all-in desert.
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Rossianism
Anyone who has read

W.

D.

Ross’s The Right and the

Goocfi^

will

recognize the similarity between my theory of
desert and his theory of
moral rightness.

Because our theories are similar, a discussion
of his

may further clarify my own.

And because our theories are similar, they

are vulnerable to similar objections.

Thus,

I

shall offer a comparison

of my theory of desert to Ross’s theory of moral
rightness.

It is

important to remember that Ross’s theory is not about desert.
have said, about moral rightness.

It is,

I

It purports to state necessary and

sufficient conditions for the moral rightness of actions.

Note also

that there is more than one interpretation of Ross’s theory.

What

follows is my favored interpretation.^'*
A concept fundamental to Ross’s theory is prima facie duty^ or

prima facie rightness.

Ross does not offer an analysis of this notion,

taking it instead as primitive.^®

However, he does explain that an

action is a prima facie duty in virtue of being an action of a certain

morally significant" kind.

On Ross’s view, there are seven such kinds:

fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement,

and non-maleficence (21).^®

Ross discusses each of these kinds in some detail, but his

discussion is not relevant here.

The relevant points are, first, that

on Ross’s view an act of one or more of these kinds is a prima facie
duty.

Second, Ross’s list of "morally significant kinds" or "right-

making characteristics" has its analogue in my catalogue of desert
bases, or what might be called "desert-making characteristics."
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Ross explains that a prima facie duty is
not an act that merely

appears to be right.

Rather, an act’s prima facie rightness is
an

objective property of the action.

Furthermore, a prima facie duty is

not necessarily an actual duty:

as almost all moralists except Kant are agreed, and
as
most plain men think, it is sometimes right to tell a
lie or
to break a promise, it must be maintained that there
is a
^iffsi'^rice between prims fscie duty and actual or absolute
duty.
(Page 28.)
If,

That is, there are occasions where (for example) telling a lie
or

breaking a promise is morally right.

This does not change the fact that

even on those occasions, truth telling and promise keeping are prima

facie duties; mutatis mutandis for the other prima facie duties.

Ross uses this notion of prima facie rightness to state the
central idea behind his theory of moral rightness:

"Whether an act is a

duty proper or actual duty depends on all the morally significant kinds
it is an instance of"

(19-20).

In other words,

the actual moral

rightness of an act is in some way the result of all the prima facie
duties that it is.

Ross explains:

Every act... viewed in some aspects, will be prima facie
right, and viewed in others, prima facie wrong, and right
acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being
those which, of all those possible for the agent in the
circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie
rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie
right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those respects
in which they are prima facie wrong.
For the estimation
of the comparative stringency of these prima facie
obligations no general rules can, so far as I can see, be
laid down.
(Page 41.)
.
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.

.

As

I

read this passage, Ross is attempting to
explain moral

rightness in terms of prima facie rightness and
"stringency."
concept of prima facie rightness has already
been discussed.

stringency?

The

What of

Ross says that there are "no general rules" for
the

comparative stringency of prima facie duties.

This suggests that on

Ross’s view, some prima facie duties not only are more
stringent than
others, but also that their relative stringency varies
from circumstance
to circumstance.

for example,

So,

in one circumstance the prima facie

duty of non-maleficence may be more stringent than the prima
facie duty
of self-improvement;

in another circumstance,

the opposite may be true.

As for the notion of stringency itself, Ross is silent.

takes it as primitive.

I

suspect he

At any rate, Ross’s theory of moral rightness

seems to be this:

(R)

An act is an actual duty in some circumstance if
and only if it is a prima facie duty and no
other act that the agent could perform is, in
that circumstance, a more stringent prima facie
duty.

Now we are in a position to compare (R) and (D).

First, Ross’s

concept of prima facie rightness has its analogue in my notion of prima
facie desert.

Each is taken as conceptually primitive.

Each is

purportedly an objective property, not merely an appearance.

Second,

Ross’s concept of stringency has its analogue in my concept of weight.
Each is conceptually primitive.

And just as prima facie duties of

justice, benevolence (and so on) differ in stringency according to
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circumstance, so bases of prima facie desert
differ in weight according
to circumstance.

Third, Ross’s concept of actual duty has
its analogue

in my notion of all-in desert.

Just as an act’s actual rightness is

determined by a balance of prima facie duties
(and prima facie wrongs)
and their relative stringencies in that circumstance,
so a subject’s

all-in desert is determined by a balance of bases
for prima facie desert
(and prima facie undeservingness) and their relative
weights in that

circumstance.

Fourth, just as any combination of Ross’s "right-making

characteristics
act,

is supposed to be able to determine the rightness
of an

so any combination of my desert bases or "desert-making

characteristics

'

is supposed to be able to determine whether a form of

treatment is all-in deserved.

Objections and replies
Ross’s theory may be vulnerable to many objections, but there are
three in particular that seem the most serious.

My theory is vulnerable

to similar objections.

The first objection to Ross’s theory concerns his catalogue of

prima facie duties.
catalogue.
(23).

As

The objection,

in Ross’s words,

is that "this

..

is an unsystematic one resting on no logical principle"

I

understand it, the idea behind the objection is this.

Ross

never justifies his claim, for any putative prima facie duty, that it is
in fact a prima facie duty.

He is content to list them without

appealing to any principle (or principles) that might be used to justify
his catalogue rather than another.

This procedure is "unsystematic,"
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for it rests on no "logical principle."

The theory of desert defended

in this chapter is vulnerable to a similar
objection:

namely, that there

has been no attempt to justify the catalogue
of desert bases, no appeal
to any principle that might justify this catalogue
rather than another.

This is supposed to be a defect.

This is no defect in Ross s theory or mine if the
respective

catalogues (i) reflect the facts, and (ii) there is no further
principle
or principles that could be used to justify them.

As far as the facts

are concerned, Ross’s reply is that his catalogue of prima facie
duties

"makes no claim to being ultimate" (23).

The same goes for mine.

Perhaps there are more (or fewer) bases for prima facie desert than
catalogued.

I

I

concede that my list of desert bases may not reflect

perfectly the facts.

But the burden of showing that it is inaccurate

now falls on the objector.

Concerning further principles that could be used to justify the
catalogue of prima facie duties, Ross maintains that there are no such
principles.

Rather, the "general principles of duty... come to be self-

evident to us just as mathematical axioms do" (32).
view about my catalogue of desert bases.

I

hold a similar

It is that this catalogue of

desert bases cannot be justified by showing that it falls out of some
deeper,

further principle (or principles).

This view gains some

indirect support from Sher’s failure, chronicled in Chapter

justify the major desert-claims.

5,

to

Sher’s failure suggests that our true

beliefs about what is and what is not a basis for prima facie desert are

epistemologically basic.
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The second objection against Ross’s
theory is,
serious.

I

believe, more

It is that his theory of moral
rightness is vacuous.

Fred

Feldman puts this objection nicelyi

Many readers find Ross’s view to be empty,
trivial, or
unenlightening.
It seems to some of these people that
all
Ross has said is that an act is right if and
only if it has
at least as much rightness as any alternative.
Surely, if
this is all that Ross has said, then his view
is indeed
rather trivial.^’

As

I

stringency

understand it, the objection is this.

Ross’s notion of

is really just the notion of "more-ness," and
prima facie

rightness is really just the notion of rightness to some
degree.
this is correct, then Ross’s theory is indeed vacuous.

If

It would assert

that an act is right if and only if no alternative is more right
than it
is.

Someone seeking an understanding of the notion of rightness is no

wiser after hearing such a theory.
My theory of desert is vulnerable to a similar objection.

It is

that the notion of "weight" is really just the notion of "more-ness,"
and prima facie desert is really just the notion of desert to some
degree.

If that is correct,

It would assert,

in effect,

then my theory of desert is indeed vacuous.
that S deserves x in virtue of F if and only

if S is more deserving of x in virtue of F than not deserving of x in

virtue of anything else.

Someone seeking an understanding of the notion

of desert will be no wiser for hearing such a theory.

My reply to this objection is blunt:

The notion of weight is not

the notion of "more-ness," and the notion of prima facie desert is not
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the notion of desert to some degree.

Weight is a primitive concept,

distinct from the concepts of prima facie
desert and all-in desert.
is

It

introduced to account for the fact that
the relative importance of

desert bases toward determining a subject’s
desert fluctuates according
to circumstance.

Prima facie desert is also a primitive
concept.

It is

introduced to account for the fact that there
appears to be a range of

properties directly relevant to all-in desert, though
none seems
sufficient for all-in desert.
about these concepts.

I

I

concede that not much more can be said

suspect Ross would make similar claims, and a

similar concession, regarding the concepts of stringency
and prima facie
rightness.

This leads to the final and most serious objection
consider.

I

wish to

The objection is that if Ross’s notion of stringency is
left

undefined, then the theory becomes obscure; likewise if my notion
of

weight is left undefined.

This is a serious objection since these are

technical notions, introduced to perform certain theoretical roles.

They are not familiar, everyday notions.

If they were,

then taking them

as primitive would not necessarily render the theories obscure.
is,

As it

the notions have no natural place in our ordinary conceptual scheme.

Thus, the theories that use them are obscure.

the concepts they purport to illuminate.

They do not illuminate

Rather, they explain obscure

concepts (like "all-in desert") in terms of alien concepts (such as
"prima facie desert" and "weight").
I

have two modest replies to this objection.

One is that even if

the theory of desert defended in this chapter is somewhat obscure, it is
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not ob\iously false.

So,

at least it is an improvement over
theories of

desert considered in the previous chapters.

My second reply is that the

notions of prima facie desert and weight
may not be quite so obscure.
The concept of prima facie desert is brought
in to account for the fact,

illustrated several times in my catalogue of desert
bases, that

properties that are relevant to a subject’s desert
may not be sufficient
for (all-in) desert.

And as for the concept of weight, it is brought
in

to account for the fact that although desert
bases determine desert,

they do this in an unsystematic way: a basis central
to one’s desert in
one circumstance may play a quite minor role in determining
one’s desert
in another circumstance.

So,

as

I

see it, the concepts of prima facie

desert and weight are not total strangers to our conceptual
scheme.

Conclusion
In Chapter 1,

I

cited Barbara Goodwin’s remark that "...the

concept of desert itself is incoherent and, philosophically speaking,
unfounded.

I

hope that a central lesson of this chapter is that

Goodwin is wrong.

The concept of desert

desert expounded in this chapter

-

-

is not "incoherent."

defects, the theory

I

self-consistent.

confess that the theory

I

more precisely, the theory of

Whatever its

defend is at least intelligible and (apparently)
I

defend may be "unfounded"

insofar as it relies on apparently brute intuitions about what is and

what is not a basis for desert.

But if, as it seems, every

philosophical theory must at some point rely on brute intuitions,

then

reliance on such intuitions would condemn every philosophical theory.
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Anyway, the theory of desert

I

defend is not "unfounded" insofar as it

reflects and systematizes a central component of common
sense morality.
It is not,

in other words,

a flight of philosophical fancy.

Besides that, there are several areas of philosophical
interest
that are in desperate need of a defensible theory of
desert.
is desert of

One area

wages, and in particular the issue of comparable worth.

have discussed these in Chapter

6.

As a conclusion,

I

I

will briefly

consider three other areas of philosophical discussion that need a

defensible theory of desert.
Justice.

(1)

From time to time,

I

have mentioned the venerable

view that justice obtains to the extent that people (and other things)
get what they deserve.

Although few contemporary theorists of justice

accept this view, there are several who maintain that justice has at
least something to do with desert.

But even those who accept this

weaker version of the venerable view of justice require some theory of
desert.

If the arguments given in previous chapters are sound,

it would

be a mistake for anyone to rely on the most influential theories of

desert.

For if those arguments are sound, then those theories of desert

are false.

What is needed, then, is an alternative theory of desert.

This is precisely what
(2)

I

offer.

Utilitarianism.

According to a standard objection, classical

(hedonistic) utilitarianism ignores justice.

So,

for example, classical

utilitarianism seems to make it morally obligatory for the sheriff of a
small town to hang an innocent vagabond in order to placate an otherwise

riotous and destructive populace, even though the hanging would be
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grossly unjust. '‘o

Thus,

it is objected,

classical utilitarianism goes

wrong in this and similar cases.
Fred Feldman has recently argued that there is a
form of

utilitarianism that does not fall to this sort of

case.'*^

According to

this form of utilitarianism, the intrinsic value of an
episode of

pleasure or pain is a function not only of the intensity and
duration of
such an episode, but also the extent to which that episode
of pleasure
or pain is deserved.
(i)

The basic intuitions on which Feldman depends are

that the value of an episode of pleasure is augmented(mitigated)
to

the extent that it is deserved(undeserved)

;

and (ii) that the disvalue

of an episode of pain is mitigated( augmented) to the extent that it is

deserved(undeserved)
The details of this form of utilitarianism are not relevant here.
The important fact is that it is supposed to yield the correct answer in

cases like the one just described.

vagabond is innocent.

For part of that case is the

He does not deserve to be hanged.

This fact

allows Feldman to say that the disvalue of his being hanged is greatly

augmented by the fact that he does not deserve it; moreover, the value
of whatever pleasures that accrue to the bloodthirsty crowd as a result

of the hanging is significantly mitigated by the fact that they do not

deserve such pleasures.

The result is supposed to be that on this form

of utilitarianism, the act of hanging the innocent vagabond is, all

things considered, morally wrong; rautatis mutandis for similar cases.

Feldman’s ingenious response to the "objection from justice"
assumes that justice is the getting of what’s deserved.
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More

pertinently,

it relies heavily on the concept
of desert.

Thus,

the

acceptability of Feldman’s form of utilitarianism
depends heavily on the
theory of desert it presupposes.
I

I

have just offered one such theory.

believe (with Feldman) that it can be incorporated
into a broadly

utilitarian framework.

Doing this would make the case for Feldman’s

brand of utilitarianism more convincing.
(3)

Punishment.

In 1985,

Michael Davis noted that "...the

retributive theory of punishment has recently enjoyed a
startling
revival. "42
is
C.

According to a standard form of retributivism, punishment

morally justifiable" only insofar as the punishment is deserved.
L.

As

Ten explains in Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical

Introduction:

Contemporary retributivists treat the notion of desert as
central to the retributive theory, punishment being
justified in terms of the desert of the offender.

Despite the apparent centrality that retributivists assign to
desert, there has been (so far as

I

to construct a theory of desert.

Thus, retributivism is yet another

know) no attempt by retributivists

area in philosophy that needs what has been offered in this chapter.

Although contemporary retributivists have not offered a general
theory of desert, at least one has offered a formula for determining a

wrongdoer’s desert of punishment.

This is Nozick.

In Philosophical

Explanations, Nozick endorses a retributive theory of punishment.

His

formula for determining the wrongdoer’s desert of punishment is this:
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The punishment deserved depends on
the magnitude H of the
wrongness of the act, and the person’s
degree of
magnitude to

theirprodJctf

In other words,

r

the severity of punishment deserved
by the wrongdoer is

equal (on some appropriate scale) to the
product of the wrongness of the
act and the wrongdoer’s responsibility for
performing that act.
It is worth noting that if Nozick were
to adopt the theory of

desert defended in this chapter, then he would
be forced to abandon his
formula for determining a wrongdoer’s desert.

According to Nozick’s

formula, a wrongdoer’s desert is determined by
only two factors: the

wrongness of the act, and the agent’s degree of
responsibility for
performing

it.

But according to my general theory of desert, any form

of deservable treatment is deservable in virtue of
the agent’s

possession of any of the desert bases.

wrongdoer

s

So,

for example, a particular

desert of punishment might, on my theory of desert, depend

not only on the wrongness of his act and the degree of
responsibility he

bears for performing it, but also on other things: being a person,

having certain needs, and so on.
is correct,

Thus,

if my general theory of desert

then Nozick’s formula for determining a wrongdoer’s desert

of punishment is, at the very least, oversimple.

This suggests that

retributivists need a defensible general theory of desert not only for
adding substance to their theories, but also for avoiding what
be false claims about desert of punishment.
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Notes

1.

Here

2.

That said, there is at least one author who accepts
a variety of

I

am assume the falsity of certain religious
views.

3.
David Armstrong calls it the "Principle of Instantial
Invariance."
See his A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press, 1989), page 40.
4.
Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," in his Doing
and
Deserving (Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press), page 58.
:

5.
Writers on desert typically divide desert bases into two sorts:
properties and actions.
Feinberg, for instance, writes:
"If a person
is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily,
be so in
virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior activity" ("Justice
and
Personal Desert," page 58).
However, for simplicity’s sake I treat all
desert bases as properties, and include actions by taking having
performed such-and-such action as a property.
6.
This last fact points to an ambiguity in the term 'desert base’:
The term can express a quite general property, such as having exerted
effort, or a quite specific property, such as having labored for hours
in the garden under the broiling sun, or even some "moderately specific"
property.
However, I think this ambiguity is harmless.
7.

1987

George Sher, Desert (Princeton, NJ
page 53
)

:

Princeton University Press,

,

Wojceich Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due, (Dordrecht:
Publishing Company, 1985), page 116 (my emphasis).
8.

D.

Reidel

9.
It is important to note that these claims are consistent with a
point I tried to establish in Chapter 6.
The point was that contrary to
a standard view of desert, any form of deservable treatment is
deservable in virtue of any desert base. This point is consistent with
the claim, for example, that criminal effort deserves punishment.
For
this is not to say that punishment is deserved only for criminal effort.
It is to say that criminal effort is a basis - one of many - for
deserving punishment.

10.

My thanks to David Waller for drawing this point to my attention.
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11.

w.

12.
Press

D. Ross, The Right and the
Good (Oxford: Oxford University
1930), page 138.

13.
I
accept that the category of persons is
broader than the category
of human beings.

Philosophers differ in their accounts of need.
For interesting
discussions, see pages 126-143 of David Miller’s
Social Justice (OxfordClarendon Press, 1976); pages 158-183 of Wojceich
Sadurski’s Giving
esert its Due; and, for an especially dense
discussion, David Wiggins’s
Claims of Need,
in Ted Honderich, ed.
Morality and Objectivity: A
Mackie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1985), pages
149-202
,

14.

Feinberg,

Justice and Personal Desert," page 93.

15.
William Galston, Justice and the Human Good (Chicago,
University Press, 1980), page 174.

IL:

Chicago
^

16.
J. R. Lucas, for example, writes: "I do
not create my own needs;
they happen to me;" then he goes on to argue: "People
ought to be done
by according to how they deserve, and how they deserve
depends on how
they have done, which in turn presupposes responsibility
and freedom."
(On Justice [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], pages
183 and 197.)
The
implication is obvious: Need is not a basis for desert.

17.
Failure to consider suffering as a basis for desert is perhaps
the
only explanation for why philosophers have accepted such
implausible
views of the supposed connection between desert and responsibility.
See
Chapter 2, and Fred Feldman’s "Desert: Reconsideration of Some
Received
Wisdom," Mind 104 (January 1995), page 72.
18.

Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," page 86.

19.

George Sher, Desert, page 201.

20.

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 103.

21.

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, page 313.

22.
In addition to those philosophers, including Rawls, mentioned in
Chapter 3, there is also Thomas Scanlon, whose own views about the
"moral significance of choice" depend on an institutional conception of
desert:

In approaching the problems of justifying both penal and
economic institutions we begin with strong pretheoretical
intuitions about the significance of choice: voluntary and
intentional commission of a criminal act is a necessary
condition of just punishment, and voluntary economic
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contribution can make an economic reward
just and its denial
unjust.
One way to account for these intuitions
is by
appeal to a preinstitutional notion of
desert: certain acts
deserve punishment, certain contributions
merit rewards, and
institutions are just if they distribute benefits
and
burdens in accord with these forms of desert.
The strategy I am describing makes a point
of avoiding
any such appeal.
The only notions of desert which it
recognizes are internal to institutions and dependent
upon a
prior notion of justice: if institutions are just
then
people deserved the rewards and punishments which
those
institutions assign them.
("The Significance of Choice," in
Sterling L. McMurrin, ed.
The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values VIII [Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah
Press,
1988]
page 188
,

,

.

23.

I
do not pretend that this argument is conclusive,
especially
insofar as it relies on the view that justice is the
getting of what’s
deserved.
Venerable though this view may be, the most influential
contemporary theorists of justice reject (or ignore) it.
For an attempt
to diagnose the flight from desert by contemporary
theorists of justice
see Chapter 1.

24.
(P) is similar to, but importantly different from,
a principle
mentioned in Chapter 2.
According to that principle, if S deserves x in
virtue of F, then S is responsible for F. This principle is
clearly
false.
As I noted in Chapter 2, it is possible to be deserving in
virtue of a property, such as having suffered^ that one is not
responsible for possessing.
But (P) is more narrow.
It restricts the
supposed connection between desert and responsibility to actions.
It
states only that actions for which one is not responsible are never
bases for desert.
This is more plausible than the principle considered
in Chapter 2.

Actually, Susan Wolf attempts to describe such a case in Freedom
Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pages 79-85. One
of Wolf s major theses in this book is that although no on deserves
blame if determinism is true, it is possible to deserve praise even if
determinism is true.
The example she cites in support of this
"asymmetry thesis" is this:
25.

Two persons, of equal swimming ability, stand on equally
uncrowded beaches.
Each sees an unknown child struggling in
the water in the distance.
Each thinks "The child needs my
help" and directly swims out to save him.
In each case, we
assume that the agent reasons correctly - the child does
need her help - and that, in swimming out to save him, the
agent does the right thing.
We further assume that in one
of these cases, the agent has the ability to do otherwise,
and in the other case not.
(Pages 81-82.)
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Wolf s intuition is that each person
deserves praise, even though one of
them is not responsible for her actions.
Provided, of course that my catalogue of
desert bases is complete.
am not confident that it is.

26.

,

I

27.
I
use the word 'concept’ to denote any
property that can be
conceived.
Thus, as I understand them, concepts
are a species of
property.

accurate to say that a statement of necessary
and sufficient conditions for F is the
"central element" in a
philosophical theory of F, rather than the theory
itself.
29.
Like the
desert contained in this chapter, an entire
philosophical
^
biconditional.
Typically it contains
othe7th?nr''^^^^w'"°''®
things, such as analyses of various concepts;
certain accompanying
or auxiliary principles, axioms, and theorems;
commitment to a
particular ontology; and so on.
G.

Press,

E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge:
Cambridge Universitv
1903), pages 1-36.

30.
For convenience’s sake,
always located in the past.

I

speak here as though desert bases are

31.
My own view is that personhood can be relevant to one’s
desert of
punishment.
But it is relevant only insofar as it is a basis for prima
facie not deserving certain sorts of punishment (say, being drawn
and
quartered)

34.

32.

These problems cannot be avoided by revising the analysandum, thus:

35.
S

is deserving if and only if...,

thereby leaving out the problematic "x". The reason this fails is that
every case of desert is a case of deserving something.
33.
Page references to this book are henceforth contained in the body
of the text.

My interpretation is indebted to that found in Fred Feldman’s
Introductory Ethics (Englewood-Clif fs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), pages
149-159.
At least one reader of Ross would deny that Ross takes prima facie
rightness as primitive.
See Frank Snare, "The Definition of Prima Facie
Duties," The Philosophical Quarterly XXIV (1974), pages 235-244.
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36.

Note that Ross does not claim "completeness
or finality" for this
Feldman,

37.

Introductory Ethics, page 157.

Barbara Goodwin, Justice By Lottery (Chicago,
University Press, 1992), page 64.
38.

IL:

For references to these philosophers, see Chapter

39.

Chicago

1.

This case is found in Kai Neilsen, "Against Moral
Conservatism," in
Louis Pojman, ed.
Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989), pages
181-187.
40.

,

Fred Feldman, "Adjusting Utility for Justice," forthcoming
in
Philosophy and Phenomenlogical Research (September 1995).

41.

Michael Davis, "How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime," in J.
Pennock and J. W. Chapman, eds.
Criminal Justice: Nomos XXVII (New
York, NY: New York University Press, 1985), page 119.
42.

,

43.

1987

C.
)

,

L.

Ten,

Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

page 46.

44.
Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press, 1981), page 393.
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